Socialist Reading Series I: The State and Revolution [Part 5]

We’re almost through with this one! Here we go…

Chapter V: The Economic Basis of the Withering Away of the State

Lenin working hard at his West Wing fan fiction
  1. Presentation of the Question by Marx

Summary

Lenin begins my noting that Marx sometime speaks of the “future nature of the state of communist society” which has made some people think that, unlike Engels, he believes that there will be a future communist state. According to Lenin this isn’t the case and Marx and Engels have precisely the same view on how the state will wither away after the revolution. The only difference between the two authors is that Engels was interested in directly showing Bebel that he shouldn’t be concerned with the state at all and thus addressed the question regarding the state directly. Marx, on the other hand, was more interested in the question about how the future communist society would develop, and, as a result, only makes passing remarks on the withering away of the state.

Thus, Lenin turns to how Marx attempts to answer that question. There, we learn two things. First, we learn that the answer will be one that’s rooted in scientific facts and reasoning (and hence it will not be utopian). Since that’s the case, and since we can’t study future subjects scientifically, we can only make inferences on the basis of what we can study scientifically in the moment. More specifically, we know that it’s capitalism that gives birth to Communism, so we can infer some claims about what the future will be on the basis of what we know through our study of the present.

In turn, what we know currently is that what all modern-day capitalist states have in common is that they’re all based on modern bourgeois society. Since the future of communism depends on what things will be like once that society is dead, the question becomes one of “what transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In other words, what social functions will remain in existence that are analogous to present function of the state?” (Lenin quoting Marx, 102).

Crucially, for Lenin this signifies that Marx is committed to the necessity of a period of transition from capitalism (the bourgeois society) to communism (the post-bourgeois society). The importance of this claim is not specified here.

Analysis

If I haven’t made it clear before, I find Lenin to be a pretty irritating writer. This is one of the times in which I find it very difficult to work out what he’s trying to get at and how he thinks that what he’s written is making the point he wants to make.

Given how the section opens, Lenin’s overarching goal must be to demonstrate that Engels and Marx were in lock-step regarding the role of the state and that both of them believed in a the “withering” hypothesis. That much is clear. It’s also clear that Lenin thinks that Marx’s commitment to this hypothesis has to be read between the lines of what he says regarding the transition period between capitalism and communism. The answer will be an indirect one that will be provided on an examination of this question.

However, what we see is, as noted, a section about how this answer must be given scientifically (which is all well and good, but granting that doesn’t add to anything like an argument), and that the existence of a Communist future entails an end to the current bourgeois state. And neither one of these things is sufficient to show the overarching goal that Lenin sets up before.

The most reasonable suggestion seems to be that a recognition of the fact that Communism comes after the death of bourgeois society is tantamount to a recognition of a transition period. Why recognizing a transition period is improtant isn’t clera yet, but the point is at least sensible (though, it seems to me that it shouldn’t be overstated). If a caterpillar has transformed into a butterfly, then there must have been some transition period between caterpillarhood and butterflydom; i.e. the chrysalis stage. More generally, it seems true that for any x that becomes a y, there is some time during which x is becoming y that can count as its transition period. This holds even when we’re talking about crossing the border between two countries (the transition period there is just the time it takes for you to cross the particular checkpoint or imaginary border that separates the two countries) as well as transformations of society. If society x is to become society y, then there has to be some time z that counts as the transition period between x and y.

Perhaps in light of this Marx’s remarks are to be read as follows: don’t ask me about the future of Communism–I can’t tell you about that. The only thing that I can tell you is that between the present and that time there will be some transition time and given that this is the case, I can tell you some things about what that transition time will be like because I can at least work that out on what I know scientifically about the present state of affairs from which this transition period is to be born. And I answer that question scientifically by looking at what state functions are currently in place, and which ones will come to be unnecessary.

This, too, is fine, but, again, it remains puzzling why Lenin sees it as showing that Marx and Engels were in agreement about the withering away of the state.

Arguably, Lenin’s argument would be complete if he can show that Marx thought that transition period just would be what Engels describes as the withering away of the state. However, this hasn’t been shown yet! In other words, Lenin seems to have only set up the question by establishing that Marx makes room for a transition state. But noting that as a matter of conceptual necessity there will be some transition period tells us nothing about what that transition period will be like. Consequently, we can’t possibly think that Marx and Engels are in agreement just yet.

So, perhaps that piece of the argument is forthcoming…hopefully.

Apart from that, there’s something odd about the way Lenin describes Marx’s reasoning. Namely, it’s not at all clear to me that the way to figure out what the transition period will be like for a transition from x to y is a matter of figuring out what functions of x remain in existence. Consider the following (I hope) analogous example to the quote from Marx: it is clear that there is a difference between my being alive and my being dead and that, consequently, there must be some period between the two in which I go from being alive to being dead. Let’s call that period ‘dying’. Should we then say “The question then arises: what transformation will the body undergo in death? In other words, what bodily functions will remain in existence that there are analogous to present functions of the living body?” Is this how we learn about dying? Maybe, but it seems like a bizarre way of looking at the matter. The same can be applied for the transformation from caterpillar to butterfly–one doesn’t look at what functions of the caterpillar are preserved in the cocoon to understand the chrysalis!

I can make some sense of this by noting that one might reasonably make some inferences about what must be going on with the chrysalis if one knew what features the caterpillar has, what features the butterfly has, and then by inferring what it must take for that transformation to happen (thus, one might reason that the transition period is one in which wings are grown). So maybe this is what’s going on: we know that currently we have states based on bourgeois society and we know that in the future there will be no bourgeois society. Thus, we infer about what it would take for bourgeois society to be removed. But it’s still not at all clear to me that we learn about this by looking at what functions of the present state are retained and which ones are removed. Rather, what that approach does at best is give us some constraints about what kind of speculations we’ll allow (though these constraints will be loose! Perhaps the state becomes superpowered and then votes its way out of existence! Perhaps all people who know about the state are zoomed away by aliens! Perhaps there’s a withering away… and so on). In any case, I don’t feel I have a good grasp of things here and Lenin isn’t making it easier for me.


He really does look quite a lot like Leonardo di Caprio here

2. The Transition from Capitalism to Communism

Summary

The second begins with an important quote from Marx regarding this transition period:

Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin quoting Marx, The State and Revolution, 102

[Note: this quote is from Marx’s critique of the Gotha Program]

Lenin claims this remark is the conclusion of a scientific analysis based on observations applying to current society and that the claim itself is an acknowledgement that there must necessarily be a political transition period without which the achievement of Communism would be impossible. The purpose of the state during that period can only be that of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

The question, then, becomes what the relation of the proletariat in this dictatorship role is to democracy. The answer is laid out in the Communist Manifesto: “to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class…to win the battle of democracy.” (103) In practice, this means a decisive rejection of the kind of democracy-in-name-only that exists in capitalism. In order to win the battle of democracy, capitalist democracy must be rejected.

Crucially, for Lenin this doesn’t mean a kind of simple lifting of restrictions so that we get “greater and greater democracy”. Rather, it means precisely instituting the dictatorship of the proletariat. Why? Because–and here I quote in full:

the resistance of the capitalist exploiters cannot be broken by anyone else or in any other way. And the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors, cannot result merely in an expansion of democracy. Simultaneously with an immense expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the moneybags, the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must suppress them in order to free humanity from wage slavery, their resistance must be crushed by force; it is clear that where there is suppression, where there is violence, there is no freedom and no democracy.

Lenin, The State and Revolution, 105

In short, there can be no straightforward expansion of democracy because if the revolution is to be successful, there must be active restriction of democracy for some (the bourgeoisie) and an active expansion for others (the proletariat). And if there’s not a kind of uniform expansion then we really are talking about a kind of dictatorship in which some people gain some rights and others have theirs taken away.

This is what happens to democracy in the transition period. The ‘bad’ democracy of the few under capitalism will be smashed and a ‘new’ democracy of the people will be introduced.

When this transition period is complete and full Communism has arrived we get the wonderful picture of true, unrestrained democracy without exception. At that point the state will wither “owing to the simple fact that, freed from capitalist slavery, from the untold horrors, savagery, absurdities and infamies of capitalist exploitation, people will gradually become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of social intercourse…without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for compulsion which is called the state.” (106)

Before that can happen–indeed, so that that can happen–oppression of some groups (viz. the bourgeoisie) is still necessary. And hence, a state as a machine of oppression is necessary as well. But once the transition period in which this necessity remains is over–once all class differences have been destroyed–that necessity no longer holds, and the state disappears.

Interestingly, this machine, when taken in the hands of the majority will not be a complex one. Much complexity is needed to keep the majority suppressed by a minority, but very little is needed to keep a minority suppressed by the majority. In fact, it’s so simple that nothing more than a mass arming of the organized proletariat.

Lenin ends this section by noting that he’s not a utopian and he knows that the arrival of communism does not mean that there won’t be individual excesses or violations of social norms. In short, Communism won’t solve every conflict. But Lenin does think that the problems that remain will not be such as to require the complex specialization of a state.

Analysis

Lenin is moving too quickly at the beginning. He is using the quote from Marx to argue that achieving communism is impossible without a dictatorship of the proletariat, but nothing so strong as a necessity claim can be immediately read from that quote. How does he get to there? The answer seems to be that the necessity claim must rest in the correspondence between the social and political revolutions. Simply put, if the social revolution necessarily requires some transition period, and if that social transition period necessarily comes with an accompanying corresponding political transition period, then there’s a necessary political transition period as well.

I suspect that Lenin is also trading on the assumption that the corresponding transition periods must occur concurrently. That is, the correspondence that he’s speaking of isn’t one of correlation but of simultaneity (or something close to simultaneity): the social revolution occurs and its completion requires an accompanying political revolution with its own transition period.

But it’s not clear why this is the case. One could imagine a social transition period that comes about with a corresponding political transition period which follows it (or precedes it) rather than occurring concurrently with it. In such a scenario, the social revolution occurs first, and then the political one happens. But if such a temporal split can happen, then it seems possible for capitalist society to transition to a Communist society with a bourgeois state, and then institute a dictatorship of the proletariat with regards to the state during that transition period. This possibility is consistent with Marx’s quote (though I’m skeptical it’s what Marx meant), but it is clearly inconsistent with what Lenin is pushing at. For Lenin’s purposes, it seems that the two transition periods must occur at the same time such that the social revolution demands the institution of a political revolution of a certain kind.

The argument for this, as we see, has to do with the claims we’ve seen made earlier (and later in the section) about the function of the state. In short, if the function of the bourgeois state is to wage class warfare on the side of the bourgeoisie and if the social revolution cannot succeed so long as the state has this function, then the success of the social revolution itself requires a political revolution–i.e. a smashing of the state.

I also want to make note of Lenin’s remark at the end of the long quote above. Crucially, part of why there can’t just be an unqualified expansion of democracy is because there are a certain group of people (the capitalists) who must be suppressed in this transition period. And if there’s a suppression of that group, then there is no democracy for that group. But it is precisely that group that was holding the reigns of the existing democratic process. In other words, there can’t be a pure expansion of democracy because it’s necessary that we actually restrict the democracy of those who were in charge; we’re not merely granting the privileges that they had to others, but are actively stripping those privileges from some and giving them to the poor. That, of course, is a dictatorship and that is precisely the change that democracy undergoes in the transition period.

I made a big deal of stressing both of these points here because they both lead us back to the familiar fact that so much of Lenin’s arguments ultimately boil down to certain commitments about the nature of the state. Why is a dictatorship of the proletariat necessary? Because without it the state remains a tool of oppression. Why must the dictatorship of the proletariat occur concurrently with (rather than following) the social revolution? Because without it the state as a tool of oppression will roll back on the social revolution. Seemingly every road points back to a fundamental commitment to the state as a monolithic entity with a singular purpose: to oppress the working classes for the benefit of the bourgeoisie. This is something tantamount to conceptual bedrock for Lenin and most of his arguments succeed or fail depending on whether or not the claim is true.

