Joe Rogan, Bernie Sanders, and Bad Moral Philosophy

This week’s ‘controversial’ topic on the moderate left concerns the endorsement of Bernie Sanders by famous bald-man and podcaster Joe Rogan. I don’t know much about Rogan, I don’t listen to his podcast, and I still primarily think of him as the host of NBC’s FearFactor (in turn, I only remember this show because it was on the air right around the time I first developed a fear of vomit and the idea that someone would purposefully make themselves sick and televise it absolutely horrified me; I’ve since made my peace with that concept and most of the NBC family programming).

This is how I’ll always remember him

From what I know about the ongoing dispute two facts are relevant. First, Rogan’s podcast is incredibly successful and his endorsement of Sanders is likely to have some sway with his very large audience. And second, Joe Rogan is kind of a piece of shit. He’s not only given a platform to well-known dangerous idiots like Alex Jones and Gavin McInnes (hell, throw in space fascist Elon Musk in that group as well), but he’s also said some pretty fucked up racist and transphobic things as well.

The dispute, then, is about whether Sanders should have accepted the endorsement by someone as shitty as Rogan (he did). Two general arguments are levied on either side: those supporting Sanders’ decision cite the size of Rogan’s audience and what an endorsement like his can do for helping Sanders win the nomination; those opposing the decision (which, I assume includes at least a few of Sanders’ supporters as well) claim that accepting such an endorsement is a kind of dirty deal and is tantamount to a tacit agreement of Rogan’s own shitty views.

Fortunately for me, I won’t be trying to settle this dispute, so those reading who might have been anxious that I’m about to drop a hot take can relax. Rather, what I want to talk about is an article by Vox’s Dylan Matthews about that dispute and what I take to be a really, really bad argument.


Matthews’ Core Argument

Matthews’ argument rests on the fact that anti-endorsement and pro-endorsement arguments mentioned above can be roughly thought of in deontological and consequentialist terms respectively. In other words, those approving of the endorsement (or holding their nose at it) justify their support by referencing the consequences that such an endorsement would have for a successful Sanders campaign. By doing this, they (implicitly or explicitly) argue that the goodness of those consequences outweigh the badness of being endorsed by someone like Rogan. By contrast, those categorically opposing the endorsement (or being critical of it) justify their opposition by appealing to some principle of morality that does not take into account the consequences of the action done.

Crucially, Matthews takes this difference to be indicative of deep, dividing fissures between ‘leftists’ and ‘liberals’ with each taking a different school of thought in presenting their arguments (this is a short, and I believe, charitable reading of the claim; the specifics are much, much weirder as I point out below). Roughly, Matthews thinks that when it comes to certain issues, liberals and leftists are speaking past each other with each group using different moral standards of assessment for different contexts. Matthews doesn’t make a judgment on which side is correct (which I commend him on since I’ve decided to take the same route!) in this meta-debate, but believes this is a serious phenomenon that we should be aware of.

Well known liberal, Immanuel Kant (kidding, not even Matthews calls him that)

Why the Argument is Garbage

But let’s stop for a second and ask whether this is so. What’s the evidence provided that there is such a deep fissure between leftists and liberals? The most obvious bit of evidence seems to be a collection of tweets that offer some principled objection to Sanders accepting Rogan’s endorsement coupled with Matthews’ claim that principled objections to certain actions are the purview of ‘liberals’ (“Most liberals have what I would characterize as a deontological opposition to discrimination. That is, they think that discriminating against or maligning someone on the basis of membership in a protected class — women, trans people, black people, and other racially oppressed communities, etc. — violates a rule that should be inviolable.”) The implication seems to be that those ‘socialist-identified’ Bernie supporters do not make take such stances but that they’re primarily driven by consequentialist considerations.

Now maybe Matthews hasn’t spent enough time in ‘leftist’ circles, but principled opposition to a position is decisively not the purview of liberals (ask a leftist what they think about opportunism and you’ll hear about an hour’s worth of anti-consequentialist polemics). The fact of the matter is that leftist politics full of principled stances (some say too many!) and it’s not even clear that the tweets that are used as evidence in this argument are even coming from liberals–I can easily see some of my leftist comrades criticizing Sanders’ endorsement precisely on the grounds that the left shouldn’t take any endorsement from anyone even remotely right-wing. It literally seems that the only thing that has convinced Matthews that this is a liberal position is his impression that it’s liberals that are in the business of offering deontological arguments!

