The ‘Moral Element’ in the Reproduction of Labor-Power

This blog post is split into two parts. The first part–this one here–is concerned with an interpretation of a passage at the end of Part I, Volume 1 of Capital dealing with the reproduction of labor-power. My goal is to offer a reading of this passage that is slightly different from what might be (or at least what I take to be) the orthodox reading, but which has significant downstream effects if correct. As such, it is largely an exercise is text interpretation. In part two (forthcoming), I try to show how this small interpretive difference can help us make sense of the tensions that have been brought up in the current COVID pandemic. Those who have little interest in Marxist minutiae can probably skip directly to part two. Otherwise, strap in.

One final note: much of my analysis here is inspired by Bob Wolff’s seminar on Marx. That being said, all mistakes–interpretative or philosophical–are my own.


Photo from Peter Menzel and Faith D’Aluisio’s Hungry Planet: What the World Eats; this is the weekly food allowance of an American family
  1. The Means of Subsistence

The passage I have in mind is a rather long, but not terribly complicated excerpt in Marx’s discussion of labor-power. In any case, I’ll break things down in pieces shortly. Here I quote it in full:

The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this specific article. In so far as it has value, it represents no more than a definite quantity of the average social labour objectified in it. Labour-power exists only as a capacity of the living individual. Its production consequently presupposes his existence. Given the existence of the individual, the production of labour- power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance. For his maintenance he requires a certain quantity of the means of subsistence. Therefore the labour-time necessary for the production of labour-power is the same as that necessary for the production of those means of subsistence; in other words, the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner. However, labour-power becomes a reality only by being expressed; it is activated only through labour. But in the course of this activity, i.e. labour, a definite quantity of human muscle, nerve, brain, etc. is expended, and these things have to be replaced. Since more is expended, more must be received. If the owner of labour-power works today, tomorrow he must again be able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a working individual. His natural needs, such as food, clothing, fuel and housing vary according to the climactic and other physical peculiarities of his country. On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are themselves products of history, and depend therefore to a great extent on the level of civilization attained by a country; in particular they depend on the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and expectations with which, the class of free workers has been formed. In contrast, therefore, with the case of other commodities, the determination of the value of labour-power contains a historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a given country at a given period, the average amount of the means of subsistence necessary for the worker is a known datum.

Marx, Capital Vol. 1 (Penguin Edition) pg. 274-275 Emphasis mine

As stated, this passage is part of Marx’s broader discussion of labor power as a commodity. Here we learn that labor-power (to hell with the British spelling!) is like every other commodity insofar as its value is determined by the average socially necessary labor needed to reproduce it. And given that labor power is something that can only be done by a living individual, the reproduction of labor-power from one day to the next requires the reproduction of the individual as well.1

To calculate the value of labor-power we have to calculate the value of the average socially necessary labor needed to reproduce the individual. And to calculate that value, we have to account for the average socially necessary labor needed for the means of subsistence which go into reproducing that individual. These means of subsistence are, roughly, that basket of goods that is necessary to replace what was spent in the process of laboring (or, as we find out later, the money equivalent for that basket–c.f. pg. 324). Thus, the means of subsistence is, for example, the food, clothing, shelter, etc. needed to keep someone working from one day to the next, and its value is determined by however much the average socially necessary labor is that goes into reproducing those material goods (bread, shirts, houses, etc.).

Now, of course, the value of each of these goods will itself have a history, such that we get little recursive cycles between the value of labor-power and the value of the means of subsistence. That is, some portion of a loaf of bread is needed to reproduce labor from day one to day two, from day two to day three, and so on (we assume, of course, for the sake of simplicity that this portion is constant); but that portion of that loaf of bread is itself the result of the application of some other amount of labor-power that was previously employed to produce the loaf (and hence that portion of bread), which, in turn, required some portion of bread to be applied, and so on and so on. Now, this series terminates–I leave proof of that for the mathematicians–so at any point in time, we’re able to quantify both the value of labor power and the value of the means of subsistence in terms of each other. This is why Marx says at the end that this is a known datum.

So far so good. However, what Marx says right before he makes the claim that the value of the means of subsistence is a known datum is of special interest. Specifically, Marx tells us that the value of labor-power will be partially a matter of historical and moral contingencies because (part of) what determines it is the value of the means of subsistence..

This reference to history and morality should be enough to perk one’s ears up. What does Marx mean here?

On a deflationary, thin reading of the text, Marx is merely pointing to the fact that, say, the concrete forms that the means of subsistence will vary from place to place based on the particular traditions and history of the location–in one place it will take the form of a meatloaf and a suit; in another it will take the from of a bowl of bean soup and woolen pants; in yet another, for ostensibly moral reasons, it will exclude pork or synthetic clothing, etc. Similarly, the means of subsistence for a society located near the equator will not include warm clothing as what’s necessary to reproduce labor from one day to the next, but a society located in the arctic circle would. And the means of subsistence for an advanced industrial society will be different from those of a purely agrarian one. Nevertheless, regardless of where we go and what culture we look at, each one will be tracking the same thing when it comes to the means of subsistence: namely, what is necessary to reproduce the labor-power of a worker in that society from day to day.

This much seems to be a brute empirical fact: different places have different culinary traditions, different fashion senses, and so on that have been shaped by specific histories peculiar to the area in question. However, I believe there’s a further question regarding whether this is all Marx meant by these remarks. Specifically, it’s once again worth noting that Marx makes explicit note of the fact that it’s the moral element in question and the expectations of the workers as they relate the means of subsistence that makes labor-power different from other commodities.

Crucially, if we take the thin reading then it’s not clear why it shouldn’t apply for every commodity. After all, is it not true that because of historical and perhaps (ostensibly) moral considerations and expectations, different groups take different things to count as tables, chairs, shirts, etc.? Yet, as far as I know, Marx never says that the way would find out the value of a coat is by calculating the average socially necessary labor and then factor in the expectations of the workers regarding their history and moral consideration of coats (the very notion that one can have moral considerations about coats might strike some people as ridiculous, but there are cultures for whom the use of special clothing–hats, hair coverings, etc.–are indeed a matter of morality). In short, this thin reading doesn’t explain the special attention Marx pays to the means of subsistence as making a difference to the value of labor-power.

How are we to understand this remark and especially the fact that what needs to be accounted for are the expectations of “the class of free workers?” Note well, the class of free workers does not constitute the entire society in which those workers labor, but, if the thin reading were correct, there would be no need to distinguish that it’s the expectations of the free workers and their history that must be considered. This seems to point to the notion that Marx had something else in mind.

The Aboubakar family of Darfur province, Sudan, in front of their tent in the Breidjing Refugee Camp, in eastern Chad, with a week’s worth of food.

2. Interlude: Upper and Lower Boundaries

To get at what I think Marx had in mind, we have to take a little detour. I promise we’ll return to the text at the end to tie things together.

Given what has been said so far, one might push back with something like the following view (presented in its own separate box for readability):

Start with some obvious scientific facts. Namely, at least when it comes to food, there is some minimal number of calories that the worker must have access to and be able to consume so that she can continue to labor from day to day (let’s leave out clothing and shelter for the sake of simplicity). This specific minimal number can be known and is a factor one’s biology, the kind of work involved, and the environment. It might vary from location to location and person to person, but in every case there is some brute biological fact about what that number is such that dipping too far below it would make it impossible to do today’s labor tomorrow, and meeting or exceeding it would allow one to labor again. The number itself will vary from job to job (breaking rocks vs. painting a fence), from person to person (a twenty-year-old woman vs. a sixty-year-old man), and from locale to locale in the specific concrete form that it takes (bean soup vs. meatloaf), but it is a determinable number that can be read off solely from the material conditions on the ground. Crucially, it is this caloric number that sets the actual value of the means of subsistence, and, consequently, it is part of what sets the value of labor-power and what determines the fair minimum price at which the capitalist must purchase it (Marx never disagrees that labor-power is purchased at its value!). It’s when the worker labors past that point that exploitation becomes a factor and how the capitalist makes his nut. In the end, the remark about cultural differences and moral elements are really in line with the thin reading–they explain superficial difference between locales, but not much more. To insist otherwise seems to be tantamount to denying that there is such a thing as a bare minimum needed to stay alive, and perhaps even to consider that some people are radically and fundamentally different in their biology.

Now, this view is not entirely wrong–after all, it is true that one can calculate the number of calories in this way, that the body needs a certain amount of calories without which the same kind of labor cannot be reproduced (at least not for long), and that, roughly speaking, human bodies are more or less the same in what they need (it’s not that some of us need bread to eat and others drink boiling vats of carbolic acid).

What’s at stake, however, is whether this view presents us with the full picture and whether this is the only way of calculating the value of the means of subsistence. We can grant that the means of subsistence must have some kind of lower boundary below which they simply can’t function as means of subsistence. But given that anything above this minimum will also reproduce labor-power, the question becomes of where to stop. Let’s look at our options.

It’s obvious where the capitalist will want it to stop. Given the labor theory of value, profit is generated depending on the amount of labor that can be squeezed out of the workers past the amount paid to them for purchasing their labor-power. If the capitalist employs the laborers for 8 hours, paying them only for the equivalent of the one hour of labor that’s needed to reproduce their labor power from one day to the next (i.e. the value of the means of subsistence), then he gets to keep the value generated for himself in the remaining seven hours. All things being equal, it’s clear from this that the longer it takes for the worker to generate the value to cover their needs of subsistence, the less value the capitalist appropriates, and hence, the lower his profit. If it takes six hours instead of one to cover the means of subsistence, then the capitalist only gets to appropriate the value of two hours worth of labor rather than seven. And that makes a big difference! What he would like, qua capitalist of course, is for the ratio of time spent covering the means of subsistence to time spent working for the capitalist to be as small as possible. And given that at least part of how that ratio is calculated is a matter of what the value of the means of subsistence is, the capitalist has a vested interest in making sure that the means of subsistence really are at the limit bare minimum. Thus, he adopts the view above and claims that the fair price for labor-power just is that bare minimum.2

Thus the capitalist reasons. But what should we make of this reasoning? He’s certainly correct insofar as there is a minimum he must pay his workers if he is to make a profit (although, this, too, is possible if there’s a sufficient number of workers waiting in the wings to take over the places of their dead comrades), but does establishing that fact mean that the value of the means of subsistence must be bound to that minimum? No–or rather, it’s not immediately obvious why that should be the case. What it establishes is simply that his profits won’t be as high if he pays beyond that, but unless we accept that the maximization of profits–the capitalist’s raison d’etre–serves as an over-riding consideration, it makes little difference.3

A picture of billionaire ghoul Jeff Bezos’ $165 million mansion

What is of interest to the worker? Presumably, she wants to stop somewhere beyond merely subsisting from day to day, toiling for the capitalist. Even if she must sell her labor, what she wants is a full life replete with all the goods that go along with it. Thus, she might want not just the caloric equivalent needed to work tomorrow, but good food she can enjoy; not just adequate shelter that keeps the elements out, but good housing; not just clothes that haven’t fallen apart, but comfortable clothes that allow her to move freely; she wants healthcare, vacations, time for creative labor, good schools for her kids, a pension, etc. In other words, she wants to have and to reproduce a certain life, the means of subsistence of which are far from the bare minimum.

Let’s suppose that just as there is a lower bound to what the capitalist must provide that represents his interest, there’s an upper bound that the worker can demand that represents her interests. At the very limit, this upper bound would be a scenario in which the worker’s entire time at work is spent generating the value that goes into (re)producing her means of subsistence and spends no time making a profit for the capitalist. The capitalist, obviously, wouldn’t accept this since he would then cease to be a capitalist, and the worker won’t accept anything below the bare minimum (and will only accept the bare minimum if forced). So, if there’s ever going to be an agreement between worker and capitalist it will be between these two limits.4

What’s important to note is that how we settle where to draw the line will be a matter of what counts as the means of subsistence, and this, in turn, will be a matter of what kind of life we aim to reproduce, or rather, what kind of being is to be sustained from day to day. If the kind of life that is to be reproduced is simply the life of a physical entity that is capable of engaging in physical labor (i.e. the kind of life that the capitalist needs), then the means of subsistence will be minimal. If, however, the kind of life that is to be reproduced is one of a robustly healthy, educated, autonomous being that labors (i.e. the kind of life that the worker wants), then the means of subsistence will be much greater.

Crucially, the question of what kind of life is to be reproduced (and hence, what the means of subsistence are to be) is not one that is established by reading off the biology of the worker, her work, etc. Indeed, the question is not settled empirically or descriptively at all! Rather, it is one that is answered only by considering the history of struggle by the free workers.


3. Back to Marx

If this is correct, then we have everything in place to explain what Marx means when he says that the value of the means of subsistence depends “on the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and expectations with which, the class of free workers has been formed” and why this means that “the determination of the value of labour-power contains a historical and moral element.”

If through its struggles, the working class at a certain locale has come to expect a certain kind of life that goes beyond the bare minimum that the capitalist needs–say, the life that includes healthcare and education on top of a salary equivalent to the minimum caloric intake–then what they will consider as the means of subsistence will be different from a different locale where there are no such expectations. Consequently, the value of the means of subsistence will differ, as will the value of their labor-power as a commodity.

Whether there have been such struggles and whether such expectations have been formed will, in turn, be a matter of the history of the locale and of the workers’ struggle. But it will also include a moral element as well insofar as the life they think they should reproduce is an ethical matter. To take one step further, the value of labor-power (via the value of the means of subsistence) will be a matter of what the workers believe they are entitled to. Given that entitlement is squarely in the realm of the ethical and that the ethical in the Marxist view is roughly settled as a matter of class struggle, the value of labor-power is at least partially a matter of how class struggle has been waged. Likewise, the future value of labor-power will likewise be a matter of how class struggle will be waged. I’ll return to this point shortly.

Before I do that, however, it’s worth noting that this doesn’t change the fact that at any given moment one can indeed calculate both the value of the means of subsistence and the value of labor-power. Both of these remain known data. The reading I’m advocating doesn’t deny this. What it does deny is that there is a fixed, a priori value to the means of subsistence that can be read and universally applied in the way that one could on what I’ve called the thin reading by simply making some simple empirical observations about human biology.


4. Why does this Matter?

One of the upshots of this reading is that it leaves room to understand the importance of action and agitation on the Marxist picture. One of the oldest ‘problems’ found in Marx’s philosophy is that it’s hard to square how to combine its descriptive and prescriptive elements. If the analysis in Capital is correct, then the revolution will come about because of the insurmountable contradictions inherent in the capitalist system itself as crisis after crisis proletarianizes (proletizes?) the masses, which will raise working class consciousness and kick things off. One way of understanding this is that the revolution will come when the material conditions are right, and those conditions will be right when capitalism itself comes to a certain stage of development. If that’s correct, then there’s seemingly no need for revolutionaries apart from what they can do to accelerate the development of capital to the appropriate stage! Indeed, they might even do significant harm if they try to start the revolution before the material conditions are right.

Yet, we also know that Marx’s writings (and his personal life) do not advocate for passivity in the face of encroaching capital, nor do they advocate for the acceleration of capitalism (as far as I’m aware Marx never encourages his readers to become capitalists so that the revolution can come sooner). How are we to square the urge for revolutionary activity and revolutionary organizing (a normative consideration) with what seems to be the purely descriptive nature of Capital?

The answer is, of course, that Capital is not a purely descriptive project and that the passage we’ve been discussing is one of the places where the normative and descriptive meet. Simply put, the descriptive element involves the discussion of the calculation of the value of labor-power via the value of the means of subsistence; the normative element involves the fact that that the value of the means of subsistence is something that is (at least partially) a matter of what the workers choose to do, expect to receive, and fight for.

One task of the revolutionary, then, rests in getting the working class to understand the fact that the value of their labor is, to some extent, a matter of what they’re willing to do and accept.

Acting to agitate in this way is perfectly compatible with the overall claim that capitalism will collapse because of its own contradictions without leading to either passive-ism or accelerationism of capital. How so? In the broadest sense, if what I’ve said is correct, then a capitalist system in which the means of subsistence are significantly robust will be less likely to cope with capitalism’s own crises since the capitalist’s profits will be minimal and less capable of withstanding shocks. This, in turn will accelerate the conflict between workers and capitalists as workers are asked to reduce their quality of life (or, rather, as the kind of life they’re able to reproduce changes) for the sake of the capitalist’s profit. But it does this without accelerating capital itself. As the workers come to see that they have no reason to do this and preserve the capitalist’s profit rather than seizing the means of production themselves and maintaining the kind of life they’ve come to expect to have, their consciousness will be raised, and the conditions will become ripe for revolution.

All this also suggests some clear tactics for what revolutionaries can do. Namely, it suggests that one of the actions that they can take is precisely to agitate workers by drawing their attention the kind of life they want to reproduce as laborers, why they are denied that kind of life, and what they can do to obtain it. Such actions are compatible with more aggressive tactics, with the claim that the state should be violently overthrown, with the claim that citizens should be armed, and even with the claim that the revolutionary party is the vanguard of the proletariat.5 My intention here is not to dull the revolutionary edge, but only to draw attention to how this small change in text interpretation serves to resolve what is taken to be a sticky problem.


There are, I believe, further upshots, but given the length of this post, I’ll leave things here. In the next post I’ll use what I’ve discussed here to make sense of something closer to home. In particular, I’ll argue that the severity of the crisis faced by capital by way of COVID-19 in the US can be understood in terms of the history of what goes in the means of subsistence for workers.


Endnotes

[1] Interestingly enough, this doesn’t mean that the reproduction of labor only requires the reproduction of the individual. Rather, it means that one of the necessary conditions in reproducing labor power is the reproduction of the physical body that provides labor-power. Maybe other things need to be produced or reproduced in order for labor-power to be reproduced. Let’s set that worry aside for now though.

[2] This is not to say that the capitalist can only remain solvent if he pays the minimum for labor. Indeed, at times he may even pay beyond the minimum if he concurrently increases the speed of the work he expects of his workers, introduces new methods of efficiency in the workplace, or adapts some creative accounting practices. By doing this he can increase workers’ wages while maintaining or even increasing his rate of profit. However, he’ll be in a tough spot if there should be a crisis–then the urge to return to profitability will drive wages down towards the minimum needed for pure physical reproduction

[3] The capitalist knows it and this argument is never given in these terms. Rather, the capitalist makes arguments having to do with how the loss of profit stifles innovation, kills the entrepreneurial spirit, or, generally, makes the workers worse off. Ideology shows up in full effect to defend his exploitation. In any case, I’ll leave these arguments to the side.

[4] Of course, this doesn’t mean that there should be such an agreement between worker and capitalist. Indeed, one might think that the capitalist has no grounds on which to claim profit over and above what he puts in as a worker and that anything beyond this minimum is exploitation. Indeed, I’m inclined to think that the demands of the workers are not bound by the preferences of the capitalist at all, but by the limits of what the means of production are able to accomplish. But that’s another matter. Let’s set these worries aside for the moment.

[5] The state may still need to be violently overthrown even if the proletariat has the appropriate level of consciousness; the citizens may still need to be armed if a violent overthrow is necessary; the revolutionary party may still be the vanguard of the proletariat insofar as it serves to help and organize the workers to see their predicament. And so on.

Monogamy, Jealousy, and Private Property

(Supposedly this is the Berenstain’s “green eyed monster.” Looks more to me like a green, eyed-monster to me but whatever)

I just finished Carrie Jenkins’ What Love is: And What it Could Be as part of my dissertation research on intimacy. It’s a quick and interesting read and while Jenkins didn’t have much to say about intimacy (to be fair, few analytic philosophers do), the core proposal that love has both a social and biological nature strikes me as essentially correct. The book also made me reconsider and reassess some of the assumptions I’ve had about the nature of polyamorous relationships and, most interestingly, about what Jenkins calls amatonormativity (the view that holds that a life without romantic love is fundamentally deficient). The book is written for a general audience and I highly recommend it if you want to read some philosophy of love stuff without getting into the weeds or exposing yourself to too much philosophical jargon.

One of the things in particular that struck me while reading Jenkins’ book involves (part of) a discussion on jealousy, marriage, and monogamy. This is the core topic of this post.

Regarding marriage and monogamy Jenkins first notes that traditionally, love and marriage were not socially or conceptually linked, but that marriage has traditionally been “about procreation and the controlled inheritance of property. It was created as a kind of transaction in which fathers could present their daughters to prospective grooms as gifts, prizes, or reward.” (pg. 40). She implies not only that the act of marrying constituted a kind of transaction, but indeed, that the women involved were part of the transaction itself.

This claim is verified by the remarks of an English lord chief justice regarding so-called crimes of passion:

The idea of a crime of passion and the related legal defense of “provocation” have served disproportionately to secure lenience for me who violently killed or injured their adulterous wives and/or the men with whom their wives were being adulterous. The attitudes behind this have a long and sexist history. In England in the early eighteenth century, the lord chief justice called sex with another man’s wife “the highest invasion of property” (because women were property) and said that since “jealousy is the rage of man,” the violent killing of someone caught in the act of committing adultery with one’s wife should not count as murder. In his own, more graphic words, “if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare manslaughter.”

pg. 112

I find no grounds (nor seek them) to disagree with Jenkins either about the current and historical function of such legal rules, or about their sexist underpinnings.