Third, the end of the section gives us yet another insight into Lenin’s view of psychology, sociology, and history. Unsurprisingly, his remarks seem to suggest that he thinks the complexities of modernity are primarily due to class antagonisms. The picture he paints is of people who naturally know how to get along and who can live together simply on the basis of simple, clearly observable and clearly learn-able standards. Conflicts arise even under these conditions, but there’s a kind of simplicity to life in those settings that renders those conflicts easy to handle. It is only with the introduction of classes, oppression, and the specialized systems and tools necessary to oppress that social life becomes so difficult. Lenin seems to be completely convinced that should these complicating factors be removed, the simplicity of life will return. And here we might be skeptical…(aside: Nietzsche thought that the introduction of Christian introspection made life both more interesting and also ruined a lot of really good stuff, but he was under no illusion that getting rid of Christianity would get rid of our new skill of introspection. That bell can’t be un-rung. As a result, he thought we needed a radical, bold, creative new value system and not a return to the Greeks. There’s no retreat to the past here–not so, it appears, for Lenin…)

Finally, it’s worth noting that there’s still a hole left in the argument. Recall, we were anticipating that the transition period that Marx is concerned with will be precisely the transition period that Engels refers to with respect to the withering of the state. However, we now find out that the withering of the state only occurs after the transition period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. So, it’s still not clear that Marx and Engels are precisely in agreement. That being said, this might seem to be a minor point if we grant that they both eventually come to think that there’s going to be some period in time during which the withering of the state occurs. I’m not sure where I land on that primarily because Lenin is really sparing with quotes from Marx about the state withering away (he returns to Engels at this point) and the quote he starts the section with only talks about the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat–that dictatorship may be necessary even if the state doesn’t wither away!


“What am I even doing here? I could be at home playing Call of Duty…”

3. The First Phase of Communist Society

Summary

Because the initial Communist society will be one that has grown out of capitalism it will initially be marked in its first stage by the characteristics of the society that produced it. It will, as Marx puts it, bear the birthmarks of capitalism. This is the first, lower stage of communism.

During this stage the means of production will not be in the hands of individuals as private property but will instead be owned collectively by society. The remuneration for each worker will be allotted by a kind of public certificate of work that specifies how much socially-necessary labor an individual has performed. In turn, these certificates can be exchanged for an appropriate quantity of goods from a public store of goods with some amount of labor subtracted for the maintenance of social services and the means of production.

(What Lenin is describing here is virtually like the kind of paper money we use every day with the exception that its value is fixed by labor value rather than by demand of treasury notes, foreign exchange reserves, or exchange rates. I leave it to the economists to figure out if this is at all possible)

Such a society might look like an equitable one (after all, everyone will be given an amount of ‘money’ equal to the amount of labor they put in), but Lenin and Marx disagree for the simple reason that an equal share of a good for people in unequal circumstances doesn’t make for equity. Different people have different needs and different abilities–if I have kids and put in as much work as you who don’t have kids and we both get the same share for the same amount of work, then you in fact get more than I.

This first stage of Communism will still preserve the unjust differences in wealth and, in that respect, will still carry with it the marks of injustice it inherits from its capitalist parent. However, what will be different is that exploitation by individuals will be impossible “because it will be impossible to seize the means of production, the factories, machines, land, etc. as private property.” (111). Full justice will not yet be in place, but the injustice of exploitation will have been eliminated even at this early stage.

Thus, Marx is under no impression that the mere fact that the means of production are in the hands of the proletariat will somehow change all the ways in which people are unequal. Even more importantly, it will not remove “the defects of distribution and the inequality of ‘bourgeois right’ which continues to prevail as long as products are divided ‘according to the amount of labor performed.'” (112)

In other words, the most important thing that happens during this stage is that the products of social labor are not allotted to private individuals (as is the rule under capitalism) but to society as a whole. That part of the ‘bourgeois right’ disappears. However, “it continues to exist in the capacity of regulator (determining factor) in the distribution of products and the allotment of labor among the members of society.” (112)

Notably, for Marx and Lenin this is a defect–things should not be like this–but it’s entirely utopian to think that people can go from having a standard of allotment to absolutely no such standard overnight. Living in this latter way must be learned and the means to do so must be created by the people who have already overthrown the capitalist system. Until that happens, the only standard remains that of the bourgeois.

Crucially, during this stage there is still a partial need for a state. Its role here is to both safeguard the public ownership of the means of production (i.e. make sure that no capitalist sneaks back in!) and to make sure that there’s the kind of equality in labor and distribution talked about here (the imperfect kind). However, insofar as there are no classes in this society, the state will no longer have the function of suppressing any classes, and, consequently, that function will no longer be in play.

Analysis

I rather like this section quite a bit precisely because it refuses to be utopian. Lenin makes it explicit that the expropriation of the means of production is not a panacea for all of society’s ills and that nobody should expect that. Indeed, Lenin’s claims might strike the reader as too modest since the only thing that the seizing of the means of production does is to eliminate the injustice of the exploitation of labor while still preserving some of the other injustices in place.

Of course, in the Marxian framework, it’s just not true that this is modest since it’s precisely class differences and exploitation that cause the intractable social problems throughout history. So, the elimination of the exploitation of labor would do quite a lot!

However, one might still wonder if it would be enough. Consider, for example, that according to Lenin one of the reasons the Communards instituted equal remuneration for all state functionaries was to curb the prestige of such jobs and the ability to leverage that prestige into special privileges that divide society. Now, as long as all such privileges are indeed garnered through one’s salary, then making everyone’s wages equal will, indeed, curb them. However, as Lenin himself says, this isn’t the case and individual differences between different people can have significant downstream effects. If the equal salary that I get for the same amount of work that you get goes only towards supporting me while yours goes towards supporting you and your children, then my salary has more purchasing power since my expenses are less than yours. Consequently, given our initial assumption about how privilege is obtained, the problematic social divisions will continue.

Now, as stated, Lenin acknowledges that this will exist in general, so he’s not ignorant of the phenomenon. This is just part of how the revolution plays out. Nevertheless, he faces a problem insofar as that phenomenon can also appear within the (smashed) state. If it appears there–if the social privileges are either preserved or begin to accumulate within the state, then we’re in trouble. And, as I’ve brought this up before, this is precisely how Stalin worked his way into power by granting special powers and privileges to the bureaucracy.

The problem becomes even bigger if this initial transition period is an indefinite one (as Lenin indeed acknowledges it must be–see the next section). What we have in that situation is…well, an indefinite dictatorship of state functionaries…

Sometimes history makes me sad.


SPOILERS!

4. The Higher Phase of Communist Society

Summary

The higher phase of Communism is marked in the first place by the disappearance of the distinction between mental and physical labor. When that distinction disappears so does the accompanying source of social inequality that treats intellectual labor as more prestigious than physical labor. This distinction, notes Lenin, cannot be removed by mere expropriation of the means of production.

Rather, that expropriation will allow the productive forces to be fully unleashed. Under capitalism these forces are constrained since, presumably, they are not put forward to producing those goods that are socially necessary, but are put forward to producing those goods that are profitable. If this constraint is not in place, then the productive forces of humanity will come to open up all sorts of new possibilities. Crucially, however, the details of just how everything is to come into place are not something that we can know a priori.

But how rapidly this development will proceed, how soon it will reach the point of breaking away from the division of labor, of doing away with the antithesis between mental and physical labor, of transforming labor into “the prime necessity of life”–we do not and cannot know.

Lenin, The State and Revolution, pg. 114

The only thing we know is that the state will fully wither away only when people can truly live according to the old maxim “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” and only when “their labor becomes so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their ability.” (115) At that point it won’t be necessary to keep close accounting track of just how much someone has worked more than someone else since everyone will be able to receive everything that they need.

The bourgeois have called this view of the future utopian and have argued that because one can’t give an explanation of how this latter stage will be put into practice, there should be no move away from capitalism into the first stage of Communism. But this is, according to Lenin, is just ignorance since no socialist has ever “promised” that this latter stage of Communism would arrive with them. And those who have spoken of it were not basing their foresight on the basis of the current conditions and on the current population but simply laying out the black-boxed future conditions that will develop under the first stage of Communism. Thus the charge that the Bolsheviks political plan is useless because they can’t introduce the fully developed communist future into the present is thus not a fair one–it’s simply not the kind of thing that can be introduced at all given the current material conditions!

Thus, we can (scientifically) distinguish between socialism on the one hand–that first stage of communism–from Communism proper (the later stage). On the basis of this distinction we can also say that under socialism there will still be a need for a kind of state since during this stage, as discussed, the ‘bourgeois right’ of the distribution of goods on the basis of labor still remains and the state is still needed to enforce and administer those goods. This, again, is because Socialism grows out of and is marked by the capitalist womb from which it emerges.

The question then becomes what happens to the state during this first stage. Democracy remains and so does a smashed state machinery, now transformed and made more democratic in the hands of the armed masses of the workers. In that stage every person engages in the management and administration of the state and every person can do this (as we have seen before) because capitalism itself has made administration of all bureaucratic functions incredibly easy.

What was said in section three is restated: the goal of this still-functioning armed worker’s state is control of the distribution of goods and the accounting of labor that makes that control equal. Here, Lenin gives us a more detailed picture of what that would look like:

Accounting and control–that is the main thing required for “arranging” the smooth working, the correct functioning of the first phase of communist society. All citizens are transformed here into hired employees of the state, which consists of the armed workers. All citizens become employees and workers of a single nationwide state “syndicate.” All that is required is that they should work equally, do their proper share of work, and get equally paid. The accounting and control necessary for this have been simplified by capitalism to the extreme and reduced to the extraordinarily simple operations — which any literate person can perform — of supervising and recording, knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic, and issuing appropriate receipts.

Lenin, The State and Revolution, 120-121

The practical goal here is to see that “the whole of society will have become a single office and a single factory, with equality of labor and equality of pay.” (121) Once this has been achieved and there’s been sufficient control to make sure that the gentry and the capitalists can’t sneak back in and ruin things, the need for government will disappear. And once that happens, once everyone has internalized the management of the state and has gotten used to living a certain way, the door will be open to the higher stage of communism.

Analysis

Most of what Lenin says here is repetition of what has been said before. Lenin doesn’t really talk about the higher stage of communism as much as he does about the first stage (i.e. Socialism) and we’ve already gotten a taste of what that’s supposed to be like from the third section. Likewise, we’ve already been tracking the fact that Lenin has some interesting presuppositions about epistemology and human psychology with respect to how the socialist future is supposed to come about. I won’t talk about them here again.

What I do want to note, however, are two other things that struck me as interesting. In the first place is an interesting parallel between the way Lenin sees the development of communism and what David Hume says about justice. Paraphrasing Hume, there would be no need for any convention of justice in a world in which there is no scarcity for necessary material goods or in which there’s an unlimited benevolence from individuals. In either a world of plenty or a world of infinite benevolence, we have no need for justice since its conventions are appealed to only to settle questions of private property and the fruits thereof. If there were enough of everything to go around for everyone, then it wouldn’t matter if you got this particular bushel of corn, or that coat instead of me–I would just get some different corn and a different coat from the pile of plenty. Likewise, even if there were scarcity, but every individual were infinitely benevolent and wasn’t thinking about how to maintain one’s welfare for the future, then we could figure out how to ration the scarce goods among us so that nobody starves or goes without clothing.

Many casual (vulgar even!) critics of communism accuse it of being too idealistic because they assume it needs something like the latter view of infinite benevolence. That is, they assume that communism requires that people be more concerned about the welfare of others than their own–that, in short, they become much, much more benevolent than they really are. But it’s clear from what is said here that, if anything, Lenin is much more committed to the former proposition and that, in fact, he thinks that (if not in the present, then in the near future) the productive technological advances employed by capitalism will indeed provide us with a world in which there is no scarcity. This is the world under high communism in which everyone can give and take whatever they need to the extent that they’re capable and this is the final version that Communists are striving for.

I suspect most people are inclined to think that this, too, is a kind of utopian fantasy, but it seems to me that there’s something to be said in its favor when we start to consider that modern farming practices are advanced enough to feed the whole world. One also can’t help but wonder how many resources are spent on different kinds of fighter planes and military adventures that could have been put forward towards other social needs. I don’t know where I stand on this. It’s incredibly easy to find examples of capitalist excesses, but it’s not like central planning was proven to be the most efficient system of distributing goods…

The second interesting thing has to do with Lenin’s reluctance to commit to any specifics about the distant future of communism. On the one hand, I think this is a good thing. One of the things that I find to be of most value in Lenin’s thought is the stress that there are, indeed, very large unknowns looming in the future, that these unknowns cannot be established a priori, and that, at best, settling them is nothing more than pure speculation. On the other hand, I find it somewhat frustrating since the theory of history that Lenin is constantly pushing is one that seems to claim very strongly that the future can be read by understanding how history unfolds. So much of the pamphlet is focused on stressing the importance of a proper “scientific” analysis of history that when we get to this point the fact that nothing can really substantive can be said past a general view of what Socialism will be like seems a bit ad hoc.