Even if Matthews is right that liberals use deontological arguments sometimes (I agree with him there!), it’s just not true that leftists don’t use them as well. He might be in a better position if he could defend the claim that liberals make such appeals more frequently than leftists, but this is a different claim from the one offered and one for which I’ve seen zero evidence.

Likewise, things might be different if he could show that leftists use consequentialist arguments more often than liberals. But not only is there no support for this, but precisely where you would expect there to be some such support the argument gets super weird. After showing that some people oppose Sanders’ endorsement on principled grounds Matthews gives us a brief gloss of consequentialism and offers the following:

Here’s how that disagreement plays into the Rogan controversy. Shortly after the Rogan controversy broke out, Sanders fans started pulling out references to Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state and arguable war criminal whose counsel Hillary Clinton welcomed in 2016. The objection is straightforward: Kissinger was responsible for the deaths of at least hundreds of thousands of innocent people over the course of his career, between his complicity in the Bangladesh genocide of 1971, his push to carpet-bomb Cambodia, and his support for brutal dictatorships in Chile and Argentina. Surely that’s worse than whatever Rogan has said, no? So is it really fair to condemn Sanders for trumpeting Rogan’s support when Clinton trumpeted her connections to a morally far worse individual?

I can’t say this strongly enough: the argument presented by “Sanders fans” is not a consequentialist argument! It is a charge of hypocrisy which is something entirely different. What they’re saying is not “the consequences of having this endorsement will be better than the consequences of taking the principled line that you advocate” but rather “you are a hypocrite by taking issue with Rogan but not taking an issue with Kissinger” or “you weren’t so principled when your favored candidate was being endorsed by shitty people.”

Matthews is right that they may also claim that on top of that that side was willing to get an endorsement by someone who’s responsible for hundreds of thousands of innocent lives, but this doesn’t make the argument a consequentialist one. Rather what this points to is the depth of hypocrisy. The same thing can be said about the back and forth about Colin Powell. How Matthews misses this is, frankly, confusing.

All this is to say that there’s nothing in here that should convince anyone of the claim that leftists are more likely to engage in consequentialist arguments. We’re still left with just Matthews’ impression that this is just what leftists do.

This is Dr. Henry Killinger who has certainly been responsible for fewer deaths than Kissinger

Let’s Give Him the Data

Let’s engage in some fantasy and give Matthews the data. Suppose Matthews had gathered a representative group of tweets on one side by explicitly self-identified liberals who give explicitly deontological reasons against the endorsement, and a representative group of tweets on the other side by explicitly self-identifying leftists giving explicit consequentialist reasons defending the endorsement. Hell, let’s make it even more robust and say that instead of tweets, Matthews did a proper controlled social psychology experiment that showed a correlation between being a leftist and supporting a consequentialist argument in this case and being a liberal and supporting a deontological argument in this case. Wouldn’t this show that there’s a deep philosophical fissure between leftists and liberals?

No! At best it would show that when it comes to the question of Bernard Sanders’ acceptance or rejection of an endorsement some people favor consequentialist reasoning and other people favor deontological reasoning. To support the more robust claim one would have to show that there’s a strong correlation between being a leftist and reasoning consequentially and being a liberal and reasoning deontologically in general.

Now, some people have tried to argue something analogous with studies about how people reason in trolley cases, but these, too, face some serious problems. Most notably, it’s notoriously difficult to prove that those studies tell us anything more than how, say, conservatives and liberals reason differently in trolley cases. One can willingly accept that some groups might be more sensitive to consequentialist reasoning when it comes to deaths by train, but it’s a further step to the broader claim that those who reason in such a way in those cases reason the same in all other moral cases.

Likewise, even if we could say that there’s a political divide with respect to this issue that can be boiled down to philosophical differences (something, which, to stress again, has not been proven), it doesn’t follow that there’s anything even close to a deep fissure along these lines (which is not to say that such a fissure doesn’t exist). For all we know, leftists and liberals reason morally in every single other domain. It’s doubtful, but nothing about this article should make anyone think otherwise.


Some Speculation of my own

I’ve been pretty hard on Matthews for not providing support, so let me make some speculative claims of my own for which I’ll provide zero empirical evidence (or really any kind of argument).