What these passages got me thinking about, however, is the link between romantic jealousy and the history of monogamy. Specifically, in light of the chief justice’s remarks, we can paint the following picture: historically (and perhaps currently), women in monogamous marriages have been treated as their husband’s private property. This treatment has come with supposed accompanying property rights of exclusivity. And jealousy is a response to a perceived violation of those supposed rights.

Now, the chief justice makes a couple of assumptions here that I wholeheartedly disagree with–that wives and women are property, that men and husbands actually have property rights over them, that jealousy is a fitting response to a violation of those rights, and that, consequently, acts of violence performed while experiencing acute jealousy are not to be punished as they normally would be. To stress, I disagree with all of these assumptions. However, I do wonder whether something like this picture remains in the back of my head when I think about jealousy.

Let me be explicit: I absolutely hate feeling romantic jealousy and I think I would be better off if I never felt such jealousy. I think it not only tends to show a kind of insecurity in a relationship that I find extremely off-putting, but I also think it’s harmful to the relationship itself, and to the people who feel it or are involved in it. Crucially, I also worry that when I feel it–and I still do feel it from time to time–it’s because I’ve subconsciously internalized these historical sexist norms through which I view my partner as my property. In other words, I worry that being jealous indicates that one views the other as property.

I’ve put this worry in terms of being a cis man inheriting sexist baggage, but I think the worry is one that any person in a monogamous relationship might have. In these broader terms, the worry is simply that to suffer romantic jealousy is to view one’s partner as a piece of property and that this is somehow just baked into monogamy. Indeed, I’ve wondered whether I have always been and continue to be monogamous because I harbor some nebulous, inchoate commitment to this horrible view of treating people like property. I’ve also wondered if polyamorous people are both more moral for being able to be in relationships in which there’s no assumption of mutual propriety, or if they’re just stronger for being jealous but for not seeing that as a reason to change that part of their lives.

At those times when I feel this worry the link between monogamy, jealousy, and possession of the other has never been in question: I feel jealous and I immediately think to myself “this is because you think that this other person belongs to you; stop it! They don’t!” The jump from jealousy to possession has always seemed like a natural one.

But I wonder if this is the correct way to think about romantic jealousy.

To keep focused, let’s consider the case in which one partner in a relationship is jealous that the other is spending some significant time with an ex-lover. When thinking about this case, I was struck by the fact that jealousy in this sense is never a feeling that I attribute towards anything that I own or consider mine. I hold that I own my laptop, but I can say with certainty that I’ve never experienced jealousy towards my laptop or, for that matter, towards anyone using my laptop (with or without my permission). The same goes for my house, my car, and even my body. When these things have been used by someone who didn’t have right to them I’ve felt anger, certainly, but never jealousy.

We come much closer to the matter, I think, when we talk about objects that I feel I should have owned or expected to own, but didn’t. I’ve certainly felt jealous of people who won scholarships that I didn’t, who got into better schools than me, or who had publications in their first year of graduate school. Maybe romantic jealousy is like that and we only need to specify that instead of feeling that we already feel we have some proprietary rights over our partner, we wish we did or feel that we deserve to have such rights. Perhaps in this sense we can say that I’m jealous over my partner spending time with an ex-lover because I think I wish or deserve that she pay attention to me rather that other clown (and, yes, they’re, of course, all clowns). And it still makes sense to say that if one feels that they wish or deserve to have property rights over a person in some respect they treat that person like property as well.

Still, there’s something that sits ill with me about this formulation. In the first place, it seems to me that not all cases of jealousy imply anything like proprietary rights and that the jump between the two is too quick. Consider, again, the jealousy one experiences when a friend gets a windfall of cash (or publishes a paper, or gets into a good school). It’s possible that the object of the jealousy is some particular object over which we have property rights (e.g. the actual money, the printed name in the journal, the acceptance letter), but it seems just as well to say that one is jealous because one wishes that some state of affairs or other applies to oneself. Less stiltedly, we might be jealous because we want something to have happened to us–we want to have been the kind of person who won the lottery, who got into Harvard, etc. In those cases there need not be anything like considerations of property in the background. I suppose some people might claim that they view moments in time or states of affairs as objects that belong to them, but this seems to me to be a stretch (I’d need to hear some arguments to the contrary at least).

The same seems to me to apply to at least some cases of romantic jealousy. When one is jealous that one’s partner is spending time with an ex-lover they’re upset that a certain state of affairs (their spending time with the ex) has occurred rather than a different one (their spending time with their beloved). This, too, might be objectionable, but not on the grounds that there’s an assumption of property rights in the background.

I also think the formulation is ill fitting because it appears to leave out an important dimension of jealousy. One of the reasons I don’t experience jealousy towards the things that I own (or towards the people who use them without my permission) is that those things aren’t agents. At least part of what’s upsetting in situations where romantic jealousy arises is the fact that it at least appears that one’s romantic partner is willingly or actively participating in something you don’t want them to do.

This, too, can be given a property rights reading insofar as it can be interpreted as a wish for someone with agency not to have that agency. In other words, to be jealous of your partner talking with an ex-lover is to wish that your partner was like a laptop or a stereo–without will of their own. Surely there are people who think this way, but I suspect it is far from the norm. Rather, it seems to me that the jealous person wishes that their partner didn’t want to spend time with their ex, or that they wanted to spend time with them instead of their ex.

This might seem like small potatoes, but I think it’s rather important since jealousy in this sense doesn’t express a desire for the other person to become property, or an assumption that they already are property, but rather expresses a desire for the other person to be a different kind of agent–one with a different set of desires and preferences than the ones they actually have. Now, this may itself be a horribly toxic attitude and we might find something problematic about one person wanting their beloved to be fundamentally different (or about feeling so passionate about their beloved being different in some small respect), but the moral problem problem here seems to me to be a different one from the one in which one views the other as property. The moral problem in the latter case is that they’re treating their beloved as an object with no agency; the problem in the former case is that they are overbearing or domineering. The two can overlap, but they need not.

If all this is correct, then it seems that at least in theory there’s some wiggle room between romantic jealousy and viewing others as property. Which I guess is alright.

I honestly don’t know whether in practice this theoretical room is ever enough to take seriously. Maybe there are serious reasons to think that when people experience romantic jealousy they really do think of their partner as property (regardless of how odd this might seem). Maybe there are serious reasons to think that men and women experience romantic jealousy differently; indeed, it would be surprising if there weren’t any differences given how we’re socialized. And maybe it really is true that being monogamous by itself carries with it the baggage of all sorts of horrible stuff. I don’t take myself to have shown any of that is off the table.

But maybe the picture that’s in the back of my head that automatically links monogamy, jealousy, and being a terrible person is also not entirely accurate.

(Yes, all research is me-search. Get over it.)

Class Consciousness as a Marxist Virtue (the lost NOLA talk)

I was set to give a talk in New Orleans this week on a topic that I’ve been kicking around in the background. Sadly, the COVID-19 worries and the fact that NC issued a state of emergency this morning means that the talk had to be canceled. That’s a bummer for all sorts of reasons, but it’s better that I don’t serve as a vector for disease for people who might be at risk than to do go and possibly harm some folks.

In light of all that, I’ve decided to put up the written version of my talk here so at least somebody can see it. At this stage this is very much a work in progress, but I’m curious to get some feedback on it. Here it is:


I. Intro

What does it take to have ‘class consciousness’ in the Marxist sense? Is it a matter of knowing a certain set of propositions (“Capitalism is rooted in exploitation of the proletariat”; “No war but class war”; etc.)? If so, of which propositions? Those identified by Marx? Lenin? Lucaks? Is it a matter of being conscious of the existence of class? Of its importance? Or rather, is it the case that consciousness is a property of the class? If so, what is the relation between the consciousness of the class and the individual? Is the former a function of the consciousness of the latter, or is it independent of it?

In this brief talk, I will argue that we can think of class consciousness as a kind of Marxist virtue along roughly Aristotelian lines, and that when we do so, the answers to these questions become apparent. In arguing for this claim, I don’t mean to imply that Marx necessarily envisioned class consciousness as such—in fact Marx only talks about class consciousness indirectly and doesn’t explicitly define it (in contrast to, say, the concepts of ‘socially necessarily labor’ or ‘means of production’). For obvious reasons, I also don’t mean to imply that Aristotle would have (or should have) included ‘class consciousness’ as one of the virtues. Rather, my claim will be the much more modest one that when we apply Aristotle’s method of defining the virtues, we can make better sense of the concept of class consciousness and its importance.

II. Aristotle’s Function Argument

Although this is likely to be frustrating I won’t start with a definition of class consciousness for reasons that I hope will become clear soon. Rather, I want to begin with a short little recap of Aristotelian virtues as discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics. The specific details here are less important than the overall structure, so don’t worry, this won’t be too painful.

The Ethics begins, as many of you might remember, with a search for and specification of that summum bonum towards which all crafts and deliberate actions aim. This end, we know, is what we call ‘happiness’; this much, Aristotle thinks, is uncontroversial. However, without knowing what happiness is, or what it takes to be happy, our agreement that happiness is the greatest good is of little use.

To get a better grip on what the content of happiness is Aristotle offers us his famous function argument. The idea here is as follows: when it comes to things that have a function—whether they be arts, crafts, of other activities—the good lies in the fulfilment of that function (or functions). Furthermore, we also know that it is by virtue of fulfilling such functions that we call things excellent of their kind, and they are such because they possess certain virtues that allows them to fulfil their function well. Thus, we can say, for example, that the function of a flute player (qua flute player) is to play the flute; that an excellent flautist is one that performs this function well (i.e. plays the flute well); and that they do so well because they have the virtues that allow them to do this (i.e. good finger placement, breath-control, etc.).

Crucially, Aristotle believes that if human beings in general have a characteristic function associated with a certain kind of activity, then the fulfilment of that function through the doing of that activity well might be the good for human beings.[1] Engaging in such activities would also make people who do so excellent qua human beings, and they will be such because they possess certain human virtues that allow them to fulfil their functions well.

Aristotle claims that human beings do indeed have such a unique function, and that it is related to the exercise of rationality. It is with respect to this function that we are set apart from all other living things. Plants and animals may live by engaging in the activity of nutrition and perception (for animals), but it is we alone who live by structuring and directing our actions based on our reasoning. And if acting in accord with reason is indeed the proper function of human beings, then it follows that living well and being happy will be a matter of exercising our rational faculty, that we will be excellent human beings when we engage in such activity well, and we will do so just in case we possess the virtues that allow us to exercise reason.

What follows in the rest of the Ethics after this functional argument is an exploration of the different virtues of character and virtues of intellect and how to acquire and cultivate them. What’s important for our purposes, however, is the general structure of the functional argument and how the virtues fit therein. Specifically, the structure requires that we first posit a telos or end towards which all human actions aim and which constitutes living well for human beings (happiness); this end is then considered in connection to a uniquely human function, the satisfaction of which amounts to living well and being an excellent human being (acting in accord with reason); and the human virtues are those traits the possession of which allows one to live well (courage, moderation, practical wisdom, etc.).

It should be clear from that has been said that the general schema pointed out in the previous paragraph can be employed to analyze matters apart from the summum bonum. We did this partially when discussing the flautist but we can list other examples as well. We posit an end towards which all doctoring actions aim and which consists in doctoring well (e.g. producing healthy bodies); this end is then connected to a function of the doctor (e.g. preserving health), the satisfaction of which is just amounts to doctoring well and being an excellent doctor; and the doctoring virtues are precisely those traits the possession of which allows one to doctor well (being attentive, informed, compassionate, etc.). Likewise, we can posit an end toward which all foot-racers aim and which consists in racing well (e.g. winning the race); this end is connected to a function of the runner (e.g. coming in first), the satisfaction of which amounts to running well and being an excellent runner; and the runner’s virtues are just those traits that allow an individual to run well (having the required stamina, knowing how to pace oneself, etc.)

In fact, we don’t even have to change all the variables to re-apply the schema. We could still posit, for example, that the end result towards which all actions aim is happiness, then say that the unique function of the doctor as it relates to that end is still that of promoting health, that he’s an excellent doctor when he does this well, and that it’s possession of the doctoring virtues that allow him to do that well. Granted, this kind of application of the schema won’t tell us much about what non-doctors should do to be happy—but on the assumption that the doctor does what he does for the sake of happiness (a safe assumption given that happiness just is that for which all deliberate actions are done), it would tell us what virtues one must cultivate to be happy qua doctor.

III. Marxian Telos

If this is true, then I suggest we can take the general schema relating ends to function to excellence and to virtue, and apply it to Marx’s philosophy. When we do this, class consciousness comes out as one of the virtues. In turn, thinking of it as a virtue allows us to give some content the very concept of class consciousness.

We can begin by noting that Marx, too posits both a telos for humanity—which, while not quite the Aristotelian end of eudaimonia, is not far removed from it either—as well as a characteristic proper human function. The latter is most clearly laid out in Marx’s remarks in the 1844 Manuscripts and specifically in the section on alienated labor where he is rather explicit that the characteristic function of humanity is that of productive labor. Thus, Marx says that “The productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character…The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of its will.” (pg. 113 italics in original)

Although other living beings interact with nature and modify it, it is human beings alone who do so purposefully and creatively in accord with their will. Not only so, but unlike other animals, the labor that man puts into modifying nature is not only reserved for his own preservation and reproduction, but for the preservation and needs of others.[2] (“Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.” Ibid) It is when engaging in this activity of freely laboring that human beings behave qua human beings; it is their proper characteristic function.

At least part of Marx’s criticisms of capitalism then follow from the effects that the capitalist mode of production has on the worker and their ability to engage in this activity. Specifically, under capitalism, the worker still labors, but his labor becomes alienated—he no longer puts his labor forward freely and creatively, but now works meaninglessly, repetitively, and monotonously for the capitalist so that he can make a profit. Labor no longer serves as the means by which man self-actualizes, but now becomes the means by which he is tormented: “The worker who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries loads, etc.—does he consider this twelve hours spinning, drilling, turning, building, shoveling, stone breaking as a manifestation of his life, as life? On the contrary life begins for him when his activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed.” (Wage Labor and Capital). In short, capitalism takes the proper characteristic function of human beings and frustrates it, prevents it from being fulfilled.

In light of this criticism (and others) Marx advocates for an economic, political, and social arrangement that allows for people to engage in just this very characteristically human activity. This is, of course, communism, under which people’s creative energies and labor are freed and put to use for the entire species rather than solely for the benefit of the capitalist. Still, one might wonder why a system in which this function is fulfilled would be preferable to the capitalist one. The answer is simple and implied in what has already been said: it is under the condition of fulfilling this function that people are happy. If its torment to live one’s life with this function frustrated—if the alienation of labor turns life into misery—then, presumably, restoring the ability to engage in that activity will allow for the possibility of happiness, and, crucially, engaging in that activity will be at least part of (if not the totality of) what constitutes happiness. Thus, we see that the end that Marx posits for people looks very much like the end that Aristotle posits as well: happiness.

If all this is correct, then we can say that Marx has provided us with two of the pieces of the previously discussed schema. The end towards which human action aims is happiness and the proper function of human beings as it relates to that end is engaging in productive labor freely and creatively. In turn, an excellent person is one who is able to do that activity well, and they will be able to do so if they have certain virtues that let them do this. The question before us now is what these virtues are.

IV. Class Consciousness as a Virtue

Undoubtedly, some of the virtues that will allow someone to engage in productive labor well will be the same as those pointed out by Aristotle given that the two share the common end of happiness. But others are going to be different based on the fact that the unique function of human beings has changed. So, we have to look at what virtues are necessary to do that function well.

I want to suggest that at least one of the things that allows one to do so is the virtue of class consciousness. The reason for this is rather straightforward in the Marxist context and has partially been stated: under capitalism, engaging in productive labor freely and creatively is virtually impossible. Part of getting to the point in which one can engage in productive labor is understanding that one’s happiness is related to productive laboring, and understanding the conditions under which one is and is not able to engage in such laboring. It involves understanding, for example, that the kind of wage labor that most workers are engage in in service of the capitalist is not the same kind of labor as free, creative, and productive labor, and that one is deprived of the ability to do the latter when engaging in the former.

To put the matter a different way, class consciousness allows one to engage in the function of productive labor well and is hence a virtue by providing individuals with the ability to recognize the importance of one’s labor, what frustrates it, and what facilitates it. This, in turn, allows an individual to direct one’s actions so as to properly engage in productive labor when possible and, hence, to be happy.

But what does this have to do with class? After all, in describing class consciousness, I’ve talked only about how it relates to one’s labor, and said nothing about class. This might appear counter-intuitive since one might have reasonably thought that class consciousness has something to do with class. This is true, but the tension can be worked out easily: on the Marxist view, what prevents the vast majority of people from engaging in productive labor is the very existence of classes—the fact that workers can’t engage in productive labor is due to the fact they are oppressed by a class whose interest requires them to do rote, repetitive, ‘unproductive’ labor for profit. Thus, a recognition of the importance of one’s labor and its relation to the individual’s happiness naturally leads to a focus on class and its role.

That being said, we also know that Marx also thinks that after the revolution there won’t be any classes since at least one of its goals is specifically to eliminate them. Thus, it might be better to say that under capitalist conditions having class consciousness is de facto a matter of understanding the role that class has in preventing people from engaging in productive labor. However, following the revolution, when classes no longer exist, the virtue of class consciousness will remain a matter of recognizing the importance of one’s productive labor as it relates to one’s happiness, but the focus on the role of class in frustrating productive labor will drop out.[3]

Let’s return to our main topic, though, and fill out the content of class consciousness a bit more—I won’t be able to give a full account given the time constraints, but I hope at least a few preliminaries will be sufficient to give a general picture. In any case, at least part of the content has already been supplied since we’ve worked out that class consciousness is concerned with matters of productive labor and specifically with what frustrates and facilitates it. If class consciousness is a virtue, then, it is a medial condition concerned with these matters. Its excesses and deficiencies don’t have names, but we can say that a person who is excessive in this respect sees more things as relevant to engaging in productive labor than there really are, and one who is deficient in them sees fewer. Thus, a person who sees nothing about the capitalist mode of production as interfering with productive labor is deficient in matters of class consciousness (they may, in fact, lack it!). And similarly, a person who thinks that everything is relevant to productive labor is excessive in these matters. The medial condition between these is, of course, that of recognizing which things really are relevant to productive labor in the proper way, and that we can call being class conscious or having class consciousness. When it comes to erring the person who sees more things as relevant is closer to the mean that the person who sees fewer.

Crucially, like all the other virtues class consciousness is not just a matter of simply knowing which things matter to productive labor, but the use of that knowledge in practice. Just as the courageous person isn’t such simply by virtue of knowing what things are to be feared and to what degree but their ability to put that knowledge into practice and to endure those things, so the person who has class consciousness is able to employ their knowledge of what matters in productive labor to act appropriately. What this means in practice will depend on the situation, of course, but we might say that a class-conscious person will be one who, for example, supports strikes when they will be affective to making labor be more productive (in the Marxist sense, not in the capitalist’s) and opposes them when they would be destructive (e.g. they wouldn’t support a strike called by an agent provocateur). Similarly, the class conscious person is able to distinguish between those reforms that are merely opportunistic and afford a temporary advantage and those that would truly liberate labor. And so on.

V. Brief Closing Remarks

Finally, I’d like to close out by showing how adopting this view gives us some straightforward answers to the questions with which we began.

Is having class consciousness a matter of knowing certain propositions? As we already discussed, the answer is no. But this doesn’t mean that those propositions are not important since they are necessary in order to act appropriately.

Is class consciousness a property of a class? Yes, but only insofar as it is a property of the individuals who make it up (just as courage can be a property of a combat battalion by virtue of the courage that each of the soldiers in the battalion). Thus, class consciousness is reducible to the consciousness of the individuals, but not to the propositions that the individuals know.


[1] The qualifications here are necessary because it’s both possible that our search is abortive, or that whatever the function of the human being is, it is so much at odds with what we normally take to make people happy that we have to reject it.     

[2] Birds and spiders produce, but they only produce what they need to survive. They can’t make a pen-knife or a jacket. Man, by contrast, can produce anything (including bee hives for bees and webs for spiders!).

[3] We can draw an analogy of this case with a different virtue like courage. We know that courage is the medial condition dealing with fears and that helps one live well insofar as it helps one properly handle situations in which one has to confront fearful things. In the wildly implausible scenario in which the fear of death is removed, but not, say, the fear of spiders, the virtue of courage will remain relevant to dealing with the latter situation, but for the most part its importance will be significantly reduced. Something similar can be said about the virtue of class consciousness.

Joe Rogan, Bernie Sanders, and Bad Moral Philosophy

This week’s ‘controversial’ topic on the moderate left concerns the endorsement of Bernie Sanders by famous bald-man and podcaster Joe Rogan. I don’t know much about Rogan, I don’t listen to his podcast, and I still primarily think of him as the host of NBC’s FearFactor (in turn, I only remember this show because it was on the air right around the time I first developed a fear of vomit and the idea that someone would purposefully make themselves sick and televise it absolutely horrified me; I’ve since made my peace with that concept and most of the NBC family programming).