I think regardless of where we settle on this, there’s still something interesting in the offing. Suppose for a moment that Lenin is right and that we can’t know anything about what the future of Communism is like and that the best we can do is give a sketch of the first stage of Socialism. What follows from that? The important thing here to note, I think, is that in that case we would still have to make a judgment about how we should live: should we remain in a system that we know but which we recognize as exploitative and which feeds on the misery of the workers and the blood of imperial subjects? Or should we fight for a different system that we have to build ourselves?

This, I think, is what Lenin is frustrated with when he says that “the mercenary defense of capitalism by the bourgeois ideologists (and their hangers-on, like Messrs. the Tseretelis, Chernovs, and Co.) consists precisely in that they substitute controversies and discussion about the distant future for the vital and burning question of present-day politics, viz., the expropriation of the capitalists…” (116). In short, he’s frustrated that the unknown nature of the future of Communism is used as grounds to preserve the current order. The “bourgeois ideologists” imply that if the opposition can’t produce a clear, controversy-free vision of the ultimate goal, then the current order should be preserved. Which is tantamount to endorsing a conservative line. And of those who say they don’t want to preserve the current order–if they do indeed believe in Marxism and the tenets of Marxism–then the specifics of what the Communist future holds should have no bearing on whether or not action is needed now.

It’s important to note that this argument does not generalize. Given certain situations it’s absolutely vital that you know what the end result is like and how you plan to get there before you sign on to a particular course of action. It’s not enough for me to say “listen, if you give me all your life savings now I’ll make sure good things happen for you–I can’t explain how cause a lot of it’s gonna depend on what I come to figure out once I get your money, but you should trust me on this.” If I’m going to convince you to get on board I better have something more to say.

The cases for which the argument does work is precisely those cases in which you’re already in a terrible situation with a clear cause and for which the alternative proposed involves some risk. If you’re trapped in a burning building you shouldn’t refuse to leave because the firefighter who’s come to rescue you can’t explain how you’re going to recoup your loses after the fire. Nor should you try to work with the fire to preserve your most cherished possessions. Rather, you should just leave the damn house and figure out the other stuff as it comes up! Arguably, this is precisely the kind of situation that Lenin believed the Socialists of his time were in: they knew the house was set on fire by the bourgeois state, yet, here is comrade such and such who’s trying to talk with the arsonists and work with them to save the house.

The problem, of course, is that it’s not equally obvious to everyone that the house really is on fire. Political and social dangers are never that universally and unambiguously obvious. We might see them as they apply to others, but we rarely see their connection to us. As long as we fail to do that it’ll only be rational to think that things aren’t as bad as they could be, that there’s still more time and fix them and to work within what’s already known rather than venture out into the uncertain.

In order to recognize such dangers one has to learn (or re-learn) how to interpret one’s situation; you have to learn to recognize what’s killing you as something that’s killing you. And that’s not an easy thing to do when, let’s face it, life goes on quite comfortably from day to day. Of course, ideology plays a big role here since, to a large extent, it forms the interpretive framework through which we make sense of such events as dangerous or not. How could an economic system be causing climate change? Sure, California’s on fire, the Caribbean is constantly hit by the biggest storms we’ve ever seen, and every month is the hottest month on record, but what’s that got to do with me and what’s that got to do with capitalism? Maybe California’s house is on fire, but mine isn’t! I’m happy to help out and make some reforms to help out (I’m not a monster, after all), but let’s not go overboard here…

Of course, all of that is ideology–you live in the same house. The clear answer to this challenge is the fostering and raising of class consciousness, but that’s a topic for another post.

All this is to say that I think that there’s something of value in the urgency with which Lenin addresses the issue that faced him and that on his assumptions, the radical stance he takes is a perfectly rational choice (perhaps the only rational choice). Whether he was right then (as well as now) will depend, once again, on whether those assumptions are true. And that, in turn, will depend on whether class antagonism is indeed the driving force of history, whether the primary function of the state is suppression of classes, whether capitalism can produce enough goods to provide for everyone’s needs, and so on and so on…

Socialist Reading Series I: The State and Revolution [Part 4]

Strap yourselves in, cause this is a long one!

Papa Engels

Chapter IV: Continuation. Supplementary Explanations by Engels

As the title states, this chapter is about the elucidation of Marx’s thoughts by Engels.

  1. The Housing Question
How Bulgaria solved its housing question–chaboi grew up in that bricked up second floor apartment on the left

Summary

Engels’ suggestion of how people are to be housed after the revolution is fairly straightforward. First, he stresses that there is no real “shortage” of housing and that there is, in fact, plenty of housing available for anyone who needs it if only the space is used rationally. That is, if some people didn’t own more housing than they needed and if that housing was made available to those who need it there would be no housing problem. The means by which this rational allocation is to take place are the same as before the revolution: expropriation and billeting. In other words, just as the state can now expropriate private property from certain owners and use it to quarter people (soldiers) therein, so the proletarian state, too, will expropriate living space from owners and billet the homeless and the workers who need a place to live. This cannot be done by the existing state, but must be taken upon by the entire working people.

Crucially, this method of expropriation differ from the Proudhonist/anarchist kind “redemption” insofar as in the latter case the individual who is given some property “becomes the owner of the dwelling, the peasant farm, the instruments of labor” (Lenin quoting Engels pg. 69). By contrast, under Marxist expropriation the collective proletariat who takes control of housing, land, or the means of production retains proprietorship of what it has taken control. Thus, a family might live in an expropriated apartment, but it does not own the apartment by virtue of occupying it–the apartment remains, ultimately, as a property of the people. In other words, the occupants of state provided housing act as renters of a space and the state (i.e. the proletariat mass that has taken control) acts as landlord.

Interestingly, Engels acknowledges this:

Under [Marxist expropriation] the ‘working people’ remain the collective owners of the houses, factories and instruments of labour, and will hardly permit their use, at least during a transitional period, by individuals or associations without compensation for the cost. Just as the abolition of property in land is not the abolition of ground rent by its transfer, although in a modified form, to society. The actual seizure of all the instruments of labour by the working people, therefore, does not at all exclude the retention of the rent relation.

Lenin quoting Engels, The State and Revolution pg. 69

Lenin doesn’t seem to be bothered by the fact that this plan is tantamount to the state becoming a landlord to the dispossessed and requiring rent from them. However, he does use it to highlight the fact that in order to provide housing to individuals there must be some standard of allotment and that “all this calls for a certain form of state, but it does not at all call for a special military and bureaucratic apparatus, with officials occupying especially privileged positions. The transition to a state of affairs when it will be possible to supply dwelling rent-free is connected with the complete ‘withering away’ of the state.” (pg. 69-70)

Furthermore, one of the main lessons that Lenin draws here is that, once again, neither Marx nor Lenin were anarchists. They do not advocate for the immediate abolition of the state overnight, but, as we’ve seen before, for a preservation of a smashed state under the dictatorship of the proletariat which then withers away.

Analysis

Lenin’s point here is to show that Marx and Engels were always stressing a particular vision of what was to happen to the state with relation to the revolution. This, we have seen, is that the state will be smashed, its function taken over by the people for their purposes and society re-organized along communal lines, until such a time that all its functions can be taken over and performed by ordinary workers (i.e. until the state withers away).

Crucially, he’s more at odds to show that this is not an anarchist proposal than the specifics being proposed by Engels at this point are practical or feasible.

To that end, his argument here is, at the very least, one that I’m able to make sense of given the previous three chapters. Whether he has the correct reading of Marx and Engels, is, perpetually, a question on which I just have to punt.

Still, I do find it strange that Lenin (and to the extent that he’s right, Marx and Engels, too) thinks the reproduction of the renter/landlord relation at the state level–however temporarily!–as a virtue. One would have thought that if a person were homeless it’s partially by virtue of the fact that they can’t afford to pay for rent. To whom they pay that rent is, I imagine, irrelevant. So, I find it difficult to see why the fact that an apartment is now owned by the worker state rather than the landlord will solve the housing problem as long as both the state and the landlord demand rent that the homeless cannot afford. Rather than solving the problem, it merely relocates it somewhere else.

I suppose the obvious answer is that under worker control the rent will not be driven by supply and demand of housing, but will be fixed by the state such that those who need housing will always be able to afford it (until, of course, all housing becomes free after the state withers away). In that respect, perhaps what’s being proposed is something like a temporary sliding scale of rent: everyone gets housing, but those who can’t afford to pay rent (or those who can only afford to pay a little) don’t have to, while others who can will continue paying rent until the state withers away. This seems like a plausible interpretation and seems go along fairly well with the whole “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” motto.

I suspect the full answer to this question is to be found in Engels’ own writing rather than its summary by Lenin, but, as I stated in the first entry to this series, I’m only staying within the particular text.


2. Controversy with the Anarchists

Proudhon

Summary

Here, Lenin brings up a series of articles published by Marx and Engels against the Proudhonists. The controversy in question is precisely about the the Marxist position regarding the abolition of the state as set against the anarchist position.

Simply put, both Marx and Engels stress that they, like all socialists of the time (which included the anarchists), believed that the state would eventually disappear once classes disappeared. What they disagreed with the anarchists on, claims Lenin, is about the use of the state by the proletariat until that time, and, hence, the use of violence by the proletariat. “[Marx] opposed the proposition that the workers should renounce the use of arms, of organized violence, that is, the state, which is to serve to ‘crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie.'” (Lenin, pg. 71).

This, then, is a question of means to a shared end. The anarchists and the Marxists both agree on the end, but whereas the former, claims Lenin, want to overthrow the state and then lay down their arms, the latter want to maintain the violent means of the state to repress their opponents until the state can, eventually wither away.

The same point is expounded on by Engels. He does this in the first place by ridiculing the notion that a society can do away with authority or structure all together in all domains of life.

Take a factory, a railway, a ship on the high seas, said Engels–is it not clear that not one of these complex technical establishments, based on the employment of machinery and the planned cooperation of many people, could function without a certain amount of subordination and, consequently, without a certain amount of authority or power?

Lenin, The State and Revolution, 72-73

In short, the doing away of all authority and all subordination is a pipe dream according to Engels and Lenin. The real question, then, is how the use of authority is going to be used with regards to the state. Here we get a fairly interesting quote from Engels:

The anti-authoritarians demand that the political state be abolished at one stroke, even before the social conditions that gave birth to it have been destroyed. They demand that the first act of the social revolution shall be the abolition of authority.

Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon — authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough? Therefore, either one of two things: either the anti-authoritarians don’t know what they are talking about, in which case they are creating nothing but confusion; or they do know, and in that case they are betraying the movement of the proletariat. In either case they serve the reaction.

Lenin quoting Engels, The State and Revolution, pg 73-74

In short, Engels claims that there can be no revolution without the use of force and authority by those who have won the revolution, and that to argue that such authority and force should be given up immediately after the successful revolt is tantamount to leaving the revolution open to its enemies.

As Lenin puts it in light of this, the anarchists’ argument is decisively non-revolutionary. It’s not that, as the Social Democrats say, this is a matter of one side recognizing the state and the other not. Rather, it’s a matter of real, practical questions of how the revolution is to be done and what the revolutionaries should do with the state. Furthermore, in answering that question, Engels looks back to the last proletarian revolution–that of the Paris Commune–and not to some utopian ideal of how revolutions are played out in order to make his argument that state authority is the order of the day. In other words, what’s learned form the Commune is the mistake of not using enough violence, and that a repudiation of authority at that stage of social development (though not permanently!) can only lead to ruin.

Analysis

On the whole, I find this section quite interesting, though not much new information is to be gleaned from it that we haven’t gleaned form previous sections. Nevertheless, the quote from Engels is pretty interesting when it comes to offering a very succinct explanation about the different positions taken by anarchists and Marxists: they have a shared end, but differ significantly on the means by which they achieve it. They also differ greatly on the source of the problem with respect to which they adopt the same end–roughly, the Marxists see class society as the problem and the anarchists see authority as the problem (and before one is tempted to think that the shared similarities are enough to make the two positions ultimately the same, take a look at this previous post).