I think Matthews’ hot takes are the result of certain general view that there are profound, deeply different ways of moral reasoning that map onto different political views. I don’t know why people find this view to be appealing (though I suspect Jonathan Haidt’s work is at least partially to blame; though, I should say I’m not familiar enough with it to comment here). I bristle at any kind of essentialist views about politics and this is no exception.

However, I can imagine that such a view might be comforting to the extent that if it’s right, then the things that divide us politically can be seen as a kind of misunderstanding or speaking past each other (“Oh, you’re just sensitive to the consequences and I’m sensitive to the rules!”). If that’s right, then the solution to our deep political issues become a matter of tinkering, clarifying, and ironing out and not of any fundamental class conflict, racism, or bigotry. And while I would love for this to be the case since it makes good work for moral philosophers, I’m just skeptical.

Part of why I’m skeptical is that this view requires that people have some pretty clear and consistent moral views. Leftists have to always (or most of the time, or consistently, or…) reason by appeals to the consequences; liberals have to always (or most of the time, or consistently, or…) reason by appeals to principles. And I just don’t think this is true.

I suspect that the majority of people don’t have coherent, systematic ways of morally reasoning that can be mapped to their political views. Rather, like Thomas Nagel says in his “War and Massacre” piece, I think that all people who are not trying to win an argument or acolytes of Kant of Mill are generally sensitive to both consequentialist and deontological reasons. I’ve personally never met a single person who only reasoned in one way or found only one way of reasoning convincing (and I hope I never do!)

Furthermore, I believe that we’re kind of pluralist and opportunistic about when we employ different kinds of reasoning and why. Sometimes we offer deontological reasons in support or against a particular view, and other times we employ consequentialist reasons. This isn’t to say that this necessarily makes for bad reasoning. Indeed, I’m more inclined to think that both kinds of reasoning might be necessary to truly understand the depths of our moral landscape and that it’s the moralist who fetishizes systematicity that is likely to get things upside down. But I think it should push us away from these essentialist psychological views.

Some Thoughts on “Parasite”

I went to see Bong Joon-Ho’s Parasite last month and came out of the theater absolutely pumped. I’ve seen more than a few great movies this year, and this one definitely ranks among the top. I meant to put down my thoughts about the movie on paper much sooner, but the end of the semester grading (and my previous commitment to finishing The State and Revolution) kept me from doing it sooner. In any case, what follows below are a couple of things that I really liked about the film (and one thing that I didn’t care for too much). Plenty of spoilers follow.

What I Loved:

Perhaps the thing I liked most about the film is its focus on the impact and importance of the material conditions on the two families. This is, of course, most clearly demonstrated in the difference between the homes of the Kim and Park families. The Kim family lives in a small, cramped, smelly, sub-basement apartment in a poor part of town. The audience gets the impression that this is less of an apartment for people as much as it is a kind of negative space that’s occupied by people (much in the same way that the space underneath the fridge is the space that happens to be occupied by cockroaches). It is distinctively and oppressively urban.

By contrast, the Park family lives in a spacious, elegant, beautifully designed house elevated above the city. Its landscape is so carefully manicured and maintained that when one looks out of the massive Park house windows one can imagine that they’re not anywhere near an urban center. The house not only suggests a life of elegant opulence, but also one of privacy–every family member has their own separate space and there are no drunks peeing in sight of the dinner table.

In fact, there’s a glut of privacy in the Park house. Only in a house like that could a man live underground without ever being noticed; only in a house like that could so many secrets be kept. The Kim family is able to trick the Parks because each of them can occupy a role that fills a space within their house. In turn, by playing that role well enough and occupying that space, they can slip by unnoticed. Clearly, the same thing could never happen in the Kim house.

These most-obvious material differences are important, but they merely scratch the surface. After all, it’s not uncommon for movies to bring the viewers’ attention to great disparities in wealth and if the most notable thing about the movie were to make us notice that some people live comfortably and affluently while others don’t, then it wouldn’t be worth writing about.