This is how I’ll always remember him

From what I know about the ongoing dispute two facts are relevant. First, Rogan’s podcast is incredibly successful and his endorsement of Sanders is likely to have some sway with his very large audience. And second, Joe Rogan is kind of a piece of shit. He’s not only given a platform to well-known dangerous idiots like Alex Jones and Gavin McInnes (hell, throw in space fascist Elon Musk in that group as well), but he’s also said some pretty fucked up racist and transphobic things as well.

The dispute, then, is about whether Sanders should have accepted the endorsement by someone as shitty as Rogan (he did). Two general arguments are levied on either side: those supporting Sanders’ decision cite the size of Rogan’s audience and what an endorsement like his can do for helping Sanders win the nomination; those opposing the decision (which, I assume includes at least a few of Sanders’ supporters as well) claim that accepting such an endorsement is a kind of dirty deal and is tantamount to a tacit agreement of Rogan’s own shitty views.

Fortunately for me, I won’t be trying to settle this dispute, so those reading who might have been anxious that I’m about to drop a hot take can relax. Rather, what I want to talk about is an article by Vox’s Dylan Matthews about that dispute and what I take to be a really, really bad argument.


Matthews’ Core Argument

Matthews’ argument rests on the fact that anti-endorsement and pro-endorsement arguments mentioned above can be roughly thought of in deontological and consequentialist terms respectively. In other words, those approving of the endorsement (or holding their nose at it) justify their support by referencing the consequences that such an endorsement would have for a successful Sanders campaign. By doing this, they (implicitly or explicitly) argue that the goodness of those consequences outweigh the badness of being endorsed by someone like Rogan. By contrast, those categorically opposing the endorsement (or being critical of it) justify their opposition by appealing to some principle of morality that does not take into account the consequences of the action done.

Crucially, Matthews takes this difference to be indicative of deep, dividing fissures between ‘leftists’ and ‘liberals’ with each taking a different school of thought in presenting their arguments (this is a short, and I believe, charitable reading of the claim; the specifics are much, much weirder as I point out below). Roughly, Matthews thinks that when it comes to certain issues, liberals and leftists are speaking past each other with each group using different moral standards of assessment for different contexts. Matthews doesn’t make a judgment on which side is correct (which I commend him on since I’ve decided to take the same route!) in this meta-debate, but believes this is a serious phenomenon that we should be aware of.

Well known liberal, Immanuel Kant (kidding, not even Matthews calls him that)

Why the Argument is Garbage

But let’s stop for a second and ask whether this is so. What’s the evidence provided that there is such a deep fissure between leftists and liberals? The most obvious bit of evidence seems to be a collection of tweets that offer some principled objection to Sanders accepting Rogan’s endorsement coupled with Matthews’ claim that principled objections to certain actions are the purview of ‘liberals’ (“Most liberals have what I would characterize as a deontological opposition to discrimination. That is, they think that discriminating against or maligning someone on the basis of membership in a protected class — women, trans people, black people, and other racially oppressed communities, etc. — violates a rule that should be inviolable.”) The implication seems to be that those ‘socialist-identified’ Bernie supporters do not make take such stances but that they’re primarily driven by consequentialist considerations.

Now maybe Matthews hasn’t spent enough time in ‘leftist’ circles, but principled opposition to a position is decisively not the purview of liberals (ask a leftist what they think about opportunism and you’ll hear about an hour’s worth of anti-consequentialist polemics). The fact of the matter is that leftist politics full of principled stances (some say too many!) and it’s not even clear that the tweets that are used as evidence in this argument are even coming from liberals–I can easily see some of my leftist comrades criticizing Sanders’ endorsement precisely on the grounds that the left shouldn’t take any endorsement from anyone even remotely right-wing. It literally seems that the only thing that has convinced Matthews that this is a liberal position is his impression that it’s liberals that are in the business of offering deontological arguments!

Even if Matthews is right that liberals use deontological arguments sometimes (I agree with him there!), it’s just not true that leftists don’t use them as well. He might be in a better position if he could defend the claim that liberals make such appeals more frequently than leftists, but this is a different claim from the one offered and one for which I’ve seen zero evidence.

Likewise, things might be different if he could show that leftists use consequentialist arguments more often than liberals. But not only is there no support for this, but precisely where you would expect there to be some such support the argument gets super weird. After showing that some people oppose Sanders’ endorsement on principled grounds Matthews gives us a brief gloss of consequentialism and offers the following:

Here’s how that disagreement plays into the Rogan controversy. Shortly after the Rogan controversy broke out, Sanders fans started pulling out references to Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state and arguable war criminal whose counsel Hillary Clinton welcomed in 2016. The objection is straightforward: Kissinger was responsible for the deaths of at least hundreds of thousands of innocent people over the course of his career, between his complicity in the Bangladesh genocide of 1971, his push to carpet-bomb Cambodia, and his support for brutal dictatorships in Chile and Argentina. Surely that’s worse than whatever Rogan has said, no? So is it really fair to condemn Sanders for trumpeting Rogan’s support when Clinton trumpeted her connections to a morally far worse individual?

I can’t say this strongly enough: the argument presented by “Sanders fans” is not a consequentialist argument! It is a charge of hypocrisy which is something entirely different. What they’re saying is not “the consequences of having this endorsement will be better than the consequences of taking the principled line that you advocate” but rather “you are a hypocrite by taking issue with Rogan but not taking an issue with Kissinger” or “you weren’t so principled when your favored candidate was being endorsed by shitty people.”

Matthews is right that they may also claim that on top of that that side was willing to get an endorsement by someone who’s responsible for hundreds of thousands of innocent lives, but this doesn’t make the argument a consequentialist one. Rather what this points to is the depth of hypocrisy. The same thing can be said about the back and forth about Colin Powell. How Matthews misses this is, frankly, confusing.

All this is to say that there’s nothing in here that should convince anyone of the claim that leftists are more likely to engage in consequentialist arguments. We’re still left with just Matthews’ impression that this is just what leftists do.

This is Dr. Henry Killinger who has certainly been responsible for fewer deaths than Kissinger

Let’s Give Him the Data

Let’s engage in some fantasy and give Matthews the data. Suppose Matthews had gathered a representative group of tweets on one side by explicitly self-identified liberals who give explicitly deontological reasons against the endorsement, and a representative group of tweets on the other side by explicitly self-identifying leftists giving explicit consequentialist reasons defending the endorsement. Hell, let’s make it even more robust and say that instead of tweets, Matthews did a proper controlled social psychology experiment that showed a correlation between being a leftist and supporting a consequentialist argument in this case and being a liberal and supporting a deontological argument in this case. Wouldn’t this show that there’s a deep philosophical fissure between leftists and liberals?

No! At best it would show that when it comes to the question of Bernard Sanders’ acceptance or rejection of an endorsement some people favor consequentialist reasoning and other people favor deontological reasoning. To support the more robust claim one would have to show that there’s a strong correlation between being a leftist and reasoning consequentially and being a liberal and reasoning deontologically in general.

Now, some people have tried to argue something analogous with studies about how people reason in trolley cases, but these, too, face some serious problems. Most notably, it’s notoriously difficult to prove that those studies tell us anything more than how, say, conservatives and liberals reason differently in trolley cases. One can willingly accept that some groups might be more sensitive to consequentialist reasoning when it comes to deaths by train, but it’s a further step to the broader claim that those who reason in such a way in those cases reason the same in all other moral cases.

Likewise, even if we could say that there’s a political divide with respect to this issue that can be boiled down to philosophical differences (something, which, to stress again, has not been proven), it doesn’t follow that there’s anything even close to a deep fissure along these lines (which is not to say that such a fissure doesn’t exist). For all we know, leftists and liberals reason morally in every single other domain. It’s doubtful, but nothing about this article should make anyone think otherwise.


Some Speculation of my own

I’ve been pretty hard on Matthews for not providing support, so let me make some speculative claims of my own for which I’ll provide zero empirical evidence (or really any kind of argument).

I think Matthews’ hot takes are the result of certain general view that there are profound, deeply different ways of moral reasoning that map onto different political views. I don’t know why people find this view to be appealing (though I suspect Jonathan Haidt’s work is at least partially to blame; though, I should say I’m not familiar enough with it to comment here). I bristle at any kind of essentialist views about politics and this is no exception.

However, I can imagine that such a view might be comforting to the extent that if it’s right, then the things that divide us politically can be seen as a kind of misunderstanding or speaking past each other (“Oh, you’re just sensitive to the consequences and I’m sensitive to the rules!”). If that’s right, then the solution to our deep political issues become a matter of tinkering, clarifying, and ironing out and not of any fundamental class conflict, racism, or bigotry. And while I would love for this to be the case since it makes good work for moral philosophers, I’m just skeptical.

Part of why I’m skeptical is that this view requires that people have some pretty clear and consistent moral views. Leftists have to always (or most of the time, or consistently, or…) reason by appeals to the consequences; liberals have to always (or most of the time, or consistently, or…) reason by appeals to principles. And I just don’t think this is true.

I suspect that the majority of people don’t have coherent, systematic ways of morally reasoning that can be mapped to their political views. Rather, like Thomas Nagel says in his “War and Massacre” piece, I think that all people who are not trying to win an argument or acolytes of Kant of Mill are generally sensitive to both consequentialist and deontological reasons. I’ve personally never met a single person who only reasoned in one way or found only one way of reasoning convincing (and I hope I never do!)

Furthermore, I believe that we’re kind of pluralist and opportunistic about when we employ different kinds of reasoning and why. Sometimes we offer deontological reasons in support or against a particular view, and other times we employ consequentialist reasons. This isn’t to say that this necessarily makes for bad reasoning. Indeed, I’m more inclined to think that both kinds of reasoning might be necessary to truly understand the depths of our moral landscape and that it’s the moralist who fetishizes systematicity that is likely to get things upside down. But I think it should push us away from these essentialist psychological views.

Some Thoughts on “Parasite”

I went to see Bong Joon-Ho’s Parasite last month and came out of the theater absolutely pumped. I’ve seen more than a few great movies this year, and this one definitely ranks among the top. I meant to put down my thoughts about the movie on paper much sooner, but the end of the semester grading (and my previous commitment to finishing The State and Revolution) kept me from doing it sooner. In any case, what follows below are a couple of things that I really liked about the film (and one thing that I didn’t care for too much). Plenty of spoilers follow.

What I Loved:

Perhaps the thing I liked most about the film is its focus on the impact and importance of the material conditions on the two families. This is, of course, most clearly demonstrated in the difference between the homes of the Kim and Park families. The Kim family lives in a small, cramped, smelly, sub-basement apartment in a poor part of town. The audience gets the impression that this is less of an apartment for people as much as it is a kind of negative space that’s occupied by people (much in the same way that the space underneath the fridge is the space that happens to be occupied by cockroaches). It is distinctively and oppressively urban.

By contrast, the Park family lives in a spacious, elegant, beautifully designed house elevated above the city. Its landscape is so carefully manicured and maintained that when one looks out of the massive Park house windows one can imagine that they’re not anywhere near an urban center. The house not only suggests a life of elegant opulence, but also one of privacy–every family member has their own separate space and there are no drunks peeing in sight of the dinner table.

In fact, there’s a glut of privacy in the Park house. Only in a house like that could a man live underground without ever being noticed; only in a house like that could so many secrets be kept. The Kim family is able to trick the Parks because each of them can occupy a role that fills a space within their house. In turn, by playing that role well enough and occupying that space, they can slip by unnoticed. Clearly, the same thing could never happen in the Kim house.

These most-obvious material differences are important, but they merely scratch the surface. After all, it’s not uncommon for movies to bring the viewers’ attention to great disparities in wealth and if the most notable thing about the movie were to make us notice that some people live comfortably and affluently while others don’t, then it wouldn’t be worth writing about.

What Parasite does especially well is explain how these differences in material conditions have massive effects on the psychologies of the characters. And it does so without resorting to a kind of moral caricaturizing. Let me explain by starting with this latter point and working backwards.

a. No Moral Caricatures

First, it’s clear that the Parks aren’t pure incarnations of evil. It’s true, they do live an affluent lifestyle, but they’re never shown to do anything particularly heinous. Mr. Park doesn’t work as, like, an arms dealer, and although Mrs. Park is shown to be a bit naïve and childish, it’s clear that she clearly loves her children and wants the best for them. Their relationship with the Kim family isn’t particularly warm (they are, after all, ‘the help’ and the Parks frequently talk among themselves about Ki-taek’s smell), but they’re neither cold nor particularly imperious. In short, they perfectly embody a kind of familiar elite aloofness which, in general, is not enough to make the audience hate them.

By contrast, it is equally clear that the Kims are not paragons of virtue. In the first place, they are willing to lie to and manipulate the Parks in order to get what they want: Kevin is not a tutor, Jessica is not an art therapist, Ki-taek is not a professional driver, and Chung-sook is not employed by an elite house-keeping service. These deceptions are not terribly serious since the members of the Kim family are more than capable of doing what the Kims need them to do–they may have lied about their qualifications, but they do their jobs well.

[That being said, the Kim children also do some pretty objectionable things: Kevin almost immediately initiates a romantic relationship with the much younger girl he’s meant to be tutoring, and it’s not obvious whether Jessica’s ‘art therapy’ is really helping the young Da-song.]

Much more objectionable are the lengths to which the Kims go to secure their position with respect to the other working-class people. First, in order to get her father hired as Mr. Park’s driver, Jessica gets his previous driver fired by implying that he’s having sex in Mr. Park’s car. And, of course, in order to get Chung-sook hired as the housekeeper, the family causes her to have a sever allergic reaction which could have killed her (indeed, later, they do just that).

The Kims’ motivation throughout the movie is exclusively self-centered. What matters to them is that they’re able to get what they think they’re able to get. That doesn’t mean that they’re willing to do anything—they never intend to kill the Parks’ former housekeeper—but the audience gets the sense that the welfare of people outside the family matters very little to them. In short, they’re selfish, opportunistic, and largely amoral. Of course, that doesn’t make them monsters, but it does make the audience’s perception of them much more complex, and, in my experience at least, much more realistic.

b. Material Conditions Shape Psychology

By refusing to make the Parks and the Kims into opposing moral caricatures the director is able to move beyond a naïve picture that explains the characters’ actions and psychology through a purely moral lens. Neither the Parks nor the Kims do what they do because they’re simply good/evil people who are naturally moved to be selfish, or cruel, or indifferent to the suffering of others. This, in turn, draws the audience’s attention to the alternative explanation: namely, that the families’ respective psychologies and motivations are shaped precisely by the material conditions in which they live.

This is perhaps the most important theme in the movie and one that I think was done fantastically well. One scene to note here is the scene in which the former house-keeper and her husband are discovered by the Kim family as they squat in the Park family house. The two families mirror each other here: both are destitute, both are desperate, both are trying to alleviate their suffering by living off the scraps of the Parks, and neither is willing to give up their temporary gains for the benefit of the other. They are, in short, both parasites (THAT’S THE NAME OF THE MOVIE! GET IT?!?!). Crucially, their recognition of equality in this situation makes the two of them competitors for those scraps. Both families realize that their relative well-being is contingent on the zero-sum gains they’ve been able to attain behind the Parks’ backs, and that the opposing family is in a position to ruin their setup by alerting the Parks. This realization culminates in the fight between the two families, and, ultimately, in the death of the former house-keeper and the imprisonment of her husband in the underground lair.

This scene (as well as the scenes in which the Kims succeed in getting their positions in the Park house) is a metaphor for the broader phenomenon in which the conditions of poor people force them to turn against one another in order to get the scraps left by the rich. It’s not the case that the Kims hate the former house-keeper and her husband—they don’t set out to kill her—and vice versa. But the situation they’ve been presented with is one in which they must either fight each other and preserve what they’ve gained, or give that up for someone else to grab while they return to their previous lot. Scarcity and poverty are what motivates the families’ behavior and what explains their actions, not anything about their inherent moral character or worth.

The psychological warping of the individual in this setting is most clearly seen in the behavior of Geun-sae, the former house-keeper’s underground dwelling husband. His subterranean life has led him to see Mr. Park as a kind of God-figure to whom reverence and submission is owed. Far from seeing his life as the manifestation of a gross injustice in which a select few get to enjoy the finest things in life while the many fight over scraps, Geun-sae sees himself as a beneficiary of a blessing bestowed to him by Mr. Park. In that sense, Mr. Park doesn’t appear to him as another human being, but rather as a supernatural entity with the power to give and take away life.

This reification of the wealthy is a familiar phenomenon and is at the core of capitalist ideology. In that ideology, the capitalist appears almost as a force of nature who produces value from nowhere for the benefit of others, and who, of course, grabs a share of those benefits in the process. Thus, the capitalist is seen not as someone who grows fat off the exploitation of others, but as someone who is the source of all that is good in life.

Now, this is quite literally the case for Geun-sae for whom day-to-day survival depends on the well-being and success of Mr. Park. But the same phenomenon is found in a lesser degree in the way ordinary people and politicians treat the rich as ‘job creators’; in the way the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ is idolized; in the belief that influx of wealth ‘fixes’ neighborhoods; and so on. Indeed, there is a general dogma (at least in America) against doing anything that might disrupt or go against the interest of the rich since to displease them would cause them to withdraw their blessings from the people. Sacrifices must be made to the Gods of Capital–taxes must be forgotten, credit extended, markets opened, communities destroyed–so that something worse, we are told, doesn’t happen; viz. so that Amazon doesn’t move its headquarters to Northern Ireland, so that Carrier doesn’t close its plants in Ohio, so that Blue Cross/Blue Shield doesn’t lay off a thousand workers. This is just Geun-sae’s supplicating attitude to Mr. Park writ large.

c. Luck, Rationality, and Contingency

Perhaps the most interesting aspect in how differences in material conditions affect individuals’ psychology is in the realm of rationality. This can be seen in one of the film’s pivotal scenes in which a deluge washes over the city, flooding the Kim family’s basement apartment, destroying all their belongings and leaving them homeless.

In the first place, this scene is interesting for the contrast between the way the same contingent event–the rainstorm–affects the Kim and Park families. For the Kim family the storm is unquestionably devastating. In the span of a couple of hours, while fantasizing about the kind of lives they’ll have if they continue to hold their positions in the Park household, all of their belongings are completely destroyed and they’re forced to take shelter in a relief center for the foreseeable future. By contrast, for the Park family, the rainstorm is a blessing that clears away the pollution and freshens the air.

This by itself is interesting, but it points to an even more serious point. Namely, it shows how absolutely devastating the role of luck can be in how well one’s life goes. Let me back up a little bit. Aside from fetishization of the wealthy, another lynch-pin in American capitalist ideology is the myth of the self-made man as the product of rational calculation and prudent risk. As it goes, the rich do not make their money through exploitation, but first by diligent saving and then careful study and investment in what the market needs. In short, successful rich folks are those who have an ability to suppress their immediate desires and delay gratification in a rational matter that maximizes their yield. In contrast, the poor are often seen as irrational, lazy, or chronically incapable of suppressing their immediate urges for the sake of greater future gains.

This is what’s in the background when people claim that poor people are that way because they spend all their money on cars, clothes, and toys rather than saving it and investing it (this, and, most of the time a hefty dose of racism, too). Indeed, I’ve even heard it said that poverty is perpetuated because poor people buy coffee from Starbucks or eat fast food rather than making either at home! In short, poverty is seen as an inability to manage a budget, and managing a budget is seen as an exercise in rational planning for the future. (For more on this kind of argument and why it’s wrong, see UNC’s own Jennifer Morton’s work on poverty and rationality)

The deluge scene in Parasite shows just how stupid this line of reasoning is in light of the actual material conditions on the ground. In one of the best scenes in the movie, Kevin asks his father in the shelter what the plan is. Ki-taek responds (paraphrasing) that the plan is the one that succeeds every time: namely, the one that isn’t made. Ki-taek’s point is, of course, not an endorsement of a kind of irrationality, but rather the very prescient one that the norms of rationality that the myth of the rational capitalist endorse only make sense under certain background conditions. Specifically, they only make sense if there’s a certain kind of security against these absolutely devastating contingencies that can completely destroy your life in the span of a few hours. It simply doesn’t make sense to live the kind of life that looks years, months, or even weeks in the future if tomorrow a rainstorm can take everything away.

Now, it’s true that, in a certain respect, we are all subject to the whims of fate. Both I and Jeff Bezos can be crushed by a falling piano tomorrow; we may both be struck by lightning; and we may both develop some rare, terminal disease. No amount of rational planning will guarantee that these things won’t happen and this is something that is shared by all of us regardless of wealth or economic status. At that level, we’re both equally vulnerable to luck. Nevertheless, at every level below that, the difference become astronomical. An unexpected root canal won’t force Jeff Bezos to take out high-interest loans; a family member falling ill won’t make a difference as to whether he’ll be able to work; etc. With respect to most (though not all!) contingencies, Bezos is protected while I’m not. What this means, of course, is that he can discount certain events when making certain decisions and that certain actions are rational for him that wouldn’t be rational for me.