That quote from Engels also puts some pressure on some of Lenin’s earlier commitments, or, at the very least, on what I ascribed to him as a commitment. Namely, it might seem that Engels believes that the complex nature of certain modern work necessarily requires a subordination to authority in order to be done. If a ship or a factory is to run at all, then some people must be subordinated to others. This, in turn, might seem to suggest that there are some jobs that are just too complex to be done by just anyone and that they must be done by certain people to whom others are subordinated. If so, then we might suspect that some of the bureaucratic tasks of the state are complex in just that way, requiring the subordination of certain masses to that of a ruling minority. Certainly, the running of the state is at least as complex as the running of a factory and the worry is that the prestige that accumulates as a result of belonging to a ruling group will be enough to create a split in the population and reproduce something like a class structure.

Here, it’s important to note that there’s a through line through this tension (whether that’s successful is a different question). Specifically, it’s important to note that what Engels seems to be concerned with is not a division of labor based on a difference in knowledge or skill needed of a job. It is perfectly possible that anyone can do any job on a ship or in a factory, but that nothing can get done unless there’s some kind of subordination by some people to others. Thus, Engels seems to be primarily concerned with the need for authority to resolve certain collective action problems which will arise regardless of how competent the people involved in the enterprise are. What Engels is objecting to in speaking against the anarchists, then, is that they think they seem to be committed to a world in which there are no collective action problems. To the extent that they are committed to such a world (unlikely), the criticism is a valid one.

Still, one might still press the line I was pressing and ask why the necessity of authority as a way of resolving these problems within the state won’t simply reproduce the same problematic conditions. Recall, further, that for Lenin, the dissolution of the state is primarily the result of the fact that the functions of the state will be able to be done by anyone. Does he in fact also think that there will be no collective action problems as a result?

Honestly, it’s not clear. However, there’s a different line of reasoning that might work. Namely, it’s important to remember that what matters for Lenin is less the existence of certain authoritative structure and more of whose interests the authoritative structures serve. One of the problems with the existing state structure is that the interests it serves are the capitalist minority. They come to do this because those who own the means of production buy them and influence them to serve their interests. This is not a problem, presumably, if the authoritarian structure comes to serve the interests of the people. As long as that’s the case, its authoritative status is not a problem. Indeed, this is part and parcel with what he believes the state must come to be during and following the revolution.

So, the real question is not about whether or not there will be the use of authority of the proletarian state–we already know that there will be. Rather, it’s a question of how it can be maintained that the authority of the state will always be used in the interest of the people. And that, we’ve been told, is done precisely by the creation of a cheap government in which everyone is paid the same and everyone can do everyone else’s work. In other words, the idea seems to be that anyone who comes to wield more power than they should will never be able to turn on the people because he or she will be always replaceable. Crucially, this goes even for the people who must wield authority for the purposes of resolving collective action problems. If Josef D. is getting too big for his bureaucratic britches, then it’s just a matter of replacing him with Leon T. who can do the job just as well (and so on and so on).

I don’t know if that’s what Lenin was going for, and a number of other practical questions arise as a result (who has the power to replace?) but I can at least make sense of what’s being said here.


3. Letter to Bebel

the rather handsome August Bebel

Summary

In March of 1875 Engels writes a letter to Ferdinand August Bebel (one of the founders of the German Social Democratic Workers’ Party) in which he criticizes the Gotha Program and, in particular, the role of the state taken up in that program. Lenin draws specific attention to the fact that Engels insists that the term “state” should be replaced with the term “community” in the program.

Engels’ argument is as follows: Once the state stops oppressing the majority in favor of the minority, it ceases to be a state. Talk of a ‘free people’s state’ or a ‘people’s state’ just doesn’t make sense since when it is in the hands of the proletariat it is no longer a state but simply a tool to be used to “hold down its adversaries.” Once this has been done—once the people are free—then there just is no state. What’s left behind is something else; viz. a community. Lenin restates this argument, then, in typical fashion uses it to rail against Kautsky, and to assure the reader that the Bolsheviks are completely on board with the proper orthodox Marxist line.

Analysis

I have very little to say about this section since nothing terribly new is being brought in. This does seem to be more grist for Lenin’s mill in claiming the mantle of the most-Marxist Marxist around, but that’s about it.


4. Criticism of the Draft of the Erfurt Program

Summary

In this section Lenin brings in Engels’ criticisms of the Erfurt Program proposed by the Social Democrats as further support for his understanding of the role of the state.

Lenin focuses on three points that Engels brings up with respect to the state’s role in the program. The first and biggest one has to do with the fact that there’s no call for a republic within the draft. Engels thinks that the current German constitution is simply a “fig leaf” over the reactionary absolutism of 1850 which only legalizes and formalizes an unjust order. Furthermore, he criticizes the SD in claiming that the only reason they’re not calling for a republic is because of fear of a reactionary backlash and the re-institution of anti-socialist laws. This, claims Engels, is an opportunist move and only serves to support the absolutists and reactionaries–they forego the pursuit of a principled end for the achievement of short term Pyrrhic victories. In Engels’ eyes, the democratic republic is the nearest approach to the dictatorship of the proletariat and there is no future for the proletariat that doesn’t go through a republic but only seeks to make peace with the status quo.

As Lenin puts it:

For such a republic–without in the least abolishing the rule of capital, and, therefore, the oppression of the masses and the class struggle–inevitably leads to such an extension, development, unfolding and intensification of this struggle that as soon as there arises the possibility of satisfying the fundamental interests of the oppressed masses, this possibility is realized inevitably and solely through the dictatorship of the proletariat, through the leadership of the masses by the proletariat.

Lenin, The State and Revolution pg. 84

In short, the move towards a republic makes it possible for the proletarian revolution to kick off once the contradictions of capitalism have come to a head.

This is the first practical suggestion Engels makes in criticizing the program: include a call for a republic. The second suggestion–in the same vein–is concerned with the model of the republic that is called for. Specifically, Engels holds that the SDs should be primarily fighting for a unitary republic and not a federal republic (although he grants that the latter may still be a step forward in some cases; viz. those in which multiple nations span the same geographic locale). In a unitary republic the provinces or individual states within the republic are all held by a common central aim or commitment to the republic. By contrast, a federal republic is one that is divided by the state in separate units. The difference, then, can be thought of as the difference between a top-down approach in which unity is forced by and the state and then partitioned by it, and a bottom-up approach in which unity is achieved through the cooperation of different autonomous parts who unite in a single state.

This is made all the more apparent when Engels speaks about the local governance of these individual units and claims that there should be “complete self-government for the provinces, districts and communities through officials elected by universal suffrage. The abolition of all local and provincial authorities appointed by the state.” (pg. 87) This, once again, reinforces the building of a bottom-up unity (we elect our officials locally and then participate nationally) rather than a top-down imposed federalism (we elect someone to the state who then appoints local officials).

All of these remarks are, of course, intended to show that Lenin has the right reading of Marx and Engels and that a proper orthodox Marxist is in favor of a democratic centralism and not whatever it is that the anarchists are calling form.

Analysis

I might be misreading either Engels’ remarks of Lenin’s analysis of them, but this section seemed to me to be less in support of Lenin than he takes them to be. Perhaps part of this is the fact that I don’t quite understand the different models of federalism that Lenin and Engels seem to have in mind in drawing their distinctions. I don’t, for example, know what the Swiss federal model is and why that kind of model is much worse than a different kind of federalism.

It also strikes me as odd, perhaps because of some unfair historical foresight on my part, that the models for self-governance advocated by Engels and Lenin is the republicanism of America and the former British colonies. Part of the reason why I think it’s odd is that the model that we know ends up being used in the USSR is precisely not the one that Lenin and Engels are pushing here. Rather, it seems to be precisely the ‘bad’ kind of federalist republicanism which operates from the center to the periphery. Within the Soviet Union, Russia was always the central player who dictated to the other members, and within the individual states within Russia (to the best of my knowledge) rule always flowed from the central party to the provinces, and not the other way around (but I could be mistaken).

In any case, I suppose it warrants saying, once again, that Lenin is writing this having had zero experience in state power (the perennial irony of all this is, of course, the fact that Marxism is supposed to be uniquely positioned to prevent precisely this kind of armchair speculation by drawing attention to the particular material conditions on the ground…though, of course, Lenin was also convinced that he knew those conditions). The second thing to keep in mind is that although Lenin is still bringing in some of this stuff to buttress his position against the anarchists (“see, Engels was about democratic centralism too!”), the group that he seems to be primarily addressing here is that group that is one that’s on his right–namely, those democratic socialists who might want incremental change within a system.

Still, it seems to me that these very same passages from Engels could be seen as going against Lenin’s theory of revolution. Recall, Lenin doesn’t want a bourgeois revolution before the socialist revolution. Rather, he wants to go directly to the latter without the former–it’s to that end that the violent smashing of the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be used. Yet, here, we have seemingly clear arguments from Engels about why a republic needs to be established first so that when certain conditions come to hold, then we can have the proletarian revolution. Why this isn’t a place where Lenin is being heterodox is unclear to me.


5. The 1891 Preface to Marx’s The Civil War in France

“H.A.G.S.” – Engels

Summary

In this preface Engels is summarizing the lessons learned from the Commune with the benefit of a 20 year hindsight. The first lesson, Lenin notes, is that the central question regarding the success of a worker’s revolution is that of who is armed. Hence, Engels’ claim that “the disarming of the workers was the first commandment for the bourgeois who were at the helm of the state. Hence, after every revolution won by the workers, a new struggle, ending with the defeat of the workers.” (89) For Lenin this is, of course, yet another reason to support a violent and armed revolution, but it is also an opportunity to throw some jabs at some of his old opponents, and in particular Tsereteli (see note below explaining what he’s getting at).

Following this is a minor note about the role of religion that seems to pertain only to the stance taken by the German SDs. Citing Engels’s statement that “in relation to the state religion is a purely private matter,” the SDs had taken the position that religion was a private matter tout court. Lenin corrects this by saying that this is a misinterpretation of Engels and that Engels’ remarks by no means meant that religion was a private matter in relation to the party. This remark seems to go nowhere other than to air out Lenin’s grievances against people whom he thinks don’t understand Marxism as well as he does.

Returning to the main point, Lenin tells us what the two main lessons learned from the Commune were with respect to the state. They’re familiar ones:

First, it’s that the state remains the state even in a democratic republic. It remains a tool of class oppression even if democracy is on the scene. The Commune had realized this and knew that as long as the state officials remained in their old capacities and still served as “masters of society” the working class couldn’t survive. To do so, it would need to do away with all previous state machinery and smash it.

Second, in order to smash the state machinery, the Commune had to transform the state officials and their roles from masters of society to servants of society. The Commune did this precisely by electing officials anew, making all of them recallable, giving them all working wages so as to stop opportunism and career hunting, and by imposing strict term limits.

Lenin then repeats that curious claim that the abolition of the state requires that the functions of the state be “converted into the simple operations of control and accounting that are within the capacity and ability of the vast majority of the population, and, subsequently, of every single individual.” (92). This, again, to stress, is what is needed in order for the state to be smashed–its machinery must be converted into this so that careerism and prestige become impossible. Once that is the done, the state loses its function as a tool of class oppression, the jobs it provides gain the status as ordinary jobs, and it slowly begins to wither away.

So much should already be familiar. Following this recap, we get a curious little passage about a mistake Engels doesn’t make. Namely, “Engels did not make the mistake some Marxists make in dealing, for example, with the question of the right of nations to self-determination, when they argue that this impossible under capitalism and will be superfluous under Socialism.” (93). What’s normally conflated is unclear (I’ll take a whack at it below), but it is followed by a less familiar claim by Lenin which I quote it here in full:

To develop democracy to the utmost, to seek out the forms for this development, to test them by practice, and so forth–all this is one of the constituent tasks of the struggle for the social revolution. Taken separately, no kind of democracy will bring Socialism. But in actual life democracy will never be “taken separately”; it will be “taken together” with other things, it will exert its influence on economic life, will stimulate its transformation; and in its turn it will be influenced by economic development, and so on. Such are the dialectics of living history.

Lenin, The State and Revolution, 93

This remark isn’t elaborated on at all. Rather, Lenin moves on to really stress that Engels’ warnings were perennially about knowing the true nature of the state:

In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such a time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap.