What Parasite does especially well is explain how these differences in material conditions have massive effects on the psychologies of the characters. And it does so without resorting to a kind of moral caricaturizing. Let me explain by starting with this latter point and working backwards.

a. No Moral Caricatures

First, it’s clear that the Parks aren’t pure incarnations of evil. It’s true, they do live an affluent lifestyle, but they’re never shown to do anything particularly heinous. Mr. Park doesn’t work as, like, an arms dealer, and although Mrs. Park is shown to be a bit naïve and childish, it’s clear that she clearly loves her children and wants the best for them. Their relationship with the Kim family isn’t particularly warm (they are, after all, ‘the help’ and the Parks frequently talk among themselves about Ki-taek’s smell), but they’re neither cold nor particularly imperious. In short, they perfectly embody a kind of familiar elite aloofness which, in general, is not enough to make the audience hate them.

By contrast, it is equally clear that the Kims are not paragons of virtue. In the first place, they are willing to lie to and manipulate the Parks in order to get what they want: Kevin is not a tutor, Jessica is not an art therapist, Ki-taek is not a professional driver, and Chung-sook is not employed by an elite house-keeping service. These deceptions are not terribly serious since the members of the Kim family are more than capable of doing what the Kims need them to do–they may have lied about their qualifications, but they do their jobs well.

[That being said, the Kim children also do some pretty objectionable things: Kevin almost immediately initiates a romantic relationship with the much younger girl he’s meant to be tutoring, and it’s not obvious whether Jessica’s ‘art therapy’ is really helping the young Da-song.]

Much more objectionable are the lengths to which the Kims go to secure their position with respect to the other working-class people. First, in order to get her father hired as Mr. Park’s driver, Jessica gets his previous driver fired by implying that he’s having sex in Mr. Park’s car. And, of course, in order to get Chung-sook hired as the housekeeper, the family causes her to have a sever allergic reaction which could have killed her (indeed, later, they do just that).

The Kims’ motivation throughout the movie is exclusively self-centered. What matters to them is that they’re able to get what they think they’re able to get. That doesn’t mean that they’re willing to do anything—they never intend to kill the Parks’ former housekeeper—but the audience gets the sense that the welfare of people outside the family matters very little to them. In short, they’re selfish, opportunistic, and largely amoral. Of course, that doesn’t make them monsters, but it does make the audience’s perception of them much more complex, and, in my experience at least, much more realistic.

b. Material Conditions Shape Psychology

By refusing to make the Parks and the Kims into opposing moral caricatures the director is able to move beyond a naïve picture that explains the characters’ actions and psychology through a purely moral lens. Neither the Parks nor the Kims do what they do because they’re simply good/evil people who are naturally moved to be selfish, or cruel, or indifferent to the suffering of others. This, in turn, draws the audience’s attention to the alternative explanation: namely, that the families’ respective psychologies and motivations are shaped precisely by the material conditions in which they live.

This is perhaps the most important theme in the movie and one that I think was done fantastically well. One scene to note here is the scene in which the former house-keeper and her husband are discovered by the Kim family as they squat in the Park family house. The two families mirror each other here: both are destitute, both are desperate, both are trying to alleviate their suffering by living off the scraps of the Parks, and neither is willing to give up their temporary gains for the benefit of the other. They are, in short, both parasites (THAT’S THE NAME OF THE MOVIE! GET IT?!?!). Crucially, their recognition of equality in this situation makes the two of them competitors for those scraps. Both families realize that their relative well-being is contingent on the zero-sum gains they’ve been able to attain behind the Parks’ backs, and that the opposing family is in a position to ruin their setup by alerting the Parks. This realization culminates in the fight between the two families, and, ultimately, in the death of the former house-keeper and the imprisonment of her husband in the underground lair.

This scene (as well as the scenes in which the Kims succeed in getting their positions in the Park house) is a metaphor for the broader phenomenon in which the conditions of poor people force them to turn against one another in order to get the scraps left by the rich. It’s not the case that the Kims hate the former house-keeper and her husband—they don’t set out to kill her—and vice versa. But the situation they’ve been presented with is one in which they must either fight each other and preserve what they’ve gained, or give that up for someone else to grab while they return to their previous lot. Scarcity and poverty are what motivates the families’ behavior and what explains their actions, not anything about their inherent moral character or worth.

The psychological warping of the individual in this setting is most clearly seen in the behavior of Geun-sae, the former house-keeper’s underground dwelling husband. His subterranean life has led him to see Mr. Park as a kind of God-figure to whom reverence and submission is owed. Far from seeing his life as the manifestation of a gross injustice in which a select few get to enjoy the finest things in life while the many fight over scraps, Geun-sae sees himself as a beneficiary of a blessing bestowed to him by Mr. Park. In that sense, Mr. Park doesn’t appear to him as another human being, but rather as a supernatural entity with the power to give and take away life.