Much further down the line are the Kim family. The question that their situation raises is about how one should live when virtually anything can ruin any plan that you have in the future. Is it even rational to spend the energy to form plans when you live in that kind of world? Ki-taek’s answer is, of course, no. Not only is there no sense in planning under such circumstances, but it’s absolutely a waste of time. Instead, these conditions suggest that one should live with the short-term in mind–with getting fed today; with getting to work today–rather than with some unattainable and implausible future further on.

This is something many people who haven’t actually been poor have a hard time understanding, and it’s something that I think the movie presents very well.

d. The Central Question

All of this serves to highlight what I take to be the central message of the film. The title naturally invites the viewer to repeatedly ask the question of who are the ‘parasites’ in this film, and, in turn, to wonder whether they are justified in ‘feeding’ off others. But these questions are not the most important ones. With respect to the first, there’s no question that the Kim family (and the former house-keeper and her husband) are the parasites–in that respect the metaphor is almost too on the nose. The second question is a bit more interesting, but the points I’ve brought up–specifically, the fact that none of the characters can be caricatured as people who ‘deserve’ their lot, and the effect that the material conditions have on their psychologies–suggest to me that the question of individual justification is, in a way, beside the point.

What matters more than whether or not the Kims are justified in doing what they do or whether the Parks are justified in living the kind of lives they live is less important than the question of what kind of society allows for the existence of parasites, and the question of the grounds on which such a society can be justified. These questions are, of course, not new questions (especially to those of us on the left), but it’s been a hot minute since I’ve seen them brought up so forcefully in a popular film. And I’m glad for that.


What I didn’t Care for

Perhaps the only thing I really didn’t like about the movie is the very last ten minutes. First and foremost, the fact that Kevin survives two massive blows to the back of the head from a thirty pound rock then wakes up in a hospital is absolutely absurd. It seems to me that the only reason he lives is to deliver the narrated anti-climax and, as everyone knows, making x happen to a character because y needs to happen is usually a bad reason for x to happen.

In the same vein, I thought the back and forth letter narration between father and son were a bit too heavy-handed and didactic (not to mention that there was no narration through the rest of the movie which makes this part of the movie stick out).

That being said, I get what the director is going for in showing us Kevin’s fantasy and why he included the scene. I understand that the final scene in which the family is reunited is an impossible fantasy that Kevin needs to indulge in in order to go on. Kevin won’t get rich, he won’t buy the house, and he will never see his father again. This fantasy is both a way of making sense of his life and its direction, and (seemingly) the only source of comfort he has in light of the events of the movie. It allows him to make sense of his life by giving him both an interpretation of what went wrong (he didn’t play by the rules! He thought he could get ahead quickly through subterfuge when he should have been working hard to become a millionaire!) and what he must do to set things right (he has to make a plan and stick to it and be perfect!).

This, of course, is just Kevin’s return to the neo-liberal capitalist ideology that underwrites and sustains the very system that makes it possible for there to be ‘parasites’ in society the first place.

The scene is tragic because despite everything that’s happened, Kevin simply can’t escape this ideology–his suffering has only driven him further into it. And we understand why this is the case. His material conditions prove his father correct–there’s no point in making long-term plans if something as simple as a rainstorm can completely destroy your life. However, to accept this and truly live without such long-term plans is, in essence, to live as an alienated impotent entity, simply reacting to the things that one is incapable of changing one way or the other. Arguably, that way of living is hardly worth living at all–it truly is to live opportunistically (like an animal or…a parasite). In such a situation ideology serves to smooth things over and play a conciliatory role: things aren’t really what they seem; the material conditions don’t make it impossible to live a good life; the world rewards merit, grit, and effort; justice and injustice are ultimately a matter of how individuals relate to one another. Kevin embraces this idea because it allows him to continue living as a human being. In the absence of an alternative way of making sense of things, who could blame him for going in this direction?

All this is to say I understand the importance of this last scene and I think the message conveyed is an important one. Nevertheless, I just didn’t like the narrative choice taken to deliver that message–reading it out through a series of letters just felt…I don’t know…artless (especially after the equally artless magical revival of the main character).

[The other side of me wants to fill in the other half of the leftist critique: the choice of the poor is not to either deny the reality of their material circumstances and escape to fantasy or to accept that reality and live in misery. One can accept reality and fight to change it. But I’ll leave it alone–no movie needs to do everything]

Kill Your Darlings: Bernard Williams’ “Moral Luck”

The end of the decade’s got me thinking about what I’ve done in the last ten years, what I’ve enjoyed, and what I’ve read. In that light, I decided to go back and re-read what I’ve always thought of as one of my favorite papers: Bernard Williams’ “Moral Luck” (you can find a pdf here–it starts on page 20).

Although I still like the paper quite a bit, I found myself more critical of it this time around than I have been in the past, and, given that apparently I have nothing better to do, I decided to put my thoughts down. In all likelihood, this will serve as lecture notes the next time I teach the paper.

I’ve given a brief summary of the setup of the paper and the relevant bits that I’m criticizing, but I don’t go into the whole thing. In fact, I stop fairly quickly into the essay (I don’t even get to Anna Karenina or the agent regret stuff). I might do a follow up post that covers the second part, but what I’ve written below is very long as it stands. I’ve also included little grey “justify it” boxes that make explicit some of the stuff that’s either in the background or that is important, but tangential to the central arguments or exposition of the post. Those who might not be familiar with Williams’ essay or with philosophy might find them useful–those who are familiar with both can skip them (although they do provide some insight into what I think is going in some tricky parts). Finally, those who are very familiar with Williams’ essay can feel free to just jump down to the criticism sections and see if those make sense. Okay, here we go.


Synopsis

The paper itself, like most of Williams’ work, is a difficult one and Williams does little to help his reader in some of the trickier parts. The ostensible thesis, however, is clear: the idea that moral value is immune to luck is a mistaken one.

Justify It Box 1: Why care whether moral value is immune to luck?

Here’s the brief argument that’s lurking in the background in favor of this mistaken view. We know that the good things in life can be stripped away by contingent forces: a tornado can destroy your gorgeous house; a dip in the market can cost you your excellent job; a car accident can take away your beautiful family; a clump of mutating cells can ruin your perfect health; and so on. We tend to think that we can plan ahead to prevent such things or, at the very least, to mitigate their effects when they happen, but, realistically, we know that there’s nothing that can be done to prevent all (or even most) such cases.

The problem, then is that if the good life is simply a matter of attaining the things in life that are good, and if those things are themselves vulnerable to luck, then it seems that the good life itself is a matter of luck. This, in turn, tends to bother people quite a bit since, if true, it suggests that one is more or less impotent with respect to how well one’s life goes. Arguably, only a person who is utterly indifferent to one’s well-being, one’s projects, and one’s life is completely unbothered by this prospect and there are very few people like that. For most human beings the effect on luck will have some troubling effect and its mitigation will be of some concern.

All that being said, the problem can be avoided altogether if first, there is something of value that is immune to luck, and second, if that thing of value is itself something that we can attain and which is substantial enough to form a life around. After all, if there were something of value that is immune to luck but which we couldn’t attain, then our predicament wouldn’t be improved (indeed, knowing about it might make it even worse!). And, if there were some such thing that we could attain, but which were of such negligible value around which someone couldn’t plausibly form a good life, then we’re still in the same boat (“Yes, it’s true, my kids are dead, but I finally saw the perfect shade of red and that can’t be taken away from me” doesn’t paint a picture of the good life to me even if we assume that seeing the perfect shade of red is of some value).

Many people have held that both of the requirements needed to solve the problem are to be found in moral value. The idea that morality is of substantial (if not supreme) value is neither an uncommon, nor an implausible view. The question, then, is whether it is immune to luck as well. Some philosophers–notably Kant, but one can make an argument for Plato as well–have argued that it is. Very simply put, for Kant, morality is a matter of exercising one’s rational nature in the proper way and such an exercise of one’s rational nature is not vulnerable to contingencies of luck. Furthermore, since all people have a rational nature that operates in the same way and to the same degree, all people regardless of circumstance are able to be moral, and hence, to live the good life; regardless of what happens, as long as one remains a person and has a rational nature, one can be moral, and, hence, one can live the good life.

If all this is right, then the problem that the good life can be take away from us due to luck falls to the side. At the very least, we can have a very good life by being moral, and, furthermore, if moral value is the supreme value, then we can get the best life by being moral.

Williams’ primary concern in the part of the paper that I want to talk about isn’t about showing that whether one acts or is even able to act morally is a factor of luck (that’s more Nagel’s aim). Rather, he wants to first focus on the role of justification and the conditions under which one can be justified in taking a course of action. It’s only near the end of the paper that he links together justification with morality. Williams’ stated reason for going this route is that the Kantian view mixes together the notions of rationality, morality, justification, and supreme value in such a way that it has the consequence that whether one is justified in acting cannot be a matter of luck (see below for more detail).

Justify It Box 2: Why does Williams think the Kantian view links morality with justification?
This is one of the many frustrating places in which one wishes Williams would explain what he has in mind. I’m not a Kant scholar, and, admittedly, my understanding of Kant is not stellar. However, I believe what Williams has in mind here is something like the following: one figures out the right thing to do by by testing the maxim on which one acts for conformity with the Categorical Imperative. If the maxim passes the test, then acting on it is the right thing to do, and if it is the right thing to do, then, clearly, one is justified in acting upon that maxim since one is always justified in doing the right thing. In this respect, one’s justification for doing x and x being the right thing coincide. Crucially, whether a maxim is in conformity with the Categorical Imperative is entirely a matter of certain of its logical properties and structure, and as such, is a matter that’s entirely independent of anything about the agent herself, or anything that happens or might happen to her. In other words, the maxim fails or passes its test in the rational realm where luck is not a factor. Just as it can’t be matter of luck that 2 + 2 = 4, so it can’t be matter of luck whether a maxim is in conformity with the Categorical Imperative.

If this is the right picture, then it follows that it also can’t be a matter of luck whether one is justified in acting.

The strategy then is to show that whether one is justified can indeed be a matter of luck. If he’s able to show that successfully, and if justification, rationality, and morality are as tightly bound as the the Kantian picture presents them to be, then it seems to follow that rationality and morality will also be vulnerable to luck.

With respect to his methodology, Williams is mercifully clear:

My procedure in general will be to invite reflection about how to think and feel about some rather less usual situations, in the light of an appeal to how we—many people—tend to think and feel about other more usual situations, not in terms of substantive moral opinions or ‘intuitions’ but in terms of the experience of those kinds of situation.

pg. 22

So, he’s going to present us with some unusual cases which will pose problems for the Kantian view of justification he’s attacking, and he’ll argue that we should judge these cases on the basis of more ordinary cases in which our judgements, are, presumably, in agreement (and not because we have some theoretical commitment that makes us have those judgments). To that end he gives us the first of two cases:

‘Gauguin’

Modeled after the real Gauguin, our Gauguin is a creative artist who is considering foregoing certain real and urgent moral commitments in order to live a kind of life that he believes will let him pursue his art. More specifically, we can imagine that he is a married man with a spouse and children who need his support to have a minimally decent life, that he thinks he could be a fantastic painter if he didn’t have to support his family and could devote himself entire to his art, and that it’s impossible for him to achieve success as a painter while supporting his family. He is faced with a choice between two incompatible lives: one in which he supports his family and decisively fails to be a painter, and one in which he tries to succeed as a painter but in which he decisively fails to support his family. Furthermore, he’s someone who sees the demands of morality as important–he realizes that if he were to abandon his family he would be committing a serious moral wrong–but he doesn’t think that these demands are decisive.

We are to imagine that with all this in mind, our Gauguin decides to pursue the life that he holds will allow him to be a great painter and leaves his family. Crucially, in making this decision, he does not know whether he will be successful as a painter or not.

What are we to make of this case?

Williams’ claim is that in Gauguin’s case the only thing that could justify this choice is his success in his endeavor. It’s clear that if he fails in becoming a great painter, then he not only did the morally wrong thing in abandoning his family, but, crucially, that he was not justified in abandoning them when he did. Simply put, there is nothing to be said in favor of his being justified in making his decision the way he made it. However, Williams claims that if he’s successful, then there’s at least some basis for thinking that he was justified in doing what he did–a basis which, to reiterate, he would not have if he fails.

To put the matter another way, if he’s successful, then in response to being confronted with the claim that he was not justified in leaving his family, he can reply with something that has some pull on us; namely, “Yes, but look at the greatness I’ve achieved which would not have been achieved otherwise!” This might not be sufficient to completely exculpate him from being a total bastard (certainly not to his family!), but we’re supposed to have the intuition that it’s at least something which has some weight and which speaks in favor of his action.

Before we delve into whether Williams is right in making these claims it’s important to make note of two points: the first is that given how the scenario is set up, Gauguin does not know prior to making his decision whether he would end up being successful. In fact, he can’t know since whether he is successful is a matter of whether he makes the very decision that he’s deliberating about. Given that this is the case, it’s impossible that his actual success can factor in as a justification for trying to succeed–there simply is no actual success at that point but, at best, only the possibility of success. In other words, the justification of his success is something that can only occur retroactively. Crucially, this is one of the places where the wedge between justification and morality can be inserted.

The second point is that what matters in whether Gauguin is justified is not simply whether he succeeds or fails, but the source of the failure. Williams is explicit that a kind of external failure (e.g. a heavy crate crushing Gauguin’s hands while en route to Tahiti, preventing him from ever painting) would not be sufficient to demonstrate that he was unjustified in leaving. In such a case and others like it, the question is, I believe, essentially supposed to remain an open one since the claim that he could have succeeded had this event not occurred is likewise still open. What decisively shuts the door on Gauguin not being justified, then, is a kind of intrinsic failure of the project; as Williams puts it, it has to be the case not that the project fails but that he fails at the project.

Crucially, whether one Gauguin is the kind of man who really can be a great painter is a matter of what Williams calls ‘intrinsic luck’. As he puts it: “it is not merely luck that he is such a man, but luck relative to the deliberations that went into his decision, that he turns out to be such a man: he might (epistemically) not have been. That is what sets the problem.” (pg. 25)

Justify It Box 3: What sets the problem?!

I admit, I find Williams’ claim about “luck relative to the deliberations that went into his decision” to be puzzling. The best I can make out of it is that he thinks luck factors doubly in Guaguin’s case. In the first place it’s a matter of luck whether Gauguin just is the kind of person that can be a great painter (see my brief criticism of that claim below); and in the second place that it’s a matter of luck that his very decision hangs on luck about his ability to be a great painter. That is, he’s (un)lucky insofar as whether he’s justified is a matter of something he can only know post facto.

I suppose this can be made sense of though if I’m correct, then, the latter strikes me as a kind of luck of circumstance and the former a kind of luck of character (loosely put–again, see my criticism below). Here, there may be some overlap with moral luck in Nagel’s sense. Specifically, I’m thinking of a case in which a person might fail to do the right thing by virtue of the fact that they have the dual bad luck of being in a bad situation for which they’re internally badly disposed to handle. Thus, one might imagine being unlucky in being the first responder to a car-crash and being unlucky in being naturally too cowardly to provide the necessary help. Why the situational kind of luck should be an intrinsic kind of luck, though, is a mystery to me. It seems more accurate to me that situational luck is extrinsic even if the situation in which I find myself is one in which intrinsic factors weigh heavily.

Alternatively, I suppose Williams could mean that the intrinsic factors are such that they cause one to be in a certain situation which they wouldn’t be in if but for certain matters of luck about who they are. In Gauguin’s case, the situation is the very one of deliberating about leaving his family and it’s caused by the fact that he currently doesn’t know whether he can cut it as a great painter. That is, if he could know that he wasn’t going to be a great painter, then he would never be in the situation in which he has to deliberate about something he can’t be ex ante justified. But he isn’t and in that respect he’s unlucky.

Again, I just find this stuff really hard to parse.

Criticism 1

Williams’ stress on intrinsic luck here makes up my first major criticism. Personally, I find the notion of intrinsic luck–especially with regard to something like artistic talent–to be pretty suspect if only because it seems to entail that things like artistic talent are just ingrained features of the person. Williams seems to hold the view that whether one is a great painter (destined to be one?) is some kind of intrinsic feature that one is either graced with it or not as a matter of luck and which one discovers through the course of their life. Not only is this not very g r o w t h m i n d s e t oriented (joke) but I also find it to be weirdly essentialist in nature. Maybe it’s something that comes of his broadly Nietzschiean commitments about human nature and determinism, but I see no reason to hold that view without something extra to back it up.

In any case, we can set the question of whether being a great painter is written in the stars and focus on a different matter. In particular, there’s tension between Williams’ claim that the only thing that could justify Gauguin is his success and the claim that he’s not unjustified if his project fails as a result of extrinsic luck.

It’s true, the two claims are not obviously inconsistent since not being unjustified does not amount to being justified so it remains possible that the only way to be justified is to succeed. However, the tension can be brought out if we reflect on what it must mean for him to not be unjustified. Williams’ direct quote is: “Irreducibly, luck of this kind affects whether he will be justified or not, since if it strikes, he will not be justified. But it is too external for it to unjustify him, something which only his failure as a painter can do.” (pg. 25) The only way I can make sense of this claim is to hold, as I do above, that the question of whether Gauguin is justified is theoretically still open. It’s not actually open since Williams admits that Gauguin has failed and that because of that failure he can’t be justified. But it’s still in some sense open since he’s not unjustified.

That all seems fine and well, but why wouldn’t he be unjustified? Suppose someone says to Gauguin “You really didn’t make it as an artist cause of all that hand crushing business, huh? In light of that it looks like your leaving your family was completely unjustified.” What would be said in response to make the point that he’s not unjustified? The most obvious answer seems to be that he’s not unjustified because he could have been a great painter if but for the hand crushing. I think this is right, but it looks to me that this means that the possibility of having been a great painter serves as some justification or some reason for claiming that one is justified. Granted, it’s not enough of a justification to count as justifying his action completely (although we should remember that even success doesn’t do this), but it’s enough to push him from being unjustified into not being unjustified.

Justify It Box 4: Aren’t you assuming some stuff?

I explicitly assume two things. First, I assume that the burden of proof is on Gauguin (or Williams) to explain why he’s not unjustified. That is, I assume that the abandoning of his family is pro tanto sufficient to hold that he’s completely unjustified unless he can offer some justification to push in the other direction. This seems like a reasonable assumption that (to stick with Williams’ own methodology) most ordinary people make. Second, I also assume that the shift from unjustified to justified is a matter of offering pieces of justification or reasons that speak in favor of one being justified (and vice versa–to move from being justified to being unjustified is to be presented with reasons that speak against one being justified).

Putting those two assumptions together with the claim that Gauguin is not unjustified because he could have been a great painter amounts to the claim that the possibility of being a great painter is itself a bit of justification for his decision (if, indeed, that is what Gauguin would say in response to his accuser–maybe I’m just completely wrong about that). So, it turns out that it’s not just his actual success that serves as some justification, but also his potential success or the possibility thereof that does too.

This might seem like small potatoes since all it means is that Gauguin now has another piece of justification available to him. However, I think it actually causes big problems for Williams. Let’s assume that Williams is right that if Gauguin were actually successful as a great painter then he would have some justification for leaving his family (more on that below) and that he can’t know if he’s justified ex ante. Even if this is true, it’s simply not true that the justification regarding the possibility of being a great painter can’t be known before making the decision. Indeed, that can be reasonably estimated and on that basis we can judge whether Gauguin is or is not justified in leaving.

Before I get into how we do this (the procedure will be familiar), I should say something about what kind of possibility we’re talking about when we say that the possibility of being a great painter is some justification for Gauguin. Clearly, it’s not some kind of logical, metaphysical, or nomological possibility that’s at play–if that were the case, then there would be justification for almost anything. There would, for example, be some justification for putting drain cleaner in your coffee because there’s some possible world in which it doesn’t kill you. No sane person would take this as any kind of justification. Rather, what we’re talking about is a kind of counterfactual possibility tied to a probability of success; i.e. if the crate hadn’t crushed his hands he would have had a decent chance of succeeding at being a painter or there would have been at least some likelihood of success.

Here, I think Williams is unfairly benefiting from the fact that we know that the real Gauguin really was successful as a painter and that we implicitly smuggle that in. Consider what happens if we mess with the likelihood of success in setting up the example. Suppose we stipulate that our Gauguin has never put brush to canvas in his life, or that instead of painting he wants to leave his family so he could train and beat the world record for the 100 meter dash despite never having run a day in his life. In other words, imagine that his aspirations are entirely unrelated to anything in his life that indicates he would have any success in achieving what he sets out to do–indeed, we might even point to factors that indicate that he’s highly unlikely to succeed (“Gauguin, my dude, beating a world record requires a lifetime of training that you just never had.”)