Lenin quoting Engels, The State and Revolution, 94

Engels gives this reminder especially to comrades in Germany, but the message is clear: don’t romanticize the state simply because it has taken a different form–it’s still the old enemy in new clothes. Lenin’s advice to his contemporaries is equally clear: this is why we shouldn’t work through the state without first smashing it; if anyone works with the state they should only do so reluctantly and never eagerly.

Finally, Lenin ends by remarking that although he agrees with Engels that the state remains a state even when democracy has entered the scene, this doesn’t mean that either of them think that the state has the same form in both monarchy and democracy. Far from it, a more open and freer class struggle is possible in the latter and not the former, and hence, we should be in favor of the latter (but for that reason and not because some kind of magic happens once democratic processes are in place!).

Analysis

I promised a bit of historical information regarding the Tsereteli remark so let me begin by addressing that. Lenin here is referring to a speech Tsereteli gave on the occasion of banning a planned Bolshevik demonstration on June 10th. The demonstration was, according to the Bolsheviks, supposed to be a peaceful one, but the grounds on which it was banned by a block of Mensheviks and SRs (Tsereteli himself was a Menshevik) was essentially that the radical nature of the Bolsheviks would be used as a justification by the Provisional Government to disarm the workers. I couldn’t find the original Tsereteli speech, but his argument appears to be “your radical revolutionary tactics are likely to sink the whole revolution; once the workers are disarmed, the whole thing’s over. So, we’re banning you from doing what you were planning for the sake of the revolution.” Lenin’s response in return seems to be that this very muzzling of revolutionary tactics is itself counter-revolutionary (a kind of “oh, so what are you doing in de-facto disarming us and not allowing us to demonstrate? Are you not playing the game on bourgeois terms?”). Hence, his claim that this was really the breaking point when the SRs and Mensheviks broke apart from the true revolutionary purpose.

Apart from this explicit reason, the SRs and the Mensheviks were, in all likelihood also trying to swing their weight around a bit and send a message to the Bolsheviks that despite their name, they still represented the minority in their coalition and that they should step in line. They score a small victory on that front in the so-called ‘July Days’ when mass street violence is blamed on the Bolsheviks, the party leaders are arrested or scattered, and Lenin is forced to go into exile. Ultimately, however, we know that the Bolsheviks have the last laugh.

Setting that aside, what should we make of the rest of the section. I don’t have much more to say about the elements that are repeated here regarding the smashing of the state, other that to say that I’m more and more convinced that I was correct earlier in my interpretation of a ‘smash’ being used as a technical term and in my claim that a lot hangs on this empirical assumption Lenin makes about what smashing requires (i.e. the transformation of all state functions into simple processes that can be done by anyone). That’s not to pat myself on the back since it only means that I can still read, but sometimes you gotta take pleasure in the small things.

Rather, I want to focus on the latter half of the section and in particular on that strange passage that I quoted in full above. I have a very hard time understanding what Lenin is trying to say there. It’s clear that he’s drawing a distinction between democracy as it can be understood when ‘taken separately’ democracy as understood when ‘taken together’, but this distinction is still opaque. My best guess is that this is a distinction between looking at any particular form of democracy and looking at what a full democracy requires. To think of democracy in the former sense is just to be concerned with what institutional features one’s political system has (i.e. is it representative, is it direct, etc.); to look at it in the latter sense is to be concerned with what genuine self-rule by the people actually needs (i.e. ???).

From that perspective Lenin’s point seems to be that there is no single kind of democracy such that when it is established, Socialism simply follows. It’s not as though instituting universal suffrage will suddenly transform the existing system into a utopia. Quite to the contrary, achievement of absolute democracy is a wholistic and dynamic thing that requires constant adjustments, experimentation, and sensitivity to the totality of how people live. In that sense, the work towards achieving a more perfect democracy is always in progress–even if you achieve it for a certain time period, conditions on the ground might change and require new ways of adapting.

If correct, then Lenin’s direct point to his contemporaries was that they shouldn’t be merely striving to achieve a democratic system. That by itself isn’t going to do anything and it certainly won’t automatically bring about the socialist revolution. As both Lenin and Engels stress, the introduction of a certain political structure is useful for the waging of a more unconstrained class struggle. This is a proximate goal towards an ultimate one and Lenin is really reminding us not to forget that.

[This reading also makes sense given the surrounding quotes by Engels, and especially the one used to chastise the Germans about their state fetishism. That makes me feel pretty confident about my interpretation, but I could be mistaken.]

One thing that I especially like about this passage (if my reading is correct) is that it highlights a certain flexibility of tactics of Lenin’s and provides us with a little window of what he envisioned the socialist future to look like. One of the unfortunate results of Stalinism (though by far not the worst) is that it turned socialism and socialist thought into something rigid and ossified (though, to be fair, shades of this are present in Lenin, too, with his obsession with the correct reading of Marxism). But it’s clear here that this was never what it was supposed to be and that it was envisioned to be something incredibly flexible and agile in response to the workers’ needs.

This view is also in stark contrast to the general ways in which so many people think about the current political and economic system. Here I have in mind the popular moderate view that capitalism has solved all fundamental economic problems, that Locke solved all fundamental political problems, and that all other problems are just a matter of implementing different wonkish tweaks to those two systems. This, too, is a rigid and ossified “end-of-history” way of thinking about things that I find particularly frustrating and it’s interesting to see the outlines of an alternative way of at least thinking about these questions (even if the lessons of history suggest that at least part of this approach is mistaken).


6. Engels on the Overcoming of Democracy

That’s right, Engels had a neckbeard when he was young. I’m disappointed too.

Summary

The general question this section aims to address is why Engels believes that the removal of the state will be complete with the arrival of a new generation. The answer comes after a rather weird digression into the proper party name. Here, Lenin quotes Engels on why he and Marx preferred the label ‘communist’ to the label ‘social-democrat’–in short, they felt that ‘Communism’ described precisely the aims towards which the proletariat should be striving, while ‘social-democracy’ gave the impression that one of the aims that the party should be striving for is the preservation of democracy. The term ‘social-democrat’ can ‘pass muster’ for Engels so long as this mistake isn’t made and the party doesn’t take the label literally but instead remains true to the more basic principles.

After proposing that the Bolsheviks take this cue to change their name to the Communists (with ‘Bolsheviks’ in brackets) to better reflect their principles, Lenin gets to the heart of the matter. Engels’ point is that overcoming the state means overcoming democracy–when the state withers away, so does democracy. Lenin admits that this might sound bizarre and incomprehensible and grants that “indeed, someone may even begin to fear that we are expecting the advent of an order of society in which the principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority will not be observed–for democracy means the recognition of just this principle.” (97)

However this is not the case because, as the alert reader may have already intuited, ‘democracy’ in this sense has a technical meaning. Lenin explains:

Democracy is not identical with the subordination of the minority to the majority. Democracy is a state which recognizes the subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e., an organization for the systematic use of violence by one class against the other, by one section of the population against another.

Lenin, The State and Revolution, 97

To overcome democracy is to overcome the state is to overcome the very use of violence for the purposes of subordination. This is the Communist aim which Lenin reiterates:

In striving for Socialism we are convinced that it will develop into Communism and, hence, that the need for violence against people in general, for the subordination of one man to another, and of one section to another, will vanish altogether since people will become accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social life without violence and without subordination.(97-98)

Lenin, The State and Revolution, 97-98

And this overcoming itself requires the arrival of a new generation that can be subject to this kind of habituation. By growing up in such an environment and internalizing it fully from birth, this new generation is finally able to dispense with the state once and for all.

Analysis

Despite the fact that this is one of the shortest sections in this chapter, I find it to be one of the most interesting and illuminating ones. I myself raised the question several chapters ago about why the destruction of the state would mean an end to the process of deliberation by democratic means. The answer that we get here is that that process isn’t eliminated. What’s eliminated is the concept of the democratic state which is the means enforcing the will of the majority by violence on the minority. This is part of what Lenin means when he says that democracy in his sense is not identical with the principle that operates in the process of democratic decision. It’s not identical because the former includes more that the latter insofar as it incorporates the element of coercion and violence against the minority to enforce the will of the majority. That kind of democracy is the kind that Engels and Lenin think is overcome when the state has withered away.

What remains in its place? Well, presumably, the principle itself minus the violence. But what does that mean? It means that the majority dictates and the minority submits willingly. Furthermore, we see that this is supposed to happen because, by growing up a certain way, people have become accustomed to a world in which this is the case.

A couple of really interesting things are worth pointing out here. The first is Lenin’s picture of psychology. Specifically, it seems to be entirely modeled on a kind of conditioning or habit based picture. In short, it seems to assume that changing the environment in which one becomes habituated makes a massive difference to behavior. In the useless debate about nature versus nurture, Lenin is strictly in the nurture camp. This, as some of Lenin’s other assumptions about the nature of bureaucracy and epistemology, is, to a certain extent an empirical matter but one that is taken for granted for Lenin.

In saying this I don’t mean to suggest that I think the opposite is true–i.e. that really, human nature is in some respects immutable and that Lenin just didn’t see that. People rarely notice how bad of a track record that argument has had when particular examples have been brought up historically; there are so many things that supposedly were part of human nature that we could never curb but which we’ve learned to do fairly well without (pick your favorite piece of racist or sexist philosophy from history if you want examples). As far as I’m concerned, human nature is much more malleable than people give it credit for.

What I do want to say, however, is that Lenin’s picture of human psychology is much too simplistic. And here, the reactionary might have a point. Perhaps human nature is very malleable but is not malleable with respect to one or two very specific things. Perhaps, pace Nietzsche or Hobbes, it is not malleable with respect to its desire for asserting its will or its selfish drive. And if what is necessary to willingly submit to the will of the majority is that one fundamentally change that aspect of humanity, then we might be in trouble.

[For what it’s worth, I think such arguments are also overstated. More conservative folks will tend to treat the Nietzschian or Hobbesian claims as a kind of established empirical dogma. It’s not–it just seems more plausible to them that people are naturally selfish or that they want to assert their will and the support needed for that claim is black-boxed.]

Alternatively, it may also be the case that the environmental conditions that would produce the desired results require more than the elimination of class. This is the second interesting point. One of the fundamental assumptions that has been brought up before and that appears again here seems to be that the source of all macro-scale social antagonisms is due to class and that the removal of class leads to the removal of all such antagonisms as well. Everything in Lenin’s political theory ultimately points to and aims at class struggle and overcoming class struggle. This, in turn puts a lot of weight on both the concept of class and that of class struggle, and one might have serious reservations that they can handle all that weight. After all, one might think that questions of race, sex, religion, gender, etc. also make a difference to macro-scale social conflicts and those questions will continue to exist even if class disappears.

This isn’t a new concern, of course, and the standard solution has been to adopt some kind of class reductionism to explain why each of these other issues really amount to issues of class as well. I’m not unsympathetic to this kind of reductionism (in fact, I think it’s more reasonable than people suppose it is), but it, too, needs to be defended separately and cannot be assumed automatically.

Finally, it’s worth also thinking about the principle that Lenin identifies with the ‘good’ kind of democracy–namely, the principle of the subordination of the minority by the majority. In one respect, I think he’s right; when democracy works well, this is precisely what happens. Furthermore, when looking at it through the lens that assigns capitalists as the minority and the rest of the world as the majority, then, it’s clear that capitalism presents a perversion of democracy of the highest order. However, it seems obvious that a full adherence to that principle also allows for a tyranny of the majority in certain other contexts. This is all the more obvious if we consider that issues of race, gender, etc. can still persists even in a system in which there are no classes. In those cases this principle becomes fully tyrannical and oppressive.

This, of course, brings us back to the first two points. If all macro-scale conflicts really are the result of class, and if class is removed, then whatever is left over won’t be one of the cases in which submission to the majority constitutes tyranny. After all, the city council isn’t tyrannical when it builds a school in that place where five people wanted to put a bar. If all cases of submission to the majority after the end of class struggle are such, then there’s not much to worry about. Likewise, but in a much more cynical frame of mind, if there are still some such cases that aren’t eliminated by the end of class struggle, but if such conflict can be avoided by conditioning people to think differently about their submission, then the worry, if not fully abated, is at least shifted.