This reification of the wealthy is a familiar phenomenon and is at the core of capitalist ideology. In that ideology, the capitalist appears almost as a force of nature who produces value from nowhere for the benefit of others, and who, of course, grabs a share of those benefits in the process. Thus, the capitalist is seen not as someone who grows fat off the exploitation of others, but as someone who is the source of all that is good in life.

Now, this is quite literally the case for Geun-sae for whom day-to-day survival depends on the well-being and success of Mr. Park. But the same phenomenon is found in a lesser degree in the way ordinary people and politicians treat the rich as ‘job creators’; in the way the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ is idolized; in the belief that influx of wealth ‘fixes’ neighborhoods; and so on. Indeed, there is a general dogma (at least in America) against doing anything that might disrupt or go against the interest of the rich since to displease them would cause them to withdraw their blessings from the people. Sacrifices must be made to the Gods of Capital–taxes must be forgotten, credit extended, markets opened, communities destroyed–so that something worse, we are told, doesn’t happen; viz. so that Amazon doesn’t move its headquarters to Northern Ireland, so that Carrier doesn’t close its plants in Ohio, so that Blue Cross/Blue Shield doesn’t lay off a thousand workers. This is just Geun-sae’s supplicating attitude to Mr. Park writ large.

c. Luck, Rationality, and Contingency

Perhaps the most interesting aspect in how differences in material conditions affect individuals’ psychology is in the realm of rationality. This can be seen in one of the film’s pivotal scenes in which a deluge washes over the city, flooding the Kim family’s basement apartment, destroying all their belongings and leaving them homeless.

In the first place, this scene is interesting for the contrast between the way the same contingent event–the rainstorm–affects the Kim and Park families. For the Kim family the storm is unquestionably devastating. In the span of a couple of hours, while fantasizing about the kind of lives they’ll have if they continue to hold their positions in the Park household, all of their belongings are completely destroyed and they’re forced to take shelter in a relief center for the foreseeable future. By contrast, for the Park family, the rainstorm is a blessing that clears away the pollution and freshens the air.

This by itself is interesting, but it points to an even more serious point. Namely, it shows how absolutely devastating the role of luck can be in how well one’s life goes. Let me back up a little bit. Aside from fetishization of the wealthy, another lynch-pin in American capitalist ideology is the myth of the self-made man as the product of rational calculation and prudent risk. As it goes, the rich do not make their money through exploitation, but first by diligent saving and then careful study and investment in what the market needs. In short, successful rich folks are those who have an ability to suppress their immediate desires and delay gratification in a rational matter that maximizes their yield. In contrast, the poor are often seen as irrational, lazy, or chronically incapable of suppressing their immediate urges for the sake of greater future gains.

This is what’s in the background when people claim that poor people are that way because they spend all their money on cars, clothes, and toys rather than saving it and investing it (this, and, most of the time a hefty dose of racism, too). Indeed, I’ve even heard it said that poverty is perpetuated because poor people buy coffee from Starbucks or eat fast food rather than making either at home! In short, poverty is seen as an inability to manage a budget, and managing a budget is seen as an exercise in rational planning for the future. (For more on this kind of argument and why it’s wrong, see UNC’s own Jennifer Morton’s work on poverty and rationality)

The deluge scene in Parasite shows just how stupid this line of reasoning is in light of the actual material conditions on the ground. In one of the best scenes in the movie, Kevin asks his father in the shelter what the plan is. Ki-taek responds (paraphrasing) that the plan is the one that succeeds every time: namely, the one that isn’t made. Ki-taek’s point is, of course, not an endorsement of a kind of irrationality, but rather the very prescient one that the norms of rationality that the myth of the rational capitalist endorse only make sense under certain background conditions. Specifically, they only make sense if there’s a certain kind of security against these absolutely devastating contingencies that can completely destroy your life in the span of a few hours. It simply doesn’t make sense to live the kind of life that looks years, months, or even weeks in the future if tomorrow a rainstorm can take everything away.