In these cases it makes sense to think that even if he can’t know whether he’ll be successful in beating the world record he has pretty damn good reason to think that he won’t be able to. This also seems like pretty damn good reason to think that he’s not justified in leaving and not because of any moral considerations, but precisely because he’s very likely to fail. Indeed, we can also have reason to think that he’ll fail not because of some external reasons, but precisely because the evidence points to the fact that he is not the kind of person who can do the thing he sets out to do. That is, we can argue that he’s likely to experience a kind of intrinsic failure. Most importantly of all, we can figure this out before he sets out to make his decision–there’s just not the kind of uncertainty that could only be closed by finding out later whether one is ultimately successful or not.

As stated above, this procedure is a familiar one and we do this kind of reasoning all the time. I might get the idea that I should abandon my studies to pursue a career in country music. In trying to figure out whether I would be justified in making this decision you might very well ask me if, for example, I know how to play an instrument or sing, whether I understand or even like the music, whether I have any ins into the business, and so on. In other words, you might reasonably ask whether I have any reason to think that I’ll succeed in this. When you find out that the answer to all of these questions is ‘no’ you might reasonably say that I’m not at all justified in doing this (and you would be right!).

All this is to say that Williams’ argument relies on the existence of cases in which the only justification that needs to factor into whether one should do something is available only post facto. I’ve been arguing that even in the Gauguin example this isn’t the case and that there’s always some other evidence available prior to making the decision that can settle the question of whether he’s justified in taking off or not.

Criticism 2

Nevertheless, Williams could take my comments aboard and say two things. First, he could claim that an even more schematized version of Gauguin’s case could be made in which we really can’t say that he’s unjustified prior to his making a decision. We might suppose, for example, that the odds are perfectly even that he could be successful or a failure, or that the situation is so ambiguous that it’s just impossible to confidently say one way or the other. I won’t have much to say about this other than that I suspect such cases would be extremely rare; if moral luck regarding justification can only appear at those fringes then I’m not terribly worried.

More importantly, however, he can still insist that even if Gauguin makes his decision to leave while being completely unjustified, if he were to nevertheless succeed he would still have some kind of justification available to him. And he could argue that this is really the important thing to note in this highly schematized example.

(It should be noted that the role of luck here has changed. It now strikes me that in the case that our Gauguin succeeds the luck is precisely in his success. But I’ll set that to the side.)

The question, then becomes whether a success like Gauguin’s really is any justification for having done what he did. Or more broadly, whether post facto justification makes sense. I don’t think it does and I think that it’s pretty easy to see why by looking at cases of negligence. This is my second objection.

Suppose, for example, that I, never having shot a gun in my life, come to think that I can become the world’s greatest marksman. As my first attempt to do this I take an apple and place it on my infant son’s head (don’t worry, I don’t really have any kids) and shoot the apple off. Prior to shooting it, most people, I hope, would think that I am not justified in taking the risk of missing the apple and killing my son (or of even exposing him to that kind of danger). Suppose, furthermore, that I actually hit the apple and my son remains unharmed. In that case I was successful and we can even say that my success is some evidence, however slight, that I am the world’s greatest marksman (after all, I did this on the first try with no practice!). However, I don’t think anyone would think that my success provides any post facto justification for having done what I did.

I might try to defend myself by saying that I have something to say in my defense (viz. that I shot the apple) which I wouldn’t have if I had failed and killed the boy since, in that case, nothing would have justified me. But this strikes me as unconvincing. That I didn’t kill the boy or that I succeeded in shooting the apple does not, in this case, serve as any kind of post-facto justification at all. We would certainly be right to say that I was lucky, but the central claim of Williams’ point is that this kind of luck can act as justification for having made the decision to shoot in the first place. And I simply can’t see why that should be the case.

Crucially, the example with my son, while extreme, is relevantly analogous to Gauguin’s case since I have opted for a choice that neglects pressing moral claims on me by my family in order to do something that exposes that family to serious risk. What’s under discussion is whether success under these conditions provides any justification for deciding in the way I did–Williams argues that the Gauguin case does and I insist that in the case with my son it adds absolutely nothing.

Justify It Box 5: But aren’t there relevant difference here?

It’s true, my example is not fully analogous since one might argue that nothing is gained by my putting my son at risk for my stupid dream of being the world’s greatest sharpshooter and succeeding while something is gained by Gauguin putting his family at risk and succeeding at being a painter. One might also say that the value of art is such that success in that domain does offer post facto justification while success in gun-play does not and that this is where the real difference lies.

This might be right, but this doesn’t strike me as something that Williams would take up. In the first place, this line of thought is almost explicitly consequentialist and Williams was no consequentialist. But even if he would avail himself to this kind of reasoning, I still think one could put pressure on the earlier claim that this kind of justification can only be known post facto since that simply isn’t true if one takes up this line. That is, it’s not the case that we don’t know anything about the value of art such that it can’t factor into our deliberations ex ante; it’s not like we discover upon my successfully shooting the apple off my son’s head that this stunt wasn’t valuable or in Gauguin’s case that art is valuable.

Maybe one would argue that at this point we’re at loggerheads–Williams claims one thing, and I claim another. However, I think more could be said in my defense. In particular, it seems to me that Williams is relying on the fact that people tend to think that if something has been accomplished, then its having been accomplished speaks in favor of it having been done in the first place. But it really does matter whether this way of thinking about the matter–regardless of whether it’s widespread–is a good way of thinking. And I just don’t see don’t see how it could be. Aside from the example I gave, one can construct countless others: the fact that I didn’t kill anyone driving drunk last night does not mean that I was justified in driving drunk in the first place; the fact that I successfully pulled out all my teeth does not mean that I was justified in pulling them out; the fact that the palace coup succeeded is not a reason to think that it was justified; etc. Let’s call the taking of a success in action as speaking in favor of the doing of that action the ‘fait accompli’ fallacy. Given the number of examples that one can generate to demonstrate that this way of thinking is pretty bad, it seems to me that the onus is on Williams to show that the when it is applied to the case of Gauguin this kind of reasoning is not fallacious. In other words, it must be shown that Gauguin’s success really does provide any kind of justification at all without just assuming that.

Now, the obvious rejoinder here is that, again, there’s something that can be said if Gauguin is successful that he wouldn’t be able to say if he failed. This is true, but it won’t cut it. If that ‘something’ that can be said is not a piece of justification (but instead a bit of fallacious reasoning) then the fact that it can be said is irrelevant. Likewise, the fact that one can affirm the consequent in the course of an argument is not a reason to think that that person is arguing well. Crucially, one can’t simply assume that whatever is offered in response to such cases is justification.

Still, it is true that at least sometimes people do commit the fait accompli fallacy and that we do say things like “well, everything worked out alright in the end!” to at least attempt to justify their actions. Why do they do this? I think one reason is to stop criticisms about what could have gone wrong in a situation–it’s no use yelling at me for taking a risk in doing x since it’s all over and what could have gone wrong is in the past now. Clearly, if the thing does go wrong, then one can’t say that one can’t be criticized about what could have happened since it actually happened. This, I think, is the ‘something’ that can be added only if one is successful in what they’re doing. Crucially, this is a move to stop a criticism, but the move itself does not stop criticism by showing that one was or is now justified, but one that relies on showing that further criticism would be fruitless. I think Williams confuses this bit.

Okay, let’s wrap this up. I’ve attacked two of Williams’ claims regarding justification in the Gauguin case: the first focused on the claim that in certain cases justification for one’s actions can only appear retroactively on the basis of whether one ends up being lucky in certain respects. I argued that even in those cases it’s just not true that the only justification is available retroactively and that we have pretty good ways of judging whether someone like Gauguin is justified on the basis of how likely he is to succeed in whatever he wants to do. I think we very frequently judge whether someone is justified in taking on a course of action in precisely this way. The second claim I attacked was the claim that being able to say something upon succeeding in an unjustified course of action provides some kind of justification for having done that action. I argued that this is implausible and that it rests on a bit of fallacious reasoning (what I called the ‘fait accompli’ fallacy). Given that there are plenty of easily constructed counter-examples in which success in taking an action adds nothing to whether one was justified in taking that action in the first place, the burden is to show why it should do this in Gauguin’s case. Finally, I closed with a short argument about what I think is actually going on when people make this fallacy.

Okay, I didn’t actually touch any of the stuff about morality or anything about agent regret. I might come back and do a follow up post at some point if I get bored again.

Justify it Box 6: Why are you writing this? Don’t you have other work to do?

Yeah…I don’t know why I do these things.

Zhelyu Zhelev’s “Fascism”: Preface

A Brief Translator’s Introduction

By birth, I’m Bulgarian; by training, I’m a philosopher. These are two elements of my identity that are likely to remain with me for the rest of my life–the latter, because I’ve gotten used to living that way, and the former, because it’s something that I can’t quite get rid of regardless of how thick my American accent gets and regardless of how little any Bulgarians actually care to claim me. In any case, these two aspects of my identity aren’t that hard to keep together, and, in fact, most of the time, they remain perfectly compartmentalized.

However, there are times when I want the two to meet. Unfortunately, and probably entirely because of sociological circumstances about how the profession works, Bulgarian philosophers are hard to come by. That’s not to say that there aren’t any. In fact, I was lucky enough to meet a Bulgarian colleague at my current institution who is one of the smartest philosophers I’ve ever met. Nevertheless, she works in America as a philosopher who does American philosophy. As do I. We are both Bulgarian, but I can’t say that either of us is a Bulgarian philosopher.

Maybe there’s no such thing. In fact, in most circumstances, I’m inclined to think that trying to find someone like that is a fool’s errand. After all, what do I expect to find? A philosopher who does philosophy in the Bulgarian way? Give me a break! I’m much too foreign, much too jaded, and much too old to believe an any nationalistic bullshit like that. I’m sure there are people who would be willing to argue about this (god knows I’ve been in conversations with people who claim that Bulgaria is an underappreciated historical jewel! Did you know, dear reader, that a Bulgarian invented the computer? Well, no, someone with Bulgarian parents did. And, no, he didn’t invent the computer, but he helped! Okay, he worked in the building where a microchip was developed. But he was there! And he was Bulgarian!). I don’t buy it.

Still, some part of me wants to find something worthwhile in Bulgarian thought that I can say “yes, this is good. It came from here and it speaks of here.”

I think there’s plenty of that in Bulgaria as a whole. I know there’s excellent poetry, excellent art, excellent music, etc. I don’t mean to shit on my birth country too much. However, one area where we haven’t made too much of a splash historically is philosophy. Go ahead, take a look at the Wikipedia page for Bulgarian philosophers–it wont’ take long, it’s a short list.

Yet, I think there may be perhaps be something worthwhile there…


This side project is an attempt to see if there is indeed something worthwhile in Bulgarian philosophy. I’m going into this entirely blind. What you’re about to read is a completely unauthorized translation of Zhelyu Zhelev’s Fascism, translated by me using what remains of my Bulgarian language skills (a nice side benefit is that in taking on this project, I’m also practicing a skill that I’ve almost entirely lost).

It goes without saying that I’m not a professional translator, and that anyone expecting that level of professionalism is in the wrong place. I’m also not a Bulgarian historian and, in fact, know very little about Zhelyu Zhelev. I know that he was a dissident during before 1989 and that he was the first democratically elected president of Bulgaria after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I have some vague memories of him on television as a child, but nothing more than that. I don’t know his politics and I don’t know the significance of the book, or its legacy. I do know, however, that he was a philosopher, that he wrote in Bulgaria, about things that were important to Bulgarians, and about issues that are still of interest to me. It remains to be seen whether he was any good as a philosopher, but that’s another matter…

I also know that I can’t easily find any translation of the text in English. So, in the spirit of samizdat, I provide this translation to the best of my abilities for others to read and analyze. I claim no credit for the original work and expect no money.

I should also make a slight note on the translation. I’ve tried to stick as closely as possible to what I take to be the original text. However, as mentioned before, I’m not a professional translator and don’t feel bound to the rules that other, more capable translators abide by. The biggest difficulty arises in the difference in syntax between Bulgarian and English–Bulgarian syntax has become bizarre to my Americanized eyes. The second biggest difficulty, which is partially the result of the syntax difficulty, is the length of sentences. This may also be a feature of Zhelev’s writing style as well. Again, I’ve tried to stick as closely to the original sentence structure, but where I thought things got ridiculous I’ve broken up super-long sentences in two.

Finally, what you’re seeing here is, of course, only part of the full work. Specifically, it’s only the preface. My hope is that over the next year I’ll be able to translate the full book, but you’ll only see it in pieces.


Fascism

by Zhelyu Zhelev

A Documented Study of German, Italian, and Spanish Fascism

(An Unauthorized Translation by Pavel Nitchovski)


In Lieu of a Prologue

Fascism or the political biography of a book

I am not a fatalist and I don’t like exaggerating, but it seems to me that things didn’t work out with this book. It could have had a much better fate. The book was written in 1967 and published in 1982. For an entire fifteen years it lingered in the publishing houses of Sofia. And it was always returned either because of the overloaded publishing plans, set in advance many years into the future, or because of the notorious “lack of paper.” Only the military was honest enough to tell me the real reason. I remember, when I went to talk to the military publishing house to see what was happening with the book, all the editors came around to see me. To see and to laugh. The laughter was congenial. So I asked them:

“Are you going to publish the book?”

“No, we can’t…”

“Why? Didn’t you like it?”

“On the contrary, we liked it a lot…”

“Well?”

“It’s too good to be published by us. This kind of thing can’t come out in Bulgaria.” One of them told me.

The only comforting thing was that the manuscript was constantly being passed around and read through by way of samizdat, both in the capital and in the county.

Credit for the rapid and widespread distribution of the manuscript goes to Radoi Ralin, who was also the book’s first reader. For years he personally distributed the text in different intellectual and political circles, giving it to certain people who, according to him, urgently needed to read it.

It’s also because of him that credit goes for the book’s speedy legalization. For that (and not only for that, of course) I dedicated it to him, even though it’s not listed in the title page for publishing reasons.

In 1968 I began negotiations with a Czechoslovakian communist party “Liberty.” At the end of July I went to Prague to arrange for the translation and other minor details. That was during the indescribable atmosphere of the “Prague Spring”, and joyous and worrisome were the “Two-Thousand Words…”

Twenty days later the Warsaw pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia and everything fell apart. In 1982 ten-thousand copies of the book were published in Bulgaria by the publishing house “Narodna Mladezh.” Three weeks after its release in bookstores it was banned and pulled from libraries. In reality, it was only the third batch of books, the last batch, that was pulled so that at least six thousand copies remained in public hands – these, the police were powerless to collect…

Shortly before the book was banned, representatives of various publishers came to me to ask permission to publish another 30 thousand copy batch. I, of course, agreed, but by the time they went to the printing department of the Communist Party headquarters to ask for an extension on the paper limit, “the infection” had already started and they were summarily kicked out.

In June of 1982 an international book fair was held in Sofia. Publishers from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland wanted to secure a contract to publish Fascism. But our ever-vigilant, ideological police had no desire to discuss this question and simply said that no such book existed. Of course, there was indeed no such book in the “Festival” halls…

In 1986 during the second Congress of Bulgarian Studies a large group of Chinese translators went to Radoi Ralin and asked him for something new to translate. With his inherent generosity and selflessness—which only those of great talent possess—Radoi told them: “Since I don’t have anything better to give you, I’m gifting you a copy of my friend’s book Fascism and recommend that you translate it in Chinese.” The large Chinese group split up the text among themselves and translated the whole book in a month. It’s now offered for publishing in the Academy for Western Philosophy and Sociological Literature in Peking. I’m purposefully withholding the name of the Chinese Bulgarianist who kept communications with us and who informed us of how the work was going. The last thing we heard before that line of communication was severed was that the book had received four positive receptions with high marks regarding the quality of the text, and that the book was already printed and bound with only the attachment of the cover remaining. Unfortunately, it was precisely at that time that the next anti-intellectual campaign started, which, in turn, caused the liberally friendly Chinese intellectuals to lose their posts, and, consequently, their political appointments as well.

The director of the Academy for Western Literature must have been among them, too, because he was also removed from his post. This fact proved to be fatal for the fate of the book’s Chinese publication.

After 1982, lots of Russians requested copies of the book. Some of them aimed to translate and publish it in Russian, while others were more modest and only wanted to introduce it in their samizdat. The brutal limitations on publishing agreements binding “brotherly nations” excluded and continues to exclude the possibility of an official publication in the Soviet Union. But it appears to be a fact that the book did circulate in their system of samizdat since so many Soviet citizens know about the book or have read it.  

At one point, Poles, too, wanted to publish different parts in various magazines and periodicals. I don’t know what happened with those attempts.    

The last group of people who came and requested a copy during June of this year were members of the committee of the Ukrainian National Front with the intention of translating and publishing the book in Ukrainian. I’m not aware what happened with that or even if anything happened at all.

In general, the fate of Fascism began to remind me of the girl who’s liked by everyone, but, who, for one reason or another, never manages to get married. Let’s hope that this isn’t happening because the girl is getting old… Actually, as the author, I would be happy if it turned out that the themes of the book have become politically dated and passé with time because it would mean that the last totalitarian regime has disappeared from the face of the planet.

But as long as totalitarianism exists, the book won’t lose its actual meaning since it initially represents an attempt, in good faith, with the help of documentary evidence, as in paleontology, to reconstruct the massive political skeleton of the totalitarian mammoth. And those who seriously want to fight against totalitarianism need to know its anatomy and physiology, without knowledge of which success cannot be guaranteed.

Personally, I see no other way to explain why even now in the era of Gorbachev’s perestroika, when the soviet press continues to bring up such massive amounts of crucially vital political information for our society, interest in the book has not waned. People look for it, they re-sell it for high sometimes extravagant prices to the tune of one or two months’ salary. Two years ago, I needed to send two copies abroad, the booksellers offered me a special author’s discounted price of $43 a copy![1]

Before perestroika, what primarily attracted the public to the book was the full overlap between the two variants of totalitarianism—the fascist variant, and, our very own communist one. Despite the analogy between the two never being made explicitly, the nature of the documented material and the way it is organized, the reader himself could discover the horrifying truth that not only is there no substantial difference between the Nazi and Communist political systems, but that to the extent that there is, the difference is of not benefit to communism.

Now, when the organs of mass information speak openly about such analogies and bring in more than a little factual material to support their claims it looks like the book continues to attract attention primarily because of its prognosis regarding the death of totalitarian regimes. The schemata through which the collapse of the fascist totalitarian is elevated to the status of law (a totalitarian system—military dictatorship—a multiparty democratic system) raises the question: will the same schema prove valid for our regime; will this law be preserved, or will it happen a different way? Because if events in Poland confirm this schemata—and this is quite so—then Gorbachev’s perestroika, in the way that it’s been conceived and realized, consists in an attempt to correct it.

Perestroika represents precisely the alternative to a military dictatorship. It has the ambition to do that which must be done by a military dictatorship, but to do so in a peaceful way, humanely, bloodlessly, democratically; i.e. to actualize the social transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

It must be said that, in principle, this alternative is not groundless. The simple fact that Hungary is implementing it before our very eyes and that the Baltic states are attempting to do so as well serves as one confirmation. But this doesn’t happen everywhere, and it’s not easy to do in the beginning.

Of great significance is the nation’s political culture, its moral character, and its cultural-historical traditions. In that sense, the more elevated a nation’s political culture is, the greater its chances of success are to correct the schemata and to replacing a military dictatorship with perestroika.

I worry that for the Soviet Union as a whole this is not an open option. To the circumstances that could lead to a similar development, I note: the multinational character of the country; the different cultural levels of the separate nations; the huge nomenclature; the colossal military machine which, in the most critical phases would have a hard time resisting the temptation to take power from the helpless civilians; the ingrained imperial habits, traditions, and relations, etc.

But the military dictatorship, however hard it tries to preserve the old totalitarian structures, or to save them (as is happening in Poland), cannot alter the process from totalitarianism to democracy but, to the contrary, will speed it up. By radicalizing its contradictions, the dictatorship speeds up the disintegration of the regime. Unfortunately, in this case everything happens with blood, it’s paid for with the lives of more than a few people.

In other words, even through perestroika, even with the help of a military dictatorship, the path through which our communist system will necessarily collapse is singular: from totalitarianism towards a multi-party democracy. This is absolute, nomological, and unavoidable. Everything else is trivial.

But life, which has always been richer than any schemas and for that reason resents being stuffed with them, will probably surprise us with new, many more wondrous and unbelievable combinations from the elements of political reality that we cannot even think of now. Who of us, for example, would have thought—despite the fact that this is so simple and close to the mind—that in the dismantling of our communist variant of the totalitarian system, the system will have to, for a certain period of time, degrade to the level of fascism—to the level of the less-developed and imperfect totalitarian fascist regime, and that in that sense, for us fascism would be one giant step towards democracy! It sounds shocking and paradoxical, but political illusions, emotions, and prejudices are one thing—another are the political realities and iron laws to which they submit.