I take it this latter option is actually highly unattractive to most people (myself included) since it seems tantamount to the development of a kind of mass adaptive preference towards the good of the majority and away from the individual’s good. This is especially worrisome if it is supposed to be applied to questions that aren’t merely incidental, but are constitutive of what is really required for people to thrive. If, for example, the majority required the suppression of a minority’s sexuality and if sexual expression is constitutive of the good life, then the option just suggested is pretty much that of brainwashing and depriving individuals of something really valuable.

This, I should stress, is not a Marxist view. The core of Marxism as I see it is very much concerned with the flourishing of human beings and with providing the means by which that can be done. Clearly, this picture of flourishing doesn’t include “privately owning the means of production for the advancement of capital” as a way to flourish so it will exclude some means (and anyone who thinks this is a way of human flourishing is so deep in ideology that I’m genuinely surprised they’ve made it through FOUR of these impossibly long blog posts about LENIN). But it does (or should) include a plurality of others. Human flourishing is not a democratically determined thing, though it is, at the same time, not something that is independent of what people think it is either! The point here is that I’m skeptical of any treatment of Marx that allows for or counts on such unprincipled tyrannical excesses and I see neither Marxism (nor Leninism for that matter just yet) as necessitating such moves.

All this is to say that perhaps the full weight of the problem falls back on the question of whether all serious macro-scale social problems can be reduced to class problems such that those problems that remain in wake of the revolution aren’t worth taking seriously. If that can be shown, then most of my concerns would be abated.

Zhelyu Zhelev’s “Fascism”: Introductory Remarks

With apologies for how long it’s taken me to translate this bit of text, I present you the introductory remarks of Fascism


Introductory Remarks

Contrary to expectation, interest in the topic of fascism has not lessened as the time between the end of the second world war and the present day has increased. We are witness to this fact. As an ideology, political system, and social practice, fascism still provokes scholars’ attention. The literature on this topic amounts to a massive mountain.

Clearly, the reason for this strange phenomenon cannot be found in a general historical interest. On all accounts it looks as though a series of supplementary social and political reasons, rooted in the complex circumstances of the 20th century, also fuel this interest: 1. The majority of people who were contemporaries of and/or participants in the events in question are still alive; the war either changed and altered the fate of each and every one of them, or else permanently left them somehow marked. For these people, every serious investigation of fascism is taken as a kind of reflection on their life, struggle, and suffering. 2. Occasionally, in many different places, military-political regimes arise which willingly borrow in both form and method from the battle arsenal of fascism (the physical extermination of Pinochet’s political enemies, the Cambodian genocide, etc.). These regimes also fuel interest in that phenomenon called fascism. 3. The current complex international relations and the occasionally increased tension and threat of confrontation between the nuclear superpowers also remind us of the lessons of the second world war which was sparked by fascist countries. Once again, we’re forced to return to and to reconsider fascism. 4. Finally, every attempt to interpret the value of cultural heritage and to appraise the complex trajectory of the movement and development of culture and civilization brings us, again and again, to the possibility that all culture and all civilization is threatened and may be ultimately destroyed unless the presuppositions of fascism are once and for all removed.

              There are probably a number of other reasons in addition to these. But whatever the reasons for the continued interest in fascism may be, they only remind us that it’s time to provide a proper theory of fascism which naturally and organically unites all of the studies about its disparate aspects.

              The truth is that this theory doesn’t yet exists despite the fact that there have been mountains of books and articles written on the topic examining this or that element of fascism. In a sense, this creates a paradoxical situation in which all the necessary methods and preconditions for the building of such a theory are readily available, and yet the theory itself has yet to crystalize. On its face, these are: a) the methodology of Marxism—historical materialism—that most solid and fruitful theoretical base of studying history and society; b) the mass of factual and documentary material (and more); c) the presence of a deep theoretical study of different aspects of fascism: economics, political structure, ideology, propaganda, terror, etc.

              It’s apparent to all contemporary scholars that a singular unifying theory of fascism must not only account for the economical and political aspects, but must also find a place for the psychological, socio-psychological, and culturo-logical elements of this phenomenon. And in order to avoid eclecticism and achieve an organic unity of these elements, we need a theoretical base that can only be supplied by historical materialism. As deterministic as it may seem at first glance, the truth is that no other method in contemporary sociological thought other than historical materialism could successfully solve the large and complex task of building up a single theory of fascism since it alone provides: 1. An explanation of the link between the economic base of fascism—financial capital—with its political superstructure, and above all within a specific country’s system; 2. The means to show the opposite in an already constructed superstructure—namely, the influence of the fascist country’s foundational institutions on the economy. The latter is also very important with an eye towards a wholistic understanding of the subject. Sadly, the current historiography, and to that extent, Marxism, too, is very weak on this point. As with all other social phenomena, despite the fact that the economic base plays a definitive role on the superstructure, the latter can also have a strong effect on, and, sometimes, can play a decisive role with respect to the economic base. From this point of view, the attempts of the fascist regimes to regulate their economic development is of great interest: the Third Reich’s attempts to control and plan its industrial and agricultural production, to regulate the proprietary relationships in the village, etc.; or the attempts of the Italian fascists to control and regulate the contradictions between the industrial workers and mercenary hires through the corporation.

              Precisely from this point of view, fascism presents not only the means by which the proletarian revolution is prevented, but also the attempt to offer an alternative.

  1. The Relevance of the Topic

              It’s been 36 years since the end of the second world war. In that time, two new generations have been born. They don’t have personal acquaintance with fascism. Their impressions of it are fueled by the many books and films on the topic. For that reason, to many of them fascism looks more exotic than terrifying. The struggles, the suffering, the grievous and countless sacrifices that fascism inflicted on the old generation are not, in their imaginations, as alive and vivid as they are in that which experienced it. Time has done its work.

              This is only natural. All events one day become history. And new generations are not bound to live with history, nor with the grief and suffering of their ancestors. They have new tasks and pursue their own ends. If it weren’t the case, they wouldn’t differ from the old generations.

              But it is precisely this fact that obscures a great danger. Because it is this that leads to a magnanimous attitude and a lack of political vigilance towards the era’s biggest dangers, while, at the same time, fascism remains more than mere history.

              The potential danger of fascism exists even today.

              Nearly daily we are reminded of this. The most recent event was the failed right-wing pro-fascist coup attempt in Spain, executed by the National Guard through an armed invasion of parliament.

              Ronald Reagan’s would-be assassin, too, turned out to have had organizational ties to the American National Socialist party which exists freely in that country.

              National Socialist and neo-fascist parties and groups exist in a number of countries in Western Europe as well. Currently they’re a minority and don’t have any serious influence over political life, but they’re no longer harmless.

              Some of them conduct military trainings with their members in the field, while others dare to hold international meetings and conferences, to march in the streets and sing fascist songs, to deface monuments dedicated to the anti-fascist struggle, to attack synagogues or to organize racist protests against people of color. The bombing of public places– the victims of which are completely innocent people—has become a common occurrence. Here and there, in different places in Western Europe, either Hitler’s mustache, or his haircut has once again become fashionable.

              The most disturbing thing about this whole neo-fascist bacchanalia is the sympathetic attitude of some of the governments of these Western nations towards these events. They view them as a kind of harmless reliving of the past that doesn’t pose any real danger. But it goes without saying that in the beginning, Hitler’s party was also seen as a motley gathering that no one even conceived could come to power.

              It is only in this way that we can explain why, even now, Hitler is considered an honorary citizen of 179 West-German towns; why there are so many numerous biographies of him, published in large numbers and distributed freely on the open market; why there are so many political relics of the Third Reich listed at fabulous prices which today constitute a veritable Hitler reliquary; why so many official bodies or national institutions are falling over themselves to declare the limits of Nazi crimes, etc.

              This tolerant attitude towards the most criminal national-political phenomenon of the 20th century—fascism—appears in other guises as well. On December 15th, 1980 the regional courts of West Berlin decided to pardon Van der Lubbe.[1] The verdict handed down by the Imperial Court in 1933 was recognized as constituting an “apparent perversion of the law.” Van der Lubbe should have only been tried as an arsonist. Nothing is said about the fact that he was a patsy for the real arsonists. What’s said about the main defendant—G. Dimitrov—is so modest that it amounts a perversion of historical fact.

              Dimitrov is presented as an ordinary defendant, acquitted due to lack of evidence. About his titanic fight against the ascending “brown plague”[2], about the heavy moral and political blows he delivered to National Socialism from the very beginning, about his heroic example, as well as his insight into future developments which were subsequently confirmed by history, nothing at all is said.

              It’s as though the Leipzig trial of 1933-1934 was merely a criminal trail, and not as a clash between two ideologies and two political systems.

              Even more alarming are the cases of sympathetic attitudes towards the budding fascist movements whom the official state police of some countries, led by formally democratic considerations, provides protection to from…the democratic antifascists.

              It doesn’t need to be proven that the sympathetic and conciliatory attitude towards the fascist threat, as well as a general underestimation of that threat, makes it more real.

              But, on the other hand, to the extent that the reality of this threat is determined to be purely psychological and socio-psychological factors, and to an even greater extent by economic, political, and historical causes, it deserves a closer look.

              We believe that the question of the possible rebirth of fascism must be posed and answered solely scientifically, and not empirically or by way of propaganda.

              What’s needed first of all is a distinction between the historical and the political manifestation of fascism. As with all social phenomena, it, too, is subject to two forms of negation.

              In the first sense—the historical—fascism has already been experienced and it can never return. This means that as an idea and a political practice that claims to have discovered a new path for humanity, a new world order, and a different, higher meaning for human life, fascism has irrevocably failed.

              After the revelations at the end of the Second World War, and especially after the Nuremberg Trials which provided massive documentation of the monstrous criminality of fascism, it can no longer appeal to any nation. For humanity, it has become a spent idea.

              Furthermore, in the political consciousness of 20th century people fascism is a completely odious phenomenon, which is why every time regimes are forced to quietly resort to its political methods, they’re also quick to distanced themselves from it, and to deny any connection or similarity to its practices. This is indirectly evidenced by the fact being accused of fascism is today tantamount to being completely discredited in a moral-political sense.

              It’s precisely these considerations that give us grounds to claim that historical fascism has been fully overcome.

              However, it doesn’t follow from this that it has also been politically overcome; i.e. that under certain circumstances the ruling arm of one country or another will not resort to borrowing various elements from fascist practice or to take up arms from its political arsenal.

              Nobody can guarantee this won’t happen. Moreover, each of us following political events, has had multiple opportunities to observe how easily tempted by this is every military junta that comes to power through a coup. Pinochet’s regime is the most recent example in this respect.

              The political defense of fascism has its own deep foundations in economics—in those processes involved in centralizing and concentrating capital and property which are deeply inherent in imperialism. This isn’t a matter of anachronistic phenomena, but of the objective tendency that maintains state capitalism. The larger the centralization and concentration of the means of production in the hands of the monopolies and the state, the larger their economic power, the greater the ability to destroy liberal democracy, to liquidate the civil and political liberties of individuals, and, following that, to bring about fascist totalitarianism.

              As far back as sixty years ago Lenin was already turning his attention towards this and other phenomena in his “Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism”: the replacement of free competition with a state monopoly in the economy (in the base) corresponds to a replacement of a bourgeois democracy with political reactionism in the superstructure. (According to Lenin the political superstructure under imperialism “presents a reversal of democracy towards political reactionism. Free competition corresponds with democracy. Monopolies correspond to political reactionism.”) Or, to say the same thing, a monopoly of the economy necessarily grows into a monopoly of politics, and from there spreads into all other spheres of public life. And it’s well known that a monopoly of politics always has one singular form: dictatorship.

              Of course, the possibility of a fascist dictatorship is not always a reality in politics, but it exists as an ordinary possibility which can threaten us during periods of significant social crisis characteristic of our century. In any case, the tendency towards totalitarianism in the current world is so strong that even traditional bourgeois democracies aren’t as idealistic as they were in the 19th century; quite frequently, one can observe in their political life certain steps and actions that reminds one more of dictatorship than of democracy.

              The relevance of the topic has another side: the necessity of clarifying the structure, laws, and the hidden mechanisms and levers of the fascist state. Until this is done it will always remain a mystery how fascism—and especially the German kind—with its anti-scientific and reactionary ideology could have dragged along the nations of Europe and used them as tools for its criminal aims; what was the system of “barbarization”, stupidity, numbing, corruption, demoralization and dehumanization that turned millions of burgers, philistines, and loyalists into a modern version of Tamerlane’s Horde, threatening all civilization with destruction?