Now, it’s true that, in a certain respect, we are all subject to the whims of fate. Both I and Jeff Bezos can be crushed by a falling piano tomorrow; we may both be struck by lightning; and we may both develop some rare, terminal disease. No amount of rational planning will guarantee that these things won’t happen and this is something that is shared by all of us regardless of wealth or economic status. At that level, we’re both equally vulnerable to luck. Nevertheless, at every level below that, the difference become astronomical. An unexpected root canal won’t force Jeff Bezos to take out high-interest loans; a family member falling ill won’t make a difference as to whether he’ll be able to work; etc. With respect to most (though not all!) contingencies, Bezos is protected while I’m not. What this means, of course, is that he can discount certain events when making certain decisions and that certain actions are rational for him that wouldn’t be rational for me.

Much further down the line are the Kim family. The question that their situation raises is about how one should live when virtually anything can ruin any plan that you have in the future. Is it even rational to spend the energy to form plans when you live in that kind of world? Ki-taek’s answer is, of course, no. Not only is there no sense in planning under such circumstances, but it’s absolutely a waste of time. Instead, these conditions suggest that one should live with the short-term in mind–with getting fed today; with getting to work today–rather than with some unattainable and implausible future further on.

This is something many people who haven’t actually been poor have a hard time understanding, and it’s something that I think the movie presents very well.

d. The Central Question

All of this serves to highlight what I take to be the central message of the film. The title naturally invites the viewer to repeatedly ask the question of who are the ‘parasites’ in this film, and, in turn, to wonder whether they are justified in ‘feeding’ off others. But these questions are not the most important ones. With respect to the first, there’s no question that the Kim family (and the former house-keeper and her husband) are the parasites–in that respect the metaphor is almost too on the nose. The second question is a bit more interesting, but the points I’ve brought up–specifically, the fact that none of the characters can be caricatured as people who ‘deserve’ their lot, and the effect that the material conditions have on their psychologies–suggest to me that the question of individual justification is, in a way, beside the point.

What matters more than whether or not the Kims are justified in doing what they do or whether the Parks are justified in living the kind of lives they live is less important than the question of what kind of society allows for the existence of parasites, and the question of the grounds on which such a society can be justified. These questions are, of course, not new questions (especially to those of us on the left), but it’s been a hot minute since I’ve seen them brought up so forcefully in a popular film. And I’m glad for that.


What I didn’t Care for

Perhaps the only thing I really didn’t like about the movie is the very last ten minutes. First and foremost, the fact that Kevin survives two massive blows to the back of the head from a thirty pound rock then wakes up in a hospital is absolutely absurd. It seems to me that the only reason he lives is to deliver the narrated anti-climax and, as everyone knows, making x happen to a character because y needs to happen is usually a bad reason for x to happen.

In the same vein, I thought the back and forth letter narration between father and son were a bit too heavy-handed and didactic (not to mention that there was no narration through the rest of the movie which makes this part of the movie stick out).

That being said, I get what the director is going for in showing us Kevin’s fantasy and why he included the scene. I understand that the final scene in which the family is reunited is an impossible fantasy that Kevin needs to indulge in in order to go on. Kevin won’t get rich, he won’t buy the house, and he will never see his father again. This fantasy is both a way of making sense of his life and its direction, and (seemingly) the only source of comfort he has in light of the events of the movie. It allows him to make sense of his life by giving him both an interpretation of what went wrong (he didn’t play by the rules! He thought he could get ahead quickly through subterfuge when he should have been working hard to become a millionaire!) and what he must do to set things right (he has to make a plan and stick to it and be perfect!).

This, of course, is just Kevin’s return to the neo-liberal capitalist ideology that underwrites and sustains the very system that makes it possible for there to be ‘parasites’ in society the first place.

The scene is tragic because despite everything that’s happened, Kevin simply can’t escape this ideology–his suffering has only driven him further into it. And we understand why this is the case. His material conditions prove his father correct–there’s no point in making long-term plans if something as simple as a rainstorm can completely destroy your life. However, to accept this and truly live without such long-term plans is, in essence, to live as an alienated impotent entity, simply reacting to the things that one is incapable of changing one way or the other. Arguably, that way of living is hardly worth living at all–it truly is to live opportunistically (like an animal or…a parasite). In such a situation ideology serves to smooth things over and play a conciliatory role: things aren’t really what they seem; the material conditions don’t make it impossible to live a good life; the world rewards merit, grit, and effort; justice and injustice are ultimately a matter of how individuals relate to one another. Kevin embraces this idea because it allows him to continue living as a human being. In the absence of an alternative way of making sense of things, who could blame him for going in this direction?