Today it is precisely this prejudice or ideologically prejudiced way of thinking that prevents the majority from understanding the reason and meaning behind the processes that have happened and are happening in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, China, and even part of the Soviet Union. Now you can hear the majority at home complain about the regime and say “This is horrifying! It’s Fascism!” by which they mean to imply that things have gotten worse than before and that the country is less democratic. If you try to disagree, they’ll point you constantly to the ever-expanding repressive measures being taken. However, they forget that the democratic movement is expanding even faster in the country and that there already exist about a dozen independent groups and movements, that civil society is re-awakening in the country, etc. –things which earlier were completely unthinkable.

This is why it would be better if we told them: yes, it’s true that on the one hand, countries like Bulgaria, GDR, Czechoslovakia, China, etc. face political repression, demagoguery, cynicism, general corruption, chauvinism, patriotism, faithlessness, etc. as well as experiencing unformed movements, open warfare for democracy, changes, and so on. On the other hand, they look more like fascist countries than communist ones, but this fact shows only that they’ve gone through a particular democratic evolution, that they’ve reached a particular phase of decomposition of the totalitarian structure. Because no other path exists in the transition from totalitarianism to democracy except the path that destroys its own political system. Whoever promises to make democracy through the perfection of the totalitarian system is working with the most profound demagoguery.

But because this question is a principled one—that is, it has not only a theoretical but also a direct practical meaning for the current moment, it deserves a closer look so that we can try to see it in historical context.

We, Marxists, were the first in history to create a totalitarian regime, a totalitarian country—the single-party system, built through the violent destruction of the other political parties or through their degradation to ordinary state organizations, completely subservient to the communist party. This absolute monopoly of the communist party in the political sphere necessarily had to lead to the complete fusion of party and state, and most of all with the state apparatus with the party apparatus, as a consequence of which the head of state and the had of the party turn out to be the same entity, possessing limitless and uncontrollable power that runs through all the lower levels of the national and economic hierarchy—the members of the party.

And so that this system could be stable and unshakeable, the absolute monopoly on the state and party, the party’s monopoly of the state, or more accurately, of the party-state, had to spread from the superstructure to the economic base of society. It was necessary that it be turned into state property—big private property by way of expropriation, the small through violent, bloody, Stalinist collectivization.

When this process of privatization of property was complete, the totalitarian regime was completed. That’s how the communist variant of totalitarianism, which even to the present day remains the most perfect model of totalitarianism throughout history. The fascist model which has been often presented as an antidote to the communist one in reality differs only from it insofar as it is unfinished and imperfect with respect to the economic base, and is consequently less perfect and more unstable. This can be investigated even in the inner architecture of Nazism and the Nazi system which nevertheless represents the most complete fascist regime. Here, the absolute monopoly of the party does not spread over the economic base, or, at least over the whole economic base. The latter is constituted in part by private property, different kinds of private property, which naturally doesn’t give rise towards impulses of cohesion, unity, or monolithicity. Quite the opposite, it creates plurality, heterogeneity, and differences which in a crisis easily transform into contradictions. A monolithic superstructure and a diverse base—this is the incompatibility between the political superstructure and the economic base in the fascist totalitarian regime. That’s what makes it unstable and short-lived. This is why ever fascist regime perished much quicker than our communist ones—some like the Nazi German and fascist Italian ones in the flames of the second world war, and others, like Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s Portugal after the war, in a matter of speaking, in peaceful conditions.

The fascist regimes not only died earlier, but they also showed up later, which shows that in this respect they are a poor imitation, a plagiarism of the original that represents the real, authentic, refined and perfected totalitarianism. My friend, professor Nicolai Genchev, with his usual sense of humor, defines fascism any time it’s brought up as “an early, un-systematized, bon-vivant variant of communism” and Hitler himself as “a pathetic imitator and operatic hero.” We must say that contained in this joke is a brutal truth. Without in any sense justifying Hitler the executioner and cannibal, we must admit that he is a veritable dwarf in comparison to Stalin the Executioner—even this comparison is a weak one. Stalin the Executioner could carry his colleague in his pocket.

I’ll mention only two figures which speak more eloquently than any arguments and deliberations of the fundamental differences between the two kinds of totalitarianism. Until the beginning of the second world war—September 1st, 1939—Hitler killed fewer than 10,000 people. As the reader recalls, this includes the victims of the “Night of Long Knives” (June 30th, 1934), when the opposition leaders of the SA were murdered, as well as the entire existing liberal opposition, and those of “Kristallnacht” (April 2938), the night of the antisemitic pogroms about which there is so much literature… By the same date of September 1st 1939, Stalin had murdered no fewer than 10 million. Some authors claim that this figure is closer to 15 million, but we won’t argue about that since this isn’t that important in this case. The important thing is that this is a difference that isn’t measured in percentages (one killed such-and-such percent more than the other), is not measured in multiplicities (this many times more than the other), but is a matter of a difference that is expressed in orders of mathematical magnitude; i.e. in quantities used in cosmology, astronomy, and modern physics…

The other figure concerns the victims of the war. Germany, which is at war with a couple of dozen countries in Europe and Africca, and which suffered a full military defeat at the hands of the Allies, suffers between 7.5 and 8 million casualties, and which includes, of course, civilian victims. In contrast, the Soviet Union, which enters the war nearly two years later suffers 30 million casualties. To hide their own incompetence and failure as leaders, Stalin only admitted to 7 million casualties, Khrushchev to 20 million, and currently the Soviet press reports casualties up to 32 million. There are authors who claim that the figure might be as high as 40 million.

Indeed, the difference here isn’t calculated in mathematical terms, but are four or five times greater given that one enters the war much later and doesn’t go to war with as many countries as the aggressor state. This indirectly speaks to the far greater scope of the completed and more perfected totalitarian regime.

But maybe nothing else speaks as eloquently on this topic as the absence of any attempts of a military coup against the Soviet leadership for the fact that it sent the population into a military catastrophe during the years of 1941 and 1942. The history of the 20th century has never known such a horrific betrayal towards one’s own nation and country as the one perpetrated by Stalin and his Politburo. The destruction of the commanding army staff, the full abandonment of the material-technical supply, the dismantlement of defensive structures on the western border, the criminal neglect of the numerous threats by the intelligent services regarding the immanent threat towards the Soviet Union, the massing of German divisions conspicuously close to the Soviet border, the lightning-fast invasion of the Soviet Union and the capture of nearly four and a half million Soviet soldiers—all this by the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 set up the Soviet Union for a complete military catastrophe, and forced Stalin, through Beria’s channels, to sue for peace with Hitler through the mediation of Tsar Boris.

The fact that even under these nationally catastrophic conditions the Soviet generals didn’t make even one attempt to take down Stalin’s team shows precisely the depth of the political and ideological collapse that was to be found in the social consciousness of the totalitarian regime at is existed in the Soviet Union.

In similar circumstances, despite the fact that they were unsuccessful, German generals did attempt a coup against Hitler and his regime on July 20, 1944. In Italy, the year before (on July 25, 2943) the military leadership of Marshall Badolio managed to arrest Mussolini and to remove the Fascist party from power. In both cases this was possible because the German and Italian generals came from the propertied classes, which means that they had ground under their feet in the civilian sector and in the most important sphere of civil life—the economic sphere. They had property. In practice this meant that if the conspiracy failed, if the worst happened, their families wouldn’t die of hunger, wouldn’t perish, and his brood would be wiped out.

As it relates to the current problem it’s interesting to remember Mussolini’s ideological evolution during the last stage of his life after he was freed from captivity by Otto Scorceni’s squad.

As a result of continuous deliberation (and how much time he had to think while being held captive in that fortress in the Alps!) he came to the conclusion that he has to create a different fascist country where the path to nationalization leads to everything becoming state property. Mussolini understood that only a state monopoly over property could create a monolithic and unshakeable totalitarian regime, capable of guaranteeing the fascist leader and fascist party against any surprises from the military. He put these ideas into his plan for the creation of the notorious Republic of Salo, the creation of which was only frustrated by the military actions of the Allies in Italy.

However, the first practical steps were already made. The creation of the “Neofascist Republic of Salo” was announced in the beginning of October 1943, naturally with close ties to SS General Karl Wolf and his German attaché Rudolf Ran. At the arranged congress in Verona in November 1943 an appeal was made to the north-Italian workers in which they were promised control of the industrial enterprises and a partial nationalization of the land…

But let’s return to the topic at hand. When we talk about the passage through the “fascist” phase in the dismantling of our communist totalitarian regime and when we present this transition as a step towards democracy, this shouldn’t be understood literally in the sense that we’re aiming towards fascism as if towards some kind of idea, that we’ll embrace its ideology, etc. We will pass through it as inevitability, as an unavoidable state of affairs, through necessity and, therefore, the faster we go through it, the better. But we pay special attention to the internal pressures in our totalitarian system in the era of perestroika—pressures which exist because the dismantling of one or another element of the base or superstructure. It is precisely the dismantling that makes the perfect totalitarian regime imperfect, and, because of that, unstable. This circumstance, in turn, becomes a reason to resort to repression as a means of compensation through which stability is restored to the system. It’s possible, of course, for perestroika in different countries to focus the dismantling processes on the base (as is the case in China), or on the superstructure (as is the case in the Soviet Union).

In either case, the totalitarian system enters a phase of instability, as it were, a structural weakness, and to strengthen itself it can’t compensate itself with anything other than the naked use of force, repression, and terror.

The most recent events in China are evidence of this. The economic reforms that the Chinese leadership has been pushing through the last ten years, which dissolved the communes, distributed the land to the peasants under 10, 15, 20, 30, and 50 year leases, which created a freer market, “special economic zones”, etc. one way or another had to lead to contradictions between those in power and the intelligentsia. The economic reforms created conditions under which different groups grew richer, more independent, and more autonomous from the state. At the same time as these groups gained this new social status and position, they demanded to be freer politically as well, which couldn’t happen under the current communist regime without overthrowing the single-party system. So they dared to. The intelligentsia and the youth, which have always been the most sensitive towards the question of freedom and democracy, reacted first against the Communist Party’s monopoly when they called for its removal.

Therefore, even before it came to the return of private property in one or another sphere of civil life, even before it came down to the typical fascist overlap between the base and superstructure (private property and the economic base of society and absolute party-state monopoly of the political structure), the characteristics of the fascist phenomenon have begun to appear.

Of course, it’s very possible that the transition through the fascist phase will not be confirmed everywhere. The instability effect that occurs during the dismantling can occur in the other direction. In the Soviet Union, for example, the economic base is still untouched and an absolute monopoly on the state over the national property continues to be complete, while the dismantling processes in the superstructure have gone so far that political pluralism has become a fact: practical steps for the separation of state and party; unformed groups, movements, and national fronts which challenge the Communist party’s monopoly of power; strikes and national liberation movements; publicity. This consistently exposes the defects and failures of the totalitarian system. In a sense, fascism is created backwards (a monopoly in the base, pluralism in the superstructure!) which, of course, continues to destabilize the system as a whole.

If reform is actualized in Bulgaria as has been planned by the nomenclature—beginning first with the economy, and ending with the political sphere—we’ll see precisely the Chinese variant of dismantlement, and the process of fascistization will be apparent. Indeed, to the extent that economic reforms have been attempted within certain parameters and certain groups in the population have begun to develop a sense of independence and self-confidence, the tension between the base and the superstructure is already more or less palpable. What matters here is not so much the subjective side of this phenomenon, as much as a number of its objective manifestations.

All these reflections on the transition through a kind of fascist stage on the path towards a full dismantlement of our communist model of totalitarianism which, I repeat, represents the perfected form of totalitarianism, don’t change the general course of the disintegration: a totalitarian system, followed by a military dictatorship (or, respectively, perestroika), and a multi-party democracy. The general formula is valid for both types of totalitarianism, and practically for all totalitarian regimes, with the exception that before the more perfected communist variety reaches the second stage it frequently descends to the more imperfect one of fascism. This moment of degradation can sometimes be very easy to spot as an erosion of the first stage, while other times, of course, its expression can be so vague that it is hardly noticeable.

As can be seen, the latest developments on the topic of fascism come from the least expected place – from perestroika – which once again points to the tight link between the two varieties of totalitarianism. Earlier, this connection was either denied, or was primarily seen in terms of a historical or historico-genetic plan (how, for example, communism birthed or stimulated the development of fascism, and following that, how fascism has enriched the political arsenal of communism, etc.), but now, it is seen in actual political terms.

These circumstances bring us back again and again to the foundational problems of studying fascism.

The most recent data confirms that the deepest foundations of fascism cannot be understood if it is not examined as a totalitarian regime, as a type of totalitarian system. Without the totalitarian model in place it’s impossible to see how fascism fits into the political frame of the twentieth century. Even less possible is it to understand its connection to the other kind of totalitarianism—communism—and to establish precisely how the two differ and what they have in common. It’s a bad science which, a priori and necessarily, and due to clearly ideological consideration denies such a connection, emphasizes an imaginary opposition between the two, and at the same time presents itself as most basic and foundational. It’s also bad science when communism is decried as a kind of fascism, the worst kind of fascism, and so on. This attempt amounts to reducing the uncompromised or less-than compromised form of totalitarianism to the other, fully compromised form as judged by the Nuremberg process. And today this hardly makes any sense.

From what has been said so far it should be obvious that for us, the Bulgarian society and the Bulgarian intelligentsia, all the problems of perestroika are not new. We’ve literally been discussing them since the second half of the 60’s, though not at the level of a political empire as in the Soviet Union, but on a significantly higher, theoretical level where the processes in question have the status of laws and from which follow specific consequences for all totalitarian regimes.

Of course, under those circumstances this could only be done openly and comprehensively only on the basis of examining one kind of totalitarianism—fascism—the other was taboo. The public, too, was much more prepared to understand it this way since it already knew the much of the critical material regarding fascism, but retained many illusions about communism.

I remember when the young military officers in Portugal staged a revolution in April of 1974, established a military dictatorship for two years which was followed by a parliamentary multi-party democracy. At the time many friends and acquaintances who had a manuscript of Fascism said that the formula for the collapse of totalitarian regime was working quite well, or, as one especially enthusiastic person said: “it’s working flawlessly.”

The same thing happened in 1981 when martial law was declared in Poland. Of course, this time they didn’t call me on the phone because things were happening in a ‘brotherly country’ and such conversations weren’t safe.

It’s no coincidence that when the book arrived on the scene the authorities reacted with such single-minded and massive repressive measures against anyone connected to its publication. Based on the reaction from the public, and based on the breathless enthusiasm with which parts of the intelligentsia reacted, they instinctively realized that people were openly discussing the biggest problems of our time, and, in that respect, discussing the fate of our “order.”

However unpleasant it must have been for them—and they understood beautifully that they were uncovering themselves by chasing an anti-fascist book—they still understood that they had to repress it since they couldn’t oppose its ideas.

They fired three editors who were closely connected to the book: the poet Cyril Gonchev who served as the internal editor of the book; Violeta Paneva, the editor who ran the “Maver” library (where the book actually came out); and Stefan Landzhev, the head executive of political literature in the publishing house.

The external editor, Professor Ivan Slavov, was censured by the party and “reprimanded.” The question of an administrative punishment was also discussed, but the sharp reaction from the party organization in the philosophy department prevented it from going through. Two reviewers also received party punishments: Professor Cyril Vasilev and Professor Nicolai Genchev. Because of his overly positive review of the book, Genchev received a different punishment. It was ordered “from above” that he resign as the dean of the History department and all of his programs were dropped from TV in the course of three or four years. Because of his positive review in the Plovdiv newspaper “Domestic Voice” Asen Kartalov was punished with a “strong censure and final warning” regarding expulsion from the party, and as removed as OK lecturer of the BCP. The journalist Slavejko Mandev was also removed from his post as head ideological editor in the same newspaper, which seems to have caused him significant stress since he passed away soon after.

As far as I know one of the main reasons for the removal of the then Central Committee’s Comsomol secretary was for ideological reasons; namely, Belcho Ivanov had allowed Fascism to be printed despite the fact that, as was confirmed later, he didn’t even know about the text and was on vacation at the time. I’ve also heard it said many times that the publication of Fascism was used against Alexander Lilov by his enemies in the Politburo but I can’t confirm whether that’s true. In any case, after the publication of the book one of his ‘aides’ attacked me on just those grounds soon after the publication of the book. He told me that with Fascism I had “stabbed Dr. Lilov in the back.”

I, too, of course, had to be punished, but since I had been long kicked out the party, I only received administrative punishments. I was released from leading my section, and was removed from the Scientific Council of History and Culture. And so as to avoid a scandal, they did it in the Jesuit way: they called for a reorganization of the Institute, as a result of which my section on “Culture and Personality” turned out to be closed, and so I couldn’t complain and as a bit of camouflage, they also closed down the neighboring section on “Regional Cultural Problems.” At the same time, the “newly rebuilt” Science Council was announced with only one name missing—mine.

I could have protested and created a scandal, but I didn’t. I was uncomfortable trying to defend myself when, because of my book, other people whom I couldn’t help suffered much more than me. It would have been terrible.

The expectations of the powers that be that these repressive measures would have scared the cultured population, force it to refrain from commenting about the book in public, that those who had a copy would refrain from spreading it around, didn’t come to fruition. The general interest in the book was already so big that the repressive measures only served to add fuel to the fire. People who had never read any political literature were trying to get their hands on it.

At that point the authorities decided to act in a more indirect and flexible way. They organized a massive, lightening fast publication of two foreign studies of fascism: Fascism: Terror and Practice from the French Burderon, and Myth and Reality from the Soviet authors D. Melinkov and L. Chornaya. Both of these were documentary studies. However…

Aside from that, the various Central Committee departments organized a brutal review of the book, which, after a lot of mottling came out in the 12th edition of “Philosophical Thought” (from 1982) under the title of “Towards a Scientific, Marxist-Leninist Analysis of Facsims” by Mitryo Yankov. The main argument against the book was that it didn’t do a class-party analysis of fascism, and that, consequently, it wasn’t written from a Marxist-Leninist position. Other than that, it made the absurd claim that it was copied—that it was plagiarized—from Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, despite the fact that that book came out ten years later in 1981 and my manuscript was registered with the central publishing authorities between 1967 and 1970. This was a nasty and naïve claim to which I was forced to respond with an open letter to the editorial board and in which I insisted that the plagiarism either be proven, as is done everywhere else in the world, or else, for the editorial board to publicly apologize or be taken to court. I had the full intention to sue the members of the editorial board but my wiser friends convinced me not to waste my time. All the more because a group of active anti-fascist fighters whose names include Boris Delchev, Braiko Kofardjiev, Boris Spasov, Dacho Marinov, Ducho Mundrov, Iskra Panova, Nevena Mechkova, Radoi Ralin, as well as younger colleagues like Ana Serafimova, Evgenia Ivanovna, and Ilia Ivanov, wrote protest letters to the head editor of “Philosophical Thought” in which they express their indignation that the publication reserves a place for 50’s style defamatory articles without the opportunity to respond to those defamations.

The authorities, apparently, did not expect these protests because in response they took a very unpopular step: they began to call in the authors of the letters for “comradely” conversations during which they tried to convince them to reject their defense of Fascism. Of course, that didn’t work. In every conversation one side attempted to convince the other to change their mind. Radoi Ralin, who was invited to discuss the matter with the philosophy department in the presence of the academic Sava Ganovski, professor Ivan Kalaikov, professor, Todor Soichev, and others tried to convince the commission that Fascism must be introduced as a textbook in the Party Building course in the Upper Party Academy. If the commission thought that this was just Radoi’s latest political joke must have found it a hilarious one, but when they realized that his recommendation was completely serious, they became completely discouraged and changed the topic to other subjects…

All of the events not only kept the book in the public’s attention, but also consistently popularized it. As a literary fact, they turned it into a political event. A spontaneous movement developed in defense of the sacked editors and reviewers. People constantly came to me to express support and solidarity, as well as, of course, threats of punishment such as expulsion from Sofia, interrogations, and liquidation.

Interest became so large that a genuine political folklore developed around the book. Suddenly, there were comic situations, rumors and legends that became grounds for political jokes. I’ll allow myself to tell you a few of these:[2]

Since she’s heard it be said in certain intellectual groups that a certain book has received a significant level of prestige, a young woman decides to get a copy. She goes to the bookstore and asks: “Excuse me, do you have Z. Zhelev’s Communism?” Surprised, the bookseller asks, “Did you mean to say ‘Z. Zhelev’s Fascism?’” “Yeah, yeah, whatever.”

Professor Ivan Slavov’s friend meets him on the street immediately after the party’s punishment has been passed and asks him: “Hey, Ivan, how are you? What are you up to?” To which he responds, “I’m marking myself as yet another victim of Fascism

Every party functionary has threatened prof. Nicolai Genchev that because of his positive review of the book, he’ll be kicked out of the party. To which he replies: “By kicking me out you’ve only registered me as an active fighter against fascism!”