              We know too much about the crimes of fascism (the burning of books, the concentration camps, the gas chambers, etc.), but know far too little about that machine called “the fascist state” that committed those crimes.

              We know too much about what we call “bestial fascism” and almost nothing about the “ordinary”, every day fascism from which the bestial kind grows.

              This is why it’s not enough to say that fascism is the dictatorship of the most reactionary imperial cliques (which, of course, is perfectly true) as an answer to these questions. It’s necessary to go further: to study in detail the fascist dictatorship as a system and a form of state power.  

2. The Numerous Definitions of Fascism

              Many different definitions from many different perspectives have been given during the different periods of fascism. Every one of them, to a certain extent, uncovers the political reality of that contradictory and culturally mysterious 20th century phenomenon. After the famous 1921 “March on Rome” when the Italian fascists come to power, many Marxists began to think of fascism as a peculiar petit-bourgeois revolution. As early as 1923 S.M. Bronsky describes fascism as a “petit-bourgeois revolution” and “a struggle of the middle classes for self-preservation” in The Communist Revolution (6-25).[3] In the beginning that’s how the Italian Communists, who were the first to feel the blows of fascist dictatorship on their backs, thought of it too. As L. Longo describes the discussions among the Italian Communists and Socialists, the fascist movement was understood as “the result of a revolt of the petit-bourgeoisie, trapped between large capital and the worker’s movement” (64-199).[4]

              This was also the understanding of the entire social-democratic population of Europe during the 20’s and 30’s.

              That was also A. Gramsci’s understanding. But attached to his name is a different definition of fascism as “extrajudicial violence on behalf of the capitalist class.” (23-471)[5]

              Later, after 1926, when Italian fascism begins to build its own specific state system and when the more aggressive German Nazi movement appears on the horizon, the counterrevolutionary nature of fascism begins to come to the forefront. At that point new definitions arise which underline precisely this characteristic. In 1932 E. Tellmann characterizes fascism as an “armed counterrevolution, presented as a mass movement, as embodied in Hitler’s organizations” (115-33). At the same time the Italian historian Delle Piane called fascism a “preventative counterrevolution”, and L. Longo described it as “one form of preventative counterrevolution.” (64-114)

              At the start of the 40’s, the French communist, G. Politzer, engaging in a polemic with the Nazi ideologue A. Rosenberg once again defined fascism as “the most reactionary counterrevolution in history” and as “the counterrevolution of the 20th century” (160-41, 44).[6]

              In his attempt to discover the contradictory nature of fascism and, specifically, the contradiction between its mass social base, between its mass national movement, and its deeply reactionary program it executes, Eugene Cox called fascism a “reactionary revolution” (52-136).

              Erich Hess, led again by the desire to express the paradoxically contradictory political nature of fascism, and especially the contradiction of his business organization, defined fascism as “industrial feudalism” (127-8), as a system that unites in itself all capitalist industrial development with pre-capitalist forms of extra-economical coercion.

              Hermann Rauschning—former party leader of Danzig who saw the adventurism of national socialism even before the war and escaped across the ocean—defined German fascism as a “nihilistic revolution”, “a revolution of negation.”[7] In his singular book The Revolution of Nihilism, published in 1938, he constantly highlights the destructive character of the fascist ‘revolution’: the struggle to destroy all moral, political, and artistic values, acquired in the slow and difficult development of human civilization. (160a-26).

              Winston Churchill his unique genetic definition of fascism by linking it with the appearance of communism. In his own words, “fascism was the shadow or ugly child of communism.” (136a-13)[8]

              It must be noted that this idea is widely shared among the bourgeois democracies and the liberal intelligentsia in the West. It’s shared with the acolytes of ‘official historiography’, for whom it’s become almost a dogma. Its typical expression is like that of philosophy professor Luigi Sturzo:[9] “In reality, between Russia and Italy there only one true difference—namely, that Bolshevism, or the communist dictatorship, is left-wing fascism, while fascism, or conservative dictatorship, is right-wing bolshevism. Bolshevik Russia created the myth of Lenin, Fascist Italy that of Mussolini” (172a-221).

              There are also numerous definitions of fascism which don’t take into account its social and class content. The American psycho-historian, R. Binion, for example, looks at the spread of fascism into Germany as “an epileptic seizure of the German people” and as a “schizophrenia of the nation.” (6-167)

              L. Mumford claims that the real roots of fascism must be sought “in the human soul, not in the economy.” In clarifying this claim, he says: “In overweening pride, in the delight in the cruel and neurotic disintegration—in this, and in the Weimar contract, or in the incompetence of the German republic lies the explanation of fascism.” (155a-118).[10]

              Wilhelm Reich, in “The Mass Psychology of Fascism”, doesn’t deny the role of the economic factor in the appearance of fascism, but attempts to explain its rise entirely through psychological causes.[11] Fascism is “a statement of the irrational structure of man, modeled on the crowd…Its sadism seeps from the nostalgia or an unsatisfied organism.” (162-176).

              Since fascism can’t be explained through the pathology of the Fuhrer or the general stupidity of the nation, we won’t busy ourselves with these kinds of pure psychological definitions. At the same time, it should be noted that without the contributions of social psychology, include those of the aforementioned authors, many things in the fascist phenomenon could not be fully understood.

              It must also be said that all of the definitions and characteristics mentioned above contain part of the truth. They simply represent different sides of the actual political phenomenon we call ‘fascism’. Because fascism is at one and the same time both “a mass movement”, and “a petit-bourgeoisie counter revolution”, and, in a sense, even an ideological “schizophrenia of the nation” and an “epileptic seizure” of an entire people.

              But none of them uncovers the deepest foundation and specific reality of fascism. The latter was more or less fully express in the definition given to fascism by the 7th Comintern Congress as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, and most imperialist elements of financial capital.” (33-29).[12] Namely, financial capital is that which stands at the base of fascism and determines its program. Without financial capital, fascism could never become a national movement and take control of state power. It’s no coincidence that fascism appears during the era of imperialism, in the midst of a deep social crisis that threatens the very existence of the capitalist system. History has known other mass movements of the petit bourgeoisie which were able to birth Bonapartism, but none that could birth fascism.

              It doesn’t matter at all that fascism began as a revolt of the middle classes, of the petit bourgeoisie against the monstrous pressure of a social crisis (unemployment, inflation, tax burdens; etc.); it doesn’t matter either that the vast majority of participants in the fascism movement is not subjectively serving finance capital in order to act as its agent and guard. Objectively, due the power of the historical circumstances during imperialism there are only two primary figures that can resolve the great problems of the age: financial capital and the proletariat.

              That’s why the social crisis can, in principle, be solved either with a proletarian revolution, or with a fascist dictatorship. The latter represents precisely the solution of financial capital.

              Despite its plurality, the petit bourgeoisie cannot offer its own solution to these problems which give rise to the social crisis. Therefore, it does belongs neither to the financial power of big capital, to the monopolies of trust, nor to the desperate determination and revolutionary energy of the proletariat.

              For the same reason every mass movement that arises from it, every one of its revolts or revolutions will, in due time and by necessity comes under the ideological leadership of one of the primary figures mentioned.

              It’s interesting to trace how the social knowledge of fascism has moved from appearance to reality. First, one looks at the social makeup of the fascist movement—the petit bourgeoisie as the major element in the mass social base of fascism. The very appearance, however, is not yet fully developed. Precisely at that point is fascism defined as a petit-bourgeoisie revolution.

              Later, when the fascism movement directs its blows against the parties and organizations of the left—the communists, the socialists, and the social-democratic parties, the independent trade unions of the proletariat, their rallies, strikes, and demonstrations – then its counterrevolutionary contents is revealed. The fascism movement is uncovered through its actions. Its counterrevolutionary nature becomes apparent. This appears as the most important thing. At this stage we see the new definitions of fascism as “a right-wing revolution”, “a reactionary revolution”, “an armed counter-revolution”, “a preventative counterrevolution.”

              Later, when the fascism movement has taken control of the state machinery and has begun to establish its dictatorship on the path towards a violent destruction of all other political parties and organizations (both right and left-wing); when it removes the institutions of liberal democracy, and the civil and political freedom of individuals—it becomes possible to pose the question: whom does the fascist dictatorship serve? As long as the petit bourgeoisie by itself, by the power of its own social nature and its own social interests cannot birth such a reaction, such a reactionary energy, to carry such a concentrated counterrevolution, this becomes the fundamental question.

              And here is precisely where we begin to see the figure of financial capital which in the crisis it finds itself in is truly in need of that kind of state power, but which remains in the shadows, hidden behind the exterior appearance of the fascist system.

              Somewhere at this stage in the understanding of the social nature of fascism we get the definition given by the Comintern as rule by the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, and most aggressive elements of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

              The definition of fascism provided by G. Dimitrov during the 7th Comintern Congress in 1935 remains to this day the best insight into the scoi-class nature of this phenomenon. Because of this, even today, when Marxists scholars turn towards the study of this or that problem in the history, sociology, social psychology of fascism, or of some even more specific problems of its practice such as its propaganda, state terror, concentration camps, etc., they invariably call upon this definition and, to one degree or another, use it as the starting point of their scientific analysis.

              At the same time, however, it would be wrong to think that the Comintern definition fully captures and exhausts all the features of fascism. It lacks an explanation of the specific political system of fascism, of its unique form of dictatorship without which we could never explain the demonic power of the fascist countries which ignited the bloodiest world war and reached a monstrous scale of terror and criminality against humanity, unprecedented in history.

              It’s true that fascism is, primarily, rule or dictatorship of financial capital—and that is the most significant of its socio-class characteristics—but it’s also true that every contemporary late-stage capitalist government power is likewise rule of financial capital with its corresponding limitations of democracy, civil and political freedoms, etc. The same applies to the same extent to all developed capital countries in the world today. However, nobody has allowed themselves on this basis to claim that those countries are fascist ones, or that the form of their political rule is a fascist dictatorship.

              It is precisely this that shows that the definition of fascism as the rule or dictatorship of financial capital, despite picking out the most significant of feature of this concept, does not exhaust its whole being. It must be supplemented by specifying its particular political system, its unique form of dictatorship which crystalizes the power of financial capital under the unique critical conditions between the two world wars. Here not only the class content, but also the form which it takes, is a significant part of this phenomenon. The organic unity of the two express the specific reality of fascism.

              The absence of this “formal” moment in the Comintern’s definition became a reason for some authors to eliminate it altogether, to engage themselves only in the study of political structures without taking account of their real contents. Others, staying dogmatically faithful to that definition, claimed that it represents the whole truth of fascism and that there was simply nothing more to be said on this question. They were usually satisfied with repeating this definition while lacking any ability to apply it creatively to the concrete sociological analysis of the studied phenomenon.

              The absence of this “formal” moment in the Comintern’s definition is a little strange because every visible actions of the Comintern took seriously this side of fascism.

              As we will see in our forthcoming exposition, even as far back as the Leipzig trial G. Dimitrov paid special attention to the political structure of the Nazi state and its totalitarian character. P. Togliatti’s detailed analysis of the architecture of the fascist system in Italy as outlined in his “Lectures on Fascism”, finds fascism’s specific reality precisely in its totalitarianism.[13] To one degree or another, this feature of fascist dictatorship was also noted by E. Tellmann, L. Longo, V. Pick and others. Namely, it is through it that they tried to explain this or that phenomenon in the political life of the fascist states which, outside of the full context of the system, would appear strange and unfamiliar.

              To jump ahead, this is why we claim that that totalitarianism is such a significant part of the fascist dictatorship, of the fascist state, so fully and wholly expresses its political nature, that it must necessarily be included in the definition of fascism. In that respect, the Comintern definition should treat fascism as the totalitarian rule, the totalitarian dictatorship of financial capital and of its most reactionary and aggressive elements. It is precisely a totalitarian—not military, not authoritarian, but a totalitarian dictatorship. What is a totalitarian dictatorship and a totalitarian fascist state is the subject of the following exposition.

3. The Concept of the Totalitarian State

Those who speak of the totalitarian state are, first and foremost, the very creators of fascism itself. In listing the three main conditions for creating the corporate system, Mussolini puts the creation of the totalitarian state second after the creation of a single party system. He characterizes the totalitarian state as “a state, which incorporates within itself…the whole energy, all interests, and all hopes of a nation” (10-37).