All this is to say I understand the importance of this last scene and I think the message conveyed is an important one. Nevertheless, I just didn’t like the narrative choice taken to deliver that message–reading it out through a series of letters just felt…I don’t know…artless (especially after the equally artless magical revival of the main character).

[The other side of me wants to fill in the other half of the leftist critique: the choice of the poor is not to either deny the reality of their material circumstances and escape to fantasy or to accept that reality and live in misery. One can accept reality and fight to change it. But I’ll leave it alone–no movie needs to do everything]

The Matrix Machines are Idiots

I’ve been thinking about a problem with how the robots power themselves in the movie “The Matrix.” Let me explain.

For a second, let’s assume that Morpheus is right and that if the machines got enough humans they *could* use them as a source of power. This is already controversial, but assume that there’s no energy loss from the little pods they’re grown in to the turbines or whatever that provide enough electricity for the machines. Even so, we know that the power they provide is power they get from the humans being kept alive in a vegetative state in those pods.

We know this because the way they get Neo out is by making the machine think that he’s dead and spitting him out (he’s no longer any good as a battery!) Obviously, to keep a human being alive–even in such a state–you need to feed them something. Morpheus confirms this: the live humans are intravenously fed the liquefied dead. (Ignore, for a moment why the machine spits Neo out when it thinks he’s dead rather than just liquefying him right there)

Let’s also assume that the humans that are being liquefied are not humans that die of old age. A quick google search establishes that the average human male body is around 125,000 calories. We also know that the average person in a coma needs about 2000 calories a day to keep living. What that means is that one liquid human body gives another person about 62 days of nutrition (and, of course, 62 human bodies about 1 day).

The average life of a singe human is about 72 years or about 26,000 days. If raised from birth (ignoring differences in caloric needs through different stages of life), a human being would need roughly 52 million calories. That would amount to about 412 dead human beings needed to keep one person alive for 72 years. Though, to stick with our average assumptions, let’s say that the machines only keep people alive until middle age.

So, let’s can say that we have a ratio of 206 dead needed to keep one alive. Currently, there are 7.7 billion people on the planet. Supposing they liquefy all of us, they would be able to maintain ~34 million people through middle age. If those people don’t reproduce they can sustain ~165,000 people, then ~800, then a little less than 4. In short, the reign of the machines can only last about 175 years.

Now, I know what you’re thinking: duh, of course they would reproduce us! Fine. Suppose that there is reproduction involved. This means that at in the limiting case we have a starting population of something like 1.16 billion women between 15-35. Assuming each one gives birth every 9 months (it’s a nightmare scenario in the post-apocalypse hell-world!) we have roughly 26 births per person (i.e. 20 years by 12 months divided by 9).

This gives us 28 billion more people from our initial cycle; factor in a .078 child death rate and you have roughly 26 billion people, 14 billion of whom would be able to give birth again. So maybe it’s not so bad for the machines!

However, this would only be possible after 15 years and those babies gotta eat during that time. Which means that the machines would need to reserve ~11 million calories per person for those 15 years, or, roughly 1.533e+17 calories (for the 14 billion born; double that for both male and female babies), which translates to about 1.2264e+12 people just to get to the next iteration. Now, obviously, that number is much greater than the 7.7 billion people available! So, this ain’t gonna cut it!

But suppose they just want to break even. Well, that won’t work either. We know that 7.7 billion people can, at max, sustain 34 million people. Which means that ~12 million will be able to reproduce, resulting in ~312 million births, half, of whom, again, would need a reserve of ~11 million calories each, which, obviously is still much, much more than the initial starting population. Suppose they just want 34 million people born–that would require 3.74e+14 calories or ~3 billion people. Which, of course, is apparent when we consider that 206 people are required to keep 1 person alive for 62 days and human beings can’t make 206 people 62 days after birth.

And this is all ignoring the fact that this is the amount of energy that’s just needed just to keep other people alive and that these human bodies are supposed to then produce extra energy that runs the machines themselves.

In short, this is a bad plan and the machines are idiots.

Thank you for coming to my Ted Talk.

*hiss hiss click click*