They asked the director of the publishing house “Naroden Mladezh”: “what’s the newest thing in the publishing game?” To which he replied: “Other than Fascism…nothing new…”

According to another joke, I sent an extensive article to the “People’s Culture” newspaper. The editorial board, overjoyed that I’d once again taken the party position decides to call me: “We’re very pleased with your article. We agree with everything. We’re publishing it without any changes. But why didn’t you sign the sign your name to it?” “Well, because it’s not mine.” “Well, what do you mean?” “It’s written by Goebbels…”

There was apparently another one that managed to compare incomparable things:u

What did the people of Eastern Europe do after the second world war? The Hungarians had an uprising in 1956, the Czechs had the “Prague Spring” in 1968, the Polish had “Solidarity” in 1980, and the Bulgarians published Fascism in 1982…

To compare the publication of one book with the uprising of a nation, or with a whole national movement, is, of course, unfounded, but it’s interesting as a certain way of thinking even if the joke is understood as a bit of self-deprecation which is the most probable case.

In connection with the contradictory and tragicomic situation in which the persecutors of the book found themselves, even the old famous joke about the “mustachioed dictator” has been updated:

A drunk finds himself, sloshed, in front of Lenin’s Mausoleum in Red Square at midnight and begins to scream “Death to the mustachioed dictator! Death to the mustachioed dictator!” The guard in front the mausoleum pretends not to hear him and waits impatiently for the drunk to leave. But, stubbornly, he remains and, from time to time, turns to the Kremlin, wagging his clenched fist and chanting his slogan. Finally, the guard is forced to call the officer on duty. When the colonel sees what’s happening, he arrests the drunk and reports to Stalin that he’s captured a dangerous enemy who’s been yelling “Death to the mustachioed dictator!” Stalin says that he’s busy at the moment and can’t deal with the matter right now but to bring the enemy to him in three hours. These three hours turn out to save the drunk and he manages to sober up. And when he’s brought before Stalin and asked “Comrade, who were you referring to when you were yelling ‘Death to the mustachioed dictator?” he answers: “Hitler, of course. He treacherously invaded our country, destroyed thousands of cities and villages, and killed millions of Soviet citiz…” “Enough!” says Stalin, “Carry on, comrade!” then turns to the colonel: “And you, comrade colonel, who were you referring to?!”

I tell this clever Soviet joke not only because it was revived by popular opinion and was always related to the fate of the book, but also because, above all, it accurately describes the tragicomic situation in which those who organized and pursued repressive measures against it necessarily found themselves in. On the one hand, they had to punish because of the supposed analogy with socialism; but on the other hand, when those punished demanded that it be pointed out to them precisely where the comparison was made, they had to admit that, despite the fact that there were no explicit textual comparisons in the book, it was written in such a way that anyone reading it would naturally make that comparison—something which the opposing side, by taking the Jesuit position, obstinately denied by proving that such a comparison could only be made by a politically perverted mind. Consequently, those who make the comparisons—the party apparatus itself—are the ones who much be punished. And since this was the direct political accusation against the persecutors, the arguments exploded over and over…

              What was happening was precisely that which the authorities most feared: that the punishments wouldn’t remain secret and the interest towards the book would become even more pronounced.

              Of the many comic situations that developed, I’ll tell only two.

              One day my friend from Pazardzhik, a poet who knew the text of the book well before it was published, saw the book on display he bought fifteen copies. The same day, he was set to meet with one of the village priest with whom he’s good friends and in order to interest him in buying the book himself, he tells him that a new book on fascism has come out and the must absolutely own it at any price. The priest tried, but couldn’t make it to the bookshop in time. A week later, he went back to find it, but by that time it was already gone. At that point, my friend gave him a copy to read and the two agreed that when the two met again in two weeks, the priest would return it. Yet, 15, 20, 30 days pass, then a month and a half, then two and not a peep from the priest. One night, my friend, worried, takes the bus to the village to see what’s going on with the priest. He finds him in the company of the village mayor, the party secretary, the leader of the local friendship league, the head of the union, and two teachers who are meeting to drink and discuss something important. He asks him why he hasn’t returned the book and the priest says “We decided that this book should stay here in the village. We started a reading group and are studying it. We’re reading each chapter and discussing it.”

“What kind of reading group is this” asks my friend. “The party secretary and the mayor are communists, you’re a Christian, the leader of the friendship league is a farmer, the teachers most likely atheists and non-party members…what do you have in common?”

“Ah, true,” said the priest, “when it’s a matter of discussing fascism and drinking, we’re a united front. Here, ideologies don’t matter…”

              The other story happened in a town outside of Plovdiv. Apparently, the local union organization decided to reward its most prominent members at the citywide assembly. Along with monetary and material rewards, they also decided to gift them books. They turned to the bookseller and told her that they preferred broadly political literature, with hard covers, and thick enough to catch the eye. The bookseller told them that she had on hand a batch of about ten books on fascism that match their desired requirements—hard covers, thick, etc. The union leaders, who were also apparently the epicenter of the local political life, signed the books and handed them out at the meeting. However, after a couple of days rumor around town spread that they’d handed out an ideologically dangerous and forbidden book. The book became an object of unexpected discussion and commentary. Most likely, these murmurs made their way to that state institution which is most concerned with the ideological health of the country and, on its instruction, they went from person to person to collect the inappropriate book.

              However, along with the comic situations, there were also tragic ones. I’ll tell only the most recent one. Last year, a young man from Pazardzhik called me and insisted that we meet.

              At first, I thought that that it was someone from the human rights movement seeking to make contact. However, it turned out he was interested in something entirely different. “My fate is very tightly connected to yours” he told me. I expressed my surprise and told him that I couldn’t understand what he meant—we didn’t even know each other.  “I was in prison for four years because of you book on fascism,” he continued, “I read it to the soldiers in my company and they put me on trial. They court martialed me and sentenced me to six years in prison, but because I worked, I came out in four. Now, I have to go be conscripted again in the fall to finish my military service. The most insulting thing was that I was tried for…spreading fascist ideas in the military.”

              I was shaken—I simply couldn’t believe my ears. Actually, I had heard at one time about a case like this but I didn’t believe it. I thought that it was one of the many rumors and legends that were being spread at the time. But now this young man was standing in front of me and there was no room for doubt. Four of the best year of his young, intelligent man were lost…

“Don’t you have parents?” I asked him, “Why didn’t you run away? Why didn’t you make a scene? Why didn’t you rouse the local population? How could you suffer such a political sham?”

The young man told me that his parents tried to find help here and there but that they were threatened and told that it’s in their best interest to keep quiet, or else things could get much worse.

They truly were scared for their son and made peace with their ‘fate’.

In conclusion, I would like to apologize to the reader for the deluge of facts which have filled this preface—this is something that isn’t normally acceptable. On the other hand, however, I think, because of the strange fate of this book, it shouldn’t be considered a fault. The facts of the book’s political biography clarify and show the importance of the its contents, they decipher and further develop it. The publishers, readers, and the repressive organs, through their attitudes toward it, through the action they took, or through the suffering they endured around its publication and distribution, continued and completed its text. They continue to do so even now…

              Sofia, August 1989

              From the Author


[1] [Translator’s note]: roughly adjusting 120 leva in 1989 value to dollar value in 2019

[2] [Translator’s note: jokes are hard to translate. Even more so political jokes from 40 years ago.]



I have some bad news: you might live forever

[The bulk of this is a retelling of and musing on a paper by David Lewis, but without any of the actual good philosophy–in essence, it’s a less artful way of presenting the same ideas. For some good philosophy, read the paper.]

David Lewis ruined my day

Please, let me ruin your day.

Consider the following scenario: you’re about to enter into a Star Trek teletransporter that will disintegrate your body here on Earth and put you together in the same configuration on Mars. You step onto the platform, hear the operator press the button to begin the process, and so close your eye in anticipation. Then…nothing. You open your eyes, still on Earth. The machine, it turns out, has malfunctioned and failed to disintegrate you. Nevertheless, as you can see from the familiar face smiling back at you from Mars, it worked well enough to put together a copy of you there. Which one of those people is you?

An embarrassment waiting to happen

This question is, in one sense, unimportant. Some people think that both people are you. That may be right, but I happen to think that from your point of view (regardless of who you actually are) the question will seem absurd. You are the person who has your subjective, first-person view and that’s just the person who has this point of view. No other person has, or, indeed, can have this point of view, regardless of how much he looks like you, what they say, what kind of history or memories they have. So, while the question of who’s the real you might pose a problem from the third person perspective of the embarrassed teletransporter technician, it will never be a problem for you.

The same point, of course, applies to whatever or whoever your doppleganger is on Mars. For him, there likewise isn’t any question about who the real him is–it’s the person who has his point of view, i.e. him. And the same point applies to you who are reading this.

The same thing will be true if tomorrow you woke up with an entirely new body. If, for example, you were cursed to inhabit the body of your teenage daughter this Friday, on waking up and taking your usual first-person perspective, the question of who you are would never arise. You might think to yourself “my god, I’m in my daughter’s body!” but you would think “my god, I am my daughter!” That’s just a mistake you could never make–you could never mistake yourself for somebody else from your own perspective. You are necessarily the one who has this perspective and this perspective can’t be somebody else’s.

I also believe the same thing will be true if you woke up with all of your memories wiped clean (well, at least those memories that don’t involve remembering how mirrors work or how to speak or whatever. Play along!). In that case you might in some sense be wondering who you were, but you would still know that whatever the answer to that question is, you’re still now the person who is looking out from these eyes and who’s trying to piece things together. Subjectively speaking, there’s no deep question about your identity.

Never answer the phone

Back to the teletransporter. Suppose that instead of malfunctioning in the way that it did, a different mistake had happened. Once again, you remain unharmed on Earth. However, when you peek at the screen broadcasting from Mars, you hear screams of horror and see something that looks like your lifeless body, crumpled on their receiving pad. Did you die? The answer is, of course, no. You are where your first-person perspective is and that’s here on Earth where you are very much alive. Furthermore, if you were to die, you couldn’t have any first-person perspective. Necessarily, you can’t experience being dead since do be dead is to have no experience whatsoever (maybe if you have a soul you could still have the perspective from your heavenly ethereal body, but that would still be living a kind of life–an afterlife–and there, too, you would know it by taking this first person perspective). To dust off the old adage: wherever death is you are not, and wherever you are death isn’t. Whew–close one.

Your trials aren’t over just yet. Imagine yourself as the victim of a Schroedinger inspired act of cruelty. You’re put in a cell with a bottle of a deadly nerve agent that is hooked up to a photon detector, which, if triggered by a photon will smash the bottle, release the gas, and kill you. A photon is set to be fired into the detector, but in its way is set up a diagonal half-silvered mirror. In one scenario, there are no collapses (see the Lewis article for the full explanation of what those are), the photon goes into a superposition, hits the mirror and bounces away, the photon detector goes into a superposition of untriggered, the bottle into a superposition of not-smashed, and you go into a superposition of remaining alive. In a different scenario, there are collapses and, well, things don’t turn out as well for you.

It you.

You realize all this. What does it look like from your perspective? What should you expect? Well, if there are no collapses, then you should follow the intensity rule: “expect branches according to their intensities” where branches are the resolutions of the quantum indeterminacy and intensity is a measurement of the likelihood of different events occurring (I’m doing my best here–I don’t know anything about quantum mechanics). In this case, you should expect equally to be alive as well as dead. But, as we just saw, you shouldn’t expect to be dead! You can’t have that experience at all since that’s not an experience you can ever have! So your expectations should be adjusted and you should expect to be alive. In fact, no matter how many times your captor repeats this process you should expect to remain alive. As long as there are no collapses, you’ll always survive your torture.

You can think of this in terms of branching timelines. On one branch (from a third-person perspective) you die, and on the other one you live. The more times the torturous experiment is repeated, the fewer branches there are in which your survive. If there is collapse between the different branches, then, sadly, you will die. However, if there’s no collapse, then there are at least some branches in which you survive. And given that you will always be where your perspective is, and that there is no perspective in which you are dead, there is also no branch in which you will be dead. Thus, you should expect to always survive this experiment.

The same is not true for your torturer. For him, there are plenty of branches in which you die, but this is fine since we’re not asking what he should expect, but only what you should.

Nevertheless, we can ask what he should expect with respect to him and the answer will be very much the same as with you. That is, if there’s no collapse, he will never find himself on any branch in which he‘s dead, though, again, many of those branches involve your deaths.

This point generalizes. One doesn’t need to be in a torture chamber to risk death and it’s clear that there are many events that could occur that could result in death. These can be chemical, biological, or mechanic. Regardless, from your perspective, however, you shouldn’t expect to ever find yourself on any of those (though, of course, I should expect it for you).

So, if there’s no collapse, you should expect to live forever. If there is, however, you should definitely not expect this. So, is there collapse? How would we know? Well, here’s the rub: if there is collapse, then you won’t be able to get evidence of it since, as Lewis says, “its prediction is that in all probability you will die soon.” And once you’re dead your death can’t be used as evidence of any kind for you since you won’t be the kind of thing that will be able to assess evidence–you’ll be a corpse. Notice, also, that the deaths of others won’t give you any kind of evidence as to whether or not there’s collapse. The fact that someone (in fact, everyone!) else has died is compatible with you continuing to live in a non-collapse universe on a branch where someone else has died. The only way you could get evidence that there is collapse is if you died. But then, to repeat, that won’t be any evidence for you.

Should you believe that there’s collapse? Well, you are, of course, free to try dying, though if you’re successful it won’t matter to you anymore and it won’t make a difference as to whether anyone else should believe that there’s no collapse. If you survive, however, you have stronger evidence and the more improbable your survival, the stronger the evidence. As Lewis advises us:

If someday you find that you have survived a remarkably long sequence of dangers, the no-collapse hypothesis will then deserve your belief more than it ever did before.

So, the longer you find yourself alive, the more you should believe that there’s no collapse. Furthermore, you’ll never find yourself not alive (wherever you are, there you are), and, given that you’ve made it this far…

BUT YOU SAID THIS WAS BAD NEWS! WHY DOESN’T THIS SHOW THAT I’M GOING TO LIVE FOREVER?

If there are no collapses, then you really will live forever. But that doesn’t mean you won’t age, grow infirm, diseased, and incapable. Furthermore, while in your timeline you will always survive regardless of what happens to you, from your perspective nobody else will. Everyone else around you will age and die as you, the oldest person alive, will, in all likelihood, continue to survive in constant agony. Even if you tried to kill yourself, you would necessarily find yourself in the timeline in which the gun doesn’t go off, the poison doesn’t work, and the rope slips. Even worse! You might very well find yourself in the timeline in which the gun does go off, but only maims or; the poison does work, but only makes you horribly ill; and the rope doesn’t slip, but only paralyzes you! And this applies to every single person!

Happy Friday!

A silver lining and an addendum:

First, if there’s no collapse you might be able to live a less horrible life in the far future in which horrible infirmities and aging can be reversed though, say, tremendous scientific advances. You would still inhabit a world in which everyone else dies and you continue to live forever, so that’s a bummer, but it’s better than the alternative! Given that in every timeline you’ll necessarily be the person who has lived the longest, you’ll probably get some special preferential treatment in testing!

And note, if everyone believes that there’s no collapse sufficiently strongly, everyone can get to work on making these scientific advances. True, from each person’s perspectives, everyone around them will die, but collectively, we might be able to make it so that in each person’s timeline science is advanced enough to keep the misery at bay.

So, really, the worst is getting through the time that you’re alive now until the science gets really good. Furthermore, once you become convinced that there’s no collapse, you should definitely volunteer to be tested on since you’ll speed up the process and will know that you’ll survive (in whatever miserable state that is) regardless. That might make waiting through that horrible middle phase go much faster.

Chin up, fellow immortal! It’s only a matter of surviving hell for a couple of hundred years. Then it’s just permanent solitude until the heat death of the universe!

Finally, let me add that I know I’ve butchered the quantum mechanics stuff and that I’m not doing justice to Lewis. Relax. This is just another thing you’ll survive.

Socialist Reading Series I: The State and Revolution [Part 2]

Alright, let’s turn to Chapter 2 of TSaR (could there be a more fitting acronym?!). Discussion of Chapter 1 can be found here.


Chapter 2: The State and Revolution. The Experience of 1848-51

  1. The Eve of the Revolution

Summary

As stated at the end of the previous chapter, Lenin is going to take us through Marx and Engels’ treatments of the revolutions of 1848 and 1871 as evidence that his (Lenin’s) interpretation of the need for a violent revolution is correct. This particular section deals with Marx’s thoughts prior to 1848 and with remarks in The Communist Manifesto.

Specifically, Lenin zeroes in on a passage from the CM about the development of the revolution.

The first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as readily as possible.

The Communist Manifesto pg. 37 in the 7th German Edition 1906 (Lenin’s citation)

What’s crucial for Lenin in this passage is this last definition of the proletariat state as a ruling class. It is this definition that Lenin sees as advocating for the infamous ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (a phrase, I should say, appears like once in a letter that Marx wrote), and it is this definition that the moderates surrounding Lenin fail to account for in their approaches to revolution.

Putting together what we’ve learned already, then, we get something like the following picture: the state is always necessarily a tool of class oppression, the bourgeois form of which must be destroyed by the proletariat and supplanted with a proletariat state that subsequently withers away. This latter state is the proletariat itself organized as a ruling class, and since the state always remains a tool for oppression, then it must be a directed oppression against the bourgeoisie by the proletariat until the aforementioned withering is complete.

More succinctly, the existing state must be destroyed and replaced with an organized ruling class of the proletariat who finish off the capitalist exploiters.

This vision of the state as a ruling class comprised of the proletariat and oppressing the is one that is starkly at odds with any moderate position which sees a kind of peaceful co-existence between capitalists and the proletariat. These positions, claims Lenin, are utopian and are at the root of the failure of the 1848 revolutions; to take such a moderate position in 1917 would be tantamount to distorting Marx and making the same mistake again.

Furthermore, Lenin argues that only the proletariat class can overthrow the bourgeoisie since only it, through its role in economic production, can unite all the disparate peoples who are oppressed by the capitalists.

Lenin then summarizes what he takes to have shown:

The teaching of the class struggle, when applied by Marx to the question of the state and of the socialist revolution, leads of necessity to the recognition of the political rule of the proletariat, of its dictatorship, i.e., of power shared with none and relying directly upon the armed force of the masses. The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming transformed into the ruling class, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organizing all the toiling and exploited masses for the new economic order.

The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, both to crush the resistance of the exploiters and to lead the enormous mass of the population–the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletarians–in the work of organizing socialist economy.

The State and Revolution Chapter 2, pg. 30

Lenin then closes with a refinement of this general argument to work in the role of the worker’s party. I believe it’s supposed to go something like this: if this reading of Marx is correct (and Lenin has no doubts that it is), then the state, as we’ve seen, needs to be used as a tool of oppression and violence against the bourgeoisie. But if that’s the case, then the state can’t include the bourgeoisie, and will only be comprised of the proletariat. But since the vast masses that comprise the proletariat have been broken up by the bourgeoisie, it falls on a particular sector of the proletariat to take up the mantle of the state and do the necessary work. Which sector is that? Well, it’s the one that best understands Marxism and which has a consciousness advanced enough to only oppress the former oppressors; i.e. the worker’s party informed by a proper understanding of Marx (i.e. surprise, surprise, the Bolsheviks).

Analysis

I admit, I’m struggling a lot with this section. Lenin moves really quickly, but it seems to me that the crux of the entire argument rests on the simple equation of ‘state = tool of oppression against a rival class’ and ‘state = political rule’, along with an equivocation between oppression, force, and violence.

If the proletariat state is defined as an organized political rule by the proletariat class, and if any and every state is always a tool of oppression by one class against another, then substituting the middle terms, it follows that political rule by the proletariat class will be oppressive against the rival capitalist class. If, furthermore, oppression is force is violence, then it follows that political rule by the proletariat class will be violent against the capitalist class. What also follows from this is also that any political rule will always be (and has always been) characterized by the use of violence against its opposing class.

This argument seems, at the very least, valid. What’s crucial here is whether the posited equivalences are true. This takes us back to the perennial question of whether the state is necessarily a tool of class oppression–a question which I’ve set to the side for this first reading series but which we’ll pick up later. But let’s grant that for now and set that equivalence aside. Now, it’s clear that Marx endorsed the second equivalence between state and the exercise of political rule held, so, Lenin’s point carries: the proletariat state would, indeed, be a state in which the proletariat exercise political rule. What we’re left with, then, is the question of whether the exercise of political power is necessarily the exercise of violence by one class against the other.

Here, I begin to chafe a bit. It seems to me that there are at least two ways to think of the exercise of political power here. One is put in terms of the ability to cause violence and oppress, the other is put in terms of the actual use of violence and oppression. On the former view, one class has political power just in case it can cause violence against the other class (even if such violence is never used); on the latter, one class has political power just in case it does cause violence against the other.

The difference between the two can be illustrated as the difference between my having a handgun so I can fight off a potential burglar who comes into my house and my having a handgun and using it to actively hunt down burglars in my neighborhood. One view on power says that I have power in both cases (and am using it if and when I shoot a burglar); the other says that I only have the power insofar as I’m shooting burglars.

Taking this analogy to the state level, one might say that by gaining the ability to rule politically the proletariat state acquires the means to defend itself through the use of violence against the intrusions of the formerly powerful bourgeoisie. Now, this is markedly different from the stronger claim that in taking power the proletariat state must use violence to crush its opposition since that’s just what it means to have political power. This stronger reading takes it that there is no political power unless it is actively used to oppress and cause violence against the bourgeoisie while the weaker reading takes it that one can have political power insofar as one has the ability (used or otherwise) to cause violence to them.