              Paul Raterbusch, one of the theorists of Nazism, in decisively opposing “the pluralistic multiparty state” of Western Democracy defines the totalitarian state thus: “…the totalitarian state is that which with the help of a certain single party or ideology has elevated itself to a totality and has claimed the exclusive political right in constructing national life…The totalitarian state represents a fundamental break with relativism, with the notion that every party contains only relative truth.” (101-61 and 62).

              The German envoy to London, Von Dirksen[14], also speaks about the fascist state. With this term he refers to both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (39-110, 115, 308, 420).

              Finally, Hitler’s Minister of Armaments and War Production, Speer[15], in his deposition in the Nuremberg trail emphasized the totalitarian state as the most important reason for the catastrophe that befell the German nation: “The great danger to be found in this totalitarian system became apparently clear at that moment in which we approached the end…Allow me to explain like this: near the end it became apparent what kind of great danger is hidden in systems of this kind even if we set aside the Fuhrer principle. It was the combination of Hitler and this system that brought forth the horrific catastrophe into this world.” (99-48)

              During the Nuremberg trial the English prosecutor Shawcross[16] called Hitler’s cabinet a “totalitarian government” because it “doesn’t tolerate any opposition” and destroys civil and political freedoms (90-50 and 60). Able Plehn presents the “Spanish Phalanx” which builds the country in its own image as “war-loving” and “totalitarian” (93-261). Curt Reiss[17] describes the “totalitarian form of government” as one “in which freedom of the press and parliament are destroyed…” (102-202). A. Manhattan[18], in quoting a report of Mussolini’s envoy to Madrid on March 25th 1939 also speaks of a “inter-European fascist block of totalitarian states throughout the whole continent.” (71-329)

              The term “totalitarian state” is used also by Marxist authors in characterizing the fascist system, especially during its final years. Indeed, Georgi Dimitrov, during the Leipzig trial in the “Ten Questions to the Criminal Police Officials” used this term, precisely in this sense. But because the text has the form of a question which can’t be separated from its context without distorting the author’s intentions, we present the tenth question in its entirety: “10. Is it true that in this tense situation the Reichstag fire serve as a signal to begin the campaign against the labor movement and to overcome the difficulties within the ‘national coalition,’ to exercise national-socialist ‘unity, and to organize the so-called ‘totalitarian state’, i.e. to the forcible destruction of all other parties and organizations, to the ‘unification’ of the state, economy, culture, military, sport, youth, church, and the other organizations of the press, propaganda, etc.?” (58-202).

              In the “Sentencing Notes” which are a synopsis of a speech never delivered to the court dated December 23, 1933, G. Dimitrov once again returns to this question, noting: “For the creation of a ‘totalitarian state’, the national-socialist ‘sole-rule’!” (34-186).

              In short, according to G. Dimitrov the totalitarian state is the kind of state that aims first “towards the violent destruction of all other parties and organizations”, and second, towards “the unification of the state, economy, culture, military, sport, youth, church, and the other organizations of the press, propaganda, etc.”, in a word, unification of all social life.

              P. Togliatti in his infamous “Lectures on Fascism” read during the spring of 1935 in Moscow’s Lenin Academy before the Italian communist party functionaries working illegally against Mussolini’s regime, also looks at the Italian fascism as a “totalitarian regime,” “a totalitarian state.” He even classifies Italian fascism in terms of its totalitarian elements: “I would divide this subject in three periods: the first period—fascism until the “March on Rome”, until the end of 1922; the second period—from 1922 to 1925, can be characterized as an attempt to create a non-totalitarian fascist regime; finally, the third period covering 1925-1930, is the period of the creation of totalitarianism and of the beginning of the greatest economic crisis” (116-33).

              Even at the beginning of his lecture Togliatti explains that “Italian fascism wasn’t born totalitarian, but became such at that moment when the ruling powers of the bourgeoisie reached the maximum level of economic, and, consequently, political unity…totalitarianism is the consequence of the dominance of financial capital” (116-44).

              From the very titles, and even more so from the content of the separate lectures it can be seen that it is through the concepts of “totalitarian system”, “totalitarian regime”, “totalitarian dictatorship” that the true nature of Italian fascism is revealed. Togliatti presents the following table of contents: a) the construction of the ‘singular rule’ or the single party system of fascism through the violent destruction of all other political parties and mass organizations—left and right—without exception; b) taking control of the country by the fascist party, the transformation of the state machinery into its own tool; c) the construction of a comprehensive system of mass organizations through which the fascist party guarantees control of the civilian population (trade unions, youth organizations”, the “Dopolavoro” organization[19], etc.); d) the creation of the corporate systems as an economic base of the fascist nation and the future “fascist order” (Mussolini).

              L. Longo, in the book Between Reaction and Revolution defines the fascist dictatorship in Italy as the “undivided, totalitarian rule of fascism.” (64-271). He doesn’t make it his aim to offer a special analysis of the concept of “totalitarianism”, but much as can be judged form the context, he gives it very much the same meaning as Togliatti.

              In his own deep study of Italian fascism (“Italian Fascism and its Collapse”) the Soviet author S.M. Slobodskoy also looks at Mussolini’s regime as a totalitarian one. Chapter five of this monograph is called “The Establishment of a Totalitarian Regime.” According to the author “Italian fascism entered its ‘totalitarian’ phase of its development during November of 1926.” (110-65) when it liquidates the last remains of bourgeois democracy—political parties and organizations, civil and political freedoms—and the fascist party establishes its absolute monopoly.

              Without clearing up the special meaning of the term ‘totalitarianism’, Santiago Carrillo[20] characterizes the fascist system in Spain in his book After Franco—where? as a “totalitarian power” and a “totalitarian dictatorship” (76-19).

              The Spanish Marxist Jose Garcia proceeds in the same manner.[21] In his Spain in the 20th Century we can find descriptions of fascism like “a centralized totalitarian fascist dictatorship” (20-279), a country with “a totalitarian character” (20-280), “totalitarian order from top to bottom” (20-282), “fascist totalitarian regime” (20-287), or “totalitarian fascist state” (20-322) etc.

              Since there is no specialized study in Marxist literature of the totalitarian fascist state and its unique structure and laws, yet, at the same time this term is used, a systematic and detailed study is needed, starting, of course, not from the understanding of individual statements, but from a strong analysis of the main fascist nations (Hitler’s Germany, fascist Italy, and Franco’s Spain)—an analysis that seeks the most general laws that appear in each of them.

              In this way the concept of a “totalitarian fascist state” can allow us to make sense of an ideal, perfected fascist state, with respect to which the separate fascist countries constitute only approximations or modifications that contain, to a certain extent, its core element.

              In reality this is the goal of every scientific study—to provide an ideal, clean model of some defined phenomenon so that this model can be used as the basis to understand some specific or particular event.

              The creation of a model of the ‘idea’ fascist state also has a great practical significance to the extent that it can provide us with the ability in every separate case to understand whether a given country can be treated as a ‘fascist state.’ In this way we can overcome that vulgar political approach in which the label of ‘fascist state’ or ‘fascist regime’ is treated as synonymous with political stigma but is not the result of an objective scientific analysis.

              The construction of a model of the totalitarian fascist state has a principally methodological significance for not only everyday political life, but also for historiography. It is impossible, for example, to distinguish between a military dictatorship from the fascist one without appealing to such a model that serves as a criterion. That’s why all too often every military regime that comes to power with the help of the military is presented as a fascist dictatorship.

              In connection to this it’s appropriate to recall the words of P. Togliatti, spoken over four decades ago: “The term ‘fascism’ is often used imprecisely, primarily as a synonym of reaction, terror, etc. That definition is incomplete. Fascism does not signify only a fight against bourgeois democracy and it’s not right to use this expression as soon as such a struggle has been identified” (116-11).

              For example, it’s impossible to uncover the ‘peculiarities’ of Bulgarian fascism without such a general model of the classic fascist state. Before we establish the national peculiarities of a given fascism (Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, and English), we must first establish what fascism is, and what the general necessary characteristics of the fascist state are.

              As can be seen from what has been said so far, the best hope for constructing a model of the ideal fascist state is to learn the structure of the classic fascist states, and to discover those general features without which it is impossible to think of any concrete fascist state. In keeping with this fundamental method, we are lead to the following general traits of the totalitarian state: a) the forced establishment of a single-party system or “single-rule” of fascism through the destruction of all other parties; b) the fusion of fascist party with the state; c) the unification of all social life; d) an authoritarian way of thinking with a cult of personality surrounding a national leader; e) concentration camps.

              Of course, it goes without saying that the present study has no pretentions in being the final word on the topic. The aim of this study is much more modest: to point to another aspect of fascism which seems promising and relevant; to aid in the building of a singular theory of fascism that can spare one of the endless aimless wanderings through the details of this or that national fascism.


[1] [Translator’s Note: Where I’m able to, I’ll include little footnotes about the characters that Zhelev is referring to in the text. However, the file I’m working with doesn’t have a bibliography or a reference page, and my transliterations don’t’ always result in me finding anyone identifiable. When that’s the case, I won’t make a footnote saying I haven’t found anything. Regardless, here, Zhelev is referring to the Dutch Communist Marinus van der Lubbe who, along with three Bulgarian members of the Comintern, was put on trial for setting the Reichstag Fire of 1933. He was the only one who was found guilty and was put to death by the state. Although Van der Lubbe’s role in the fire is historically contested, it is generally held that he was used as a scapegoat by the Nazis to justify further repression of the Communists. In 1980, as Zhelev says, van der Lubbe was pardoned by West German courts, but that appeal was overturned in 1983. In 2007 he was fully pardoned by German courts.]

[2] [Translator’s Note: this is referring to the SA’s brown shirts]

[3] [Translator’s note: I’ve left the page references that are in the original text that I have only to demonstrate that Zhelev wasn’t pulling things out of thin air. As noted, however, the copy I have does not have a bibliography section, so the page references remain completely cryptic to me.]

[4] [Translator’s note: Luigi Longo was the secretary of the Italian Communist Party in the 60’s and mid-70’s]

[5] [Translator’s Note: This is, of course, referring to Antonio Gramsci, the Italian communist philosopher]

[6] [Translator’s Note: The former is most likely Georges Politzer, a Marxist philosopher arrested, tortured, and put to death by the Nazis in France in 1942. The latter refers to Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and key developer of Nazi ideology. He was tried at Nuremberg and put to death for war crimes.]

[7] [Translator’s Note: Hermann Rauschning was briefly a Nazi party member before renouncing his membership in the early 30’s and emigrating to the US. From there, he spoke strongly against Nazism.]

[8] [Translator’s Note: Winston Churchill was, of course, the British Prime Minister during WWII]

[9] [Translator’s Note: From what I could find Luigi Sturzo was not a philosophy professor, but an anti-fascist priest and politician. Why Zhelev credits him as a philosophy professor is a mystery to me.]

[10] [Translator’s Note: This is most likely referring to Lewis Mumford, the American sociologist, psychologist, and philosopher]

[11] [Translator’s Note: This is referring to the Austrian psychoanalyst—among other things, he coined the phrase “the sexual revolution”]

[12] [Translator’s Note: The Comintern was the name of the third international organization advocating for global communism (Communism + International = Comintern). It was founded by Lenin in 1919 and dissolved by Stalin in 1943 as way appeasing the wartime allies of the Soviet Union. Between 1934 and 1943 it was headed by the Bulgarian Georgi Dimitrov, who has been mentioned—and will continue to be mentioned—already. The Seventh Congress was its last.]

[13] [Translator’s Note: This is a reference to Palmiro Togliatti, General Secretary of the Italian Communist party from the 30’s through the 60’s]

[14] [Translator’s Note: Herbert von Dirksen, German diplomat to Britain before WWII]

[15] [Translator’s Note: This is referring to Albert Speer]

[16] [Translator’s Note: Hartley Shawcross, the British barrister and head British prosecutor during the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal]

[17] [Translator’s Note: Curt Reiss was a German refugee to America who worked as a war correspondent cataloguing Hitler’s war crimes]

[18] [Translator’s Note: Possibly Avro Manhattan, an Italian polymath and writer]

[19] [Translator’s Note: This was the Italian fascist adult recreation group]

[20] [Translator’s Note: Santiago Carrillo was the General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party from 1960-1982]

[21] [Translator’s Note: This might be referring to Jose Garcia Ladron de Guevara, but I can’t find enough information.