The important point is that this distinction leaves room for a view of political rule in which the use of force and violence is reactive rather than proactive. This is perfectly compatible with the claim that the state is always a tool for oppression since, after all, tools retain their powers even when they’re not in use. It is also compatible with the claim that the state is an organization of political rule if we we grant that political rule involves the possibility of using force and not simply its actual use.

Again, the difference here in practice is the difference between having a political body which capable of defending the revolution with arms and a political body whose purpose is to kill the enemies of the revolution.

I think it’s not exactly clear which version Lenin is advocating for here. If I squint hard enough I can see him as strictly advocating for the former, weaker version–after all, he does say that the proletariat must transform itself into a class “capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie” [emphasis mine]. Thus, one could read him as merely arguing that the proletariat class must be one that violently overthrows the oppressive state, then maintains its monopoly on violence until such a time that it is no longer needed. But part of me thinks that he’s really pushing for the stronger view that the rule of the proletariat state needs to be proactively violent until there’s no more classes to be violent against.

I don’t see the weaker version as objectionable. Or, at the very least, I don’t see it as unreasonable. However, the stronger version still makes me uncomfortable since it seems to rely on this kind of fetishization of violence that I just don’t care for. I’m also not convinced that the view of power that underlies this version and which rests on the claim that power just is the active use of violence is a good one.

Finally, something needs to be said about the role of the party that sneaks into the very end of the section and which lays the grounds for a single party state. I tried to present the argument in the most charitable way possible in the summary section by pointing out that the way the definitions of the state and political power are laid out excludes the possibility of a state that’s comprised of bourgeois and proletariat parties. This might be true, but it’s clear that Lenin has set things up that makes it almost impossible for a plurality of, say, proletariat parties to work in a state as well. This is because every party that has the same (proper) reading for Marx will, de facto, just be the same party, and every party that doesn’t have that reading will either be opportunistic, or in the worst case, a class enemy that must be destroyed to protect the revolution. What this means is that there will always be one party that has things right, and a bunch of others that must either be defeated or united by force under the party doctrine.

This, for what it’s worth, is something that it seems to me comes purely from Lenin and isn’t to be found in Marx. He doesn’t use any quotes from Marx or Engels to support this, and it seems to me to be entirely brought in from Lenin’s own views about the importance of the party.


“Look over there! Enemies of the revolution!” – Lenin (probably)

2. The Revolution Summed Up

Summary

So, what did Marx make of the ’48-’51 revolution? His full assessment is in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (EB) from which Lenin specifically focuses on Marx’s claim that the revolution failed in France because it tried to work within the state. Here’s Marx:

The parliamentary republic finally, in its struggle against the revolution, found itself compelled to strengthen, along with the repressive measures, the resources and centralization of governmental power. All the revolutions perfected this machine, instead of smashing it up. The Parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor.

Lenin quoting Marx. Italics Lenin’s

In short, this passage confirms what Lenin had presented in chapter 1 in his discussion of Engels: the state is not something that can be co-opted by the revolution, but something that has to be overthrown, destroyed, and replaced.

Lenin then walks us through a brief description of the history and development of the modern bourgeois state in France. In doing so, he gives a more specific explanation of something else that we saw previously in Engels–namely, he outlines how the agents of the state come to have the interests of the ruling class rather than the oppressed class. Unlike the general remarks we saw earlier, this is an explanation of how this specifically happens in the bourgeois state as we recognize it and how working within the state failed under the specific conditions of ’48-’51.

Regarding its birth, Lenin says the bourgeois state forms with the collapse of absolutism and feudalism (think 1789 and its consequences). Crucially, this state is primarily characterized by two institutions that displace the existing ones that preceded it: bureaucracy and the standing army [side note: prior to the French Revolution, the majority of warfare was a job for nobility and hired mercenaries; it was only following the French Revolution and the threat posed to it by the monarchs of Europe that the concept of mass conscription and a standing republican army takes hold. For a really really good book on this check out David Bell’s The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know it.] These, in turn, stand as “a parasite on the body of bourgeois society” which it needs in order to suppress, repress, and contain class antagonisms. And it is through these organizations that the state evolves with each subsequent bourgeois revolution that spread on the heels of the French. New lessons are learned and the institutions are developed and perfected to suppress more effectively.

Crucially, what happens with each bourgeois revolution is the establishment of these two institutions, which, in turn, requires the appointment of government posts and positions of power. In filling these positions, the people who are involved in the institutions are separated and placed above the masses and apart from their interests. As parasites on the body of bourgeois society, their own survival depends on the existence of the bourgeoisie, and they come to be work for the benefits of that class.

Interestingly, Lenin doesn’t talk about how this played out in France, but illustrates this point with how the developments played out in Russia following the (bourgeois) revolution that overthrew the Romanovs. Following that revolution, notes Lenin, all the places of power that used to be populated by the Black Hundreds (ultra nationalist supporters of the tsar) simply were redistributed to members of some of the “moderate” Mensheviks, Social-Revolutionaries, and Kadets parties (each of which were, of course, Lenin’s enemies). Then, with that task complete, all talk of implementing radical changes and instituting reforms suddenly stopped or were indefinitely shelved.

Importantly, as this process of co-optation, betrayal, and inaction plays out, it does not go unnoticed by the proletariat, but serves to demonstrate just what they should expect from any moderates who want to participate in the state as a means of reform–viz., nothing. As the proletariat’s consciousness is raised through this realization, it becomes the best interest of the bourgeoisie and to more effectively perfect the state and its suppressive powers against its enemies.

The point, in all this, is, of course, clear: by participating in perfecting the state and working within it, the revolutionaries of 1848 did nothing more but strengthen the bourgeoisie’s ability to oppress. cannot improve the lot of the proletariat by working through the state, but, again, only by destroying it.

Anticipating an objection, Lenin notes that even if these conditions lead Marx to conclude that this is what the problem was in France in ’51, one may not be justified in extrapolating further than that. Can Marx’s claim be generalized? Unsurprisingly, given the fact that Lenin has already generalized it, he argues that it can. Here, the argument is that since ’51 the same process of consolidation of power against the proletariat has appeared in every country:

On the one hand, the development of “parliamentary power” in the republican countries (France, America, Switzerland), as well as in the monarchies (England, Germany to a certain extent, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, etc.); on the other hand, a struggle for power between the various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties which distribute and re-distribute the “spoils” of office, while the foundations of bourgeois society remain unchallenged. Finally, the perfection and consolidation of “executive power,” its bureaucratic and military apparatus

Lenin, The State and Revolution, Chapter 2, Section 3

The argument here is, I admit, a bit obscure, but I believe it’s supposed to be that in every developed country the impetus has been in working within the state–either through parliamentary politics or the re-assignments of offices in non-parliamentary governments, and never towards following any non-state interventions. I’ll return to why I find this argument odd below, but this is the best I can make of it here.

Finally, Lenin ends this section by noting that the global trend as of 1917 is towards imperialism, imperial war, and state-capitalism (note, he’s writing this years before the rise of fascism which makes state-capitalism it’s modus operandi), and that these forces are uniting to further oppress and suppress the proletariat populations of the world.

Analysis

I thought this section was one of the most interesting and most frustrating section so far. It’s interesting insofar as it describes the all-too-familiar process by which participation with the state blunts, subsumes, and defeats all promises of radical reform and change.

I can’t help but draw the parallels between Lenin’s haranguing of people who enter into office promising radical change only to be immediately sucked into the bureaucratic machinery, their promises of reform shelved, and the kind of disappointment that so many of us felt after Obama’s 2008 election. I don’t say that to place blame on Obama himself, but rather to highlight the fact that for many of us, the Obama promise seemed like a truly revolutionary one at the time and many of us seriously thought that with his election there would be some serious changes in place. Instead, nothing like that happened. Sure, I suppose some progress was made (though, to be honest, I’m finding it hard to see what that progress is in light of the last three years), but what was made clear to everyone was just how little could actually be accomplished while working from within the state bureaucracy. I’m afraid similar hopes have been hoisted on the Sanders campaign (a hoisting I’m guilty of as well) and that we’re still under the impression that if just the right people can get in office, then, everything would be alright. In that sense, Lenin’s description and analysis of the attempts to work within the state hits closer to home than I expected. So as far as putting his finger on an interesting phenomenon, Lenin remains an interesting read.

Nevertheless, I find the actual arguments really really thin! In fact, he doesn’t really put forward any arguments about the formation of the bourgeois state, its development, or the opposition that the proletariat must play (he doesn’t really even talk about France, as he says he will, but mostly draws on his own analysis of Russia!). Rather, he just asserts some claims without defending them, and then says that this has been proven by history. I’ve tried to fill in some of the details above (viz. the remarks about the development of the standing army), but even there I’m kind of speculating. Now, I know that he’s writing to a friendly audience that’s supposed to be familiar with Marx and, admittedly, I only got through half of the EB when I tried to read it, but I really wanted to see more. How does the bureaucracy of the modern bourgeois state prevent reform? Why does everyone who works within the state end up necessarily serving the bourgeoisie? (I tried to give a plausible answer to that in the summary, but I have no idea whether I’m right!)

Speaking of that, I also found it really interesting that nothing is said about the ability to enter into the state and destroy it from within. This, one might think, is what the republican party has been doing in the US since the rise of the Tea Party. It’s clearly effective and it can clearly further class interests (since all republican efforts so far have gone to benefit only the bourgeoisie), but it’s not an instance in which the state is violently overthrown. If so, then, it’s possible that the state can be destroyed by participating within it, but this is something that Lenin doesn’t consider. This is all the more strange given that Lenin’s own Bolsheviks frequently used participation in different organizations opportunistically to destroy them (side note: this was also the tactic used by some real chuds to destroy the grad union I used to belong to).

Finally, I found Lenin’s final argument about whether he’s justified to expand the lessons from ’51 apply outside of France really bizarre. What he needed to show was just as working within the state in France didn’t work in ’51, so working within the state wouldn’t work in 1917, and, presumably in 2019. What he does instead is show that the scope and power of the state is expanding everywhere, and then concludes from that that the conditions that held in France apply other places. But this is patently a bad argument! In fact, it relies on the very assumption that working within the bourgeois state is always bound to fail, and since there’s nothing but bourgeois states or states that function through this swapping around of surface appointments, there’s no reason to try. One could argue that there are notable differences between the material conditions of ’51 France and 1917 Russia, for example, that would make work within the former state a viable option. Or, perhaps, the argument relies on the never-before-established assumption that the stronger the state is, the more likely one is to fail in working within it. Now, this latter claim sounds interesting, but I couldn’t find anything in this section that amounted to an argument for it!

Like I said, frustrating!


3. The Presentation of the Question by Marx in 1852

Summary

The question to which Lenin is referring to here is the question of what is going to displace the bourgeois state once it has been destroyed. Marx’s answer, claims Lenin, is a dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus Marx says in a letter to a colleague in 1852 (the letter to which I referred earlier)

And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society, nor yet the struggle between them. Long before me, bourgeois historians had described the historical development of class struggle, and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production; 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society

Lenin quoting Marx; Emphasis Lenin’s

Thus, argues Lenin, the real insight from Marx is not the importance of class struggle, which Marx admits was not his doing, but with the idea that the end of that class struggle requires a dictatorship of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is perfectly content with accepting everything else in Marx except this last part, but it is precisely that which marks (pun intended) the real Marxist from those opportunists and reformists who do not understand his insight.

This is what Lenin’s arch nemesis Kautsky fails to see. Importantly, the exclusion of the dictatorship of the proletariat from limits all discussion within the acceptable bourgeois discourse and thus removes all revolutionary edge from Marxism.

Lenin ends this short section with two important claims: first, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a necessity–one cannot get to the true classless state of communism without this dictatorship; and, second, that this dictatorship remains a necessity until that classless state is reached.

Analysis

This section presents probably the most forceful argument Lenin has presented this far, but it all rests on what Marx meant by ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. From what I know, this letter is the only time he uses this phrase and it’s not at all clear what he means by this. The language, of course, invites the worst and harshest reading and Lenin’s comments seem to imply that he intends to take the worst of them. For him, a dictatorship is necessarily violent and forceful, so if Marx advocates for a dictatorship of the proletariat, then he must also be advocating for the use of violence of the proletariat.

But it’s not clear that this is the only way to read Marx. One might think, for example, that ‘dictatorship’ here signifies the role of the person or group of people who set the rules despite the wishes of others. This may very well involve violence, but it does not necessarily imply it. The way in which it is implied is in the sense that violence may be used in those cases in which one, for example, takes up arms or seeks to undermine the authority or rule of those in charge. This is, of course, the way in which, for example, most ordinary people think that the state is authorized to imprison or harm people who refuse to pay taxes, kill others, or take up arms against the government. In this sense, the current state is also dictatorial and Lenin is right to say that this is a kind of dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Now, clearly, there are cases in which this violence is proactive and patently unjust (e.g. the policing of black and brown bodies in the US), but this doesn’t mean that there isn’t a sense in which the use of violence is strictly reactive and used in self-defense. To repeat an earlier point, there’s a big difference between the active use of violence any and all enemies, and the right to defend oneself against those enemies should they choose to regain their previous position. The former still seems objectionable to me; the latter seems reasonable.

[Aside: the question of justice in this context is an interesting one that I can’t engage with fully here. I use the term in its colloquial sense. I understand that there’s an argument in the offing about how what counts as just or unjust is itself a product of the ruling class–a Thrasymachean argument–but I think such arguments are pretty weak. The very fact that we can recognize instances of injustice that go against the ruling power’s interests goes a long way, I think, to holding that the link isn’t as tight as such arguments make things out to be. In other words, I still think there’s an autonomy of ethics.]

This is all more the case if we consider that the end towards which the particular dictatorship is put forth is supposed to be genuine universal liberation. I am fine with a dictatorship that prevents the enslavement or rape of others and fully endorse the use of violence against the use of those who would take up arms or use violence in order to override such edicts. If the dictum is true liberation, then it’s downright stupid to oppose violence in defending it (see my note on Engels’ remarks against Duhring in the previous post for much the same argument). Now, of course, there is always the problem of whether this is the end in question (here, again, I still think de Beauvoir has the best take), but this is an orthogonal problem (though very important one).

So, even if we grant Lenin that the revolution requires a dictatorship of the proletariat, the conclusions that should be drawn from this are unclear until we settle the question of what precisely is meant by this term. In fact, even if we grant that a dictatorship necessarily implies the use of violence, the question still remains as to what is meant by violence and to what purpose that violence is put.

To be fair to Lenin, he himself doesn’t make explicit the sense in which he understands the relevant terms(is this fair?!). What makes me skeptical that he takes the more moderate/reactive position that I’ve been pushing for here is the fact that he constantly moves between speaking of the use of violence needed to overthrow the state and the kind of violence that is to be involved in the dictatorship of the proletariat without any qualification. The former, I take it, is clearly an active violence, aimed at overthrowing an oppressor–there’s little doubt about that. The latter, however, can have this reactive reading. If Lenin thought of the violence regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat in any other way than he thought of the violence needed to overthrow the state, then, presumably, he would have made that distinction. But he doesn’t, and the fact that the two kinds of violence seem the same for him, makes me uneasy.

Socialist Reading Series I: The State and Revolution [Part 1]

Why Lenin? Why now?

Lenin in 1919

This is the first entry into what I hope will be a reading series in classic socialist/communist/Marxist texts. I don’t get to read many such texts as part of my graduate school education, and, in general, there seems to be little interest in analytic philosophy departments in discussing them. This isn’t to say that there’s a hostility towards such texts. There isn’t, and in my experience most people’s attitudes towards Marx and socialist theory remain generally warm. But only in a second-hand kind of way–the way that you might have a general positive attitude towards someone that your good friend has vouched for, but whom you don’t know otherwise. I’ve met very few (any?) people in analytic philosophy under the age of 50 who have either read any of Marx’s primary texts as part of their education, or who see Marxism as a serious object of study (dare I say he gets the same treatment in analytic programs as Nietzsche?). So, my impression is that Marx is rarely read, tolerated, but generally considered passe by folks around my age. (This is not the case in other departments within the liberal arts and I’m certain it’s not the case in continental programs but I’m speaking from an analytic department view. I imagine, of course, that there are individual differences between different analytic philosophy departments and perhaps differences in sub-fields. I’d love to learn more about where it is taken more or less seriously.)

Given that Marx isn’t taken terribly seriously, it’s not at all surprising that other socialist writers are not talked about at all. To have an interest in reading Marx might be a tolerable quirk, but to have an interest in reading Lenin (or God forbid!) Mao, you’ve got to have some kind of radical ideological bend! As far as I’m aware nobody reads them in my neck of the woods. Yet, it is these writers, their actions, and their thinking that took Marx’s ideas and used them to shape much of the twentieth century. I can’t count the number of conversations I’ve had with other graduate students about how ineffectual and impotent doing philosophy can seem, and yet, here are writers and thinkers (dare I say philosophers? No…philosophy is done in journals and universities…) who took philosophy and used it to shape the majority of the twentieth century, but whose work we don’t even glance at! I’ve read Kripke’s Naming and Necessity four different times in my philosophical education but had to read Capital Vol. 1 alone during a Christmas break, and have never even touched Mao!

So, in light of all this, I’m trying to do a little self-education through writing. I won’t pretend that I don’t have any kind of ideological bend–I do. I’m highly sympathetic to Marxism, highly skeptical of Anarchism, and critical of anything to the right of that. I’m not going into this study as some kind of neutral objective observer (as if such things exists), so nobody should expect otherwise. I’ll be going into this study as a charitable and sympathetic reader. Nevertheless, I won’t be taking a dogmatic approach to the subject either. Given the fact that I’m a product of my education system, my knowledge of all this stuff is pretty amateurish–I’ve read some classics of socialism, but far from enough to be an expert or to have fixed and decided opinions on some of the more subtle issues. In short, I simply don’t know enough to be dogmatic! So, while I’ll be taking it as a given that, for example, most of what Marx says was fundamentally correct, I won’t be treating Capital as scripture. I’ll also limit my study to the particular piece of literature at hand–i.e. for this bit, I’ll only be reading The State and Revolution and not going to other sources or pulling from other texts. This is less a matter of methodology than of laziness; I just don’t have the time to do the kind of work that would be fitting for something more serious (hence this reading series’s banishment to the crumb dungeon).

Finally, a little note on why I’ve chosen this particular piece of Lenin’s. First, the piece is relatively short and straightforward, and from what I’ve read regarding Lenin’s works, it’s perhaps the one piece that isn’t explicitly directed at some particular factional dispute that he was involved in in like 1875. In other words, it’s one of the works that has had some staying power and that doesn’t require that we understand the inner workings of the struggle for power between emigre nerds in Switzerland in the last century (although, take that with a grain of salt, cause there’s still a bunch of that in here as well!). Second, it’s directed at answering a question that I’m particularly squeamish about (from a perspective that I don’t endorse): the importance of violence in facilitating social change. Frankly, I’m not a fan of the claim that such violence is always necessary and I think one of the things that bothers me is how quickly and easily endorsing that idea can get out of hand. And not only for moral reasons (which rightly might be dismissed as bourgeois anyway), but for practical ones as well. The violence is rarely used against the people whom it is initially justified and bald-faced terror does little to win converts [Aside: One of the things that really pisses me off about the current climate on the left currently is the fetishization of the guillotine as a symbol of popular violence as though the people whose heads were cut off were all aristocrats. The vast majority of them were regular, inconsequential people!] So, this piece is also chosen because of intellectual curiosity: could Lenin’s argument be right, and if not, given that I’m sympathetic to the general socialist project, on what grounds can I criticize it?

With all that behind us, let’s turn to the chapter one. For each section I’ll offer a brief summary followed by an analysis.

[Note: the edition I’m using is 1965 reprinting from the Selected Works of V. I. Lenin, Engl. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952, Vol. II, Part I. Fun note: the actual copy is a badass little first edition printing from the People’s Republic of China]


Chapter I: Class Society and The State

  1. The State as the Product of the Irreconcilability of Class Antagonisms

Summary

Lenin’s goal is established in this first chapter: he wants to set the record straight about the proper interpretation of Marx with regards to the question of…well, the state and revolution. According to Lenin, Marx and Engels have been misinterpreted by different bourgeois philosophers and economists (and Lenin’s political enemies) who have attempted to strip their writings of their true revolutionary and radical commitments. Rather than embracing the true radicalism of Marxism as Lenin has, these thinkers push their adherents to a moderate, incrementalist, complacent position. These are bad interpretations and Lenin is going to show that Marxism is inherently revolutionary from the ground up.

He begins with Engels and his version of the emergence of the state. According to Engels, the state arises at a particular time in history in which the contradictions of some initial communal society are unable to be resolved internally. These contradictions are, naturally, the product of the economic class interests of that society, and are, crucially, antagonistic and irreconcilable. They will continue to exist until some conflict either removes one of the contradictory terms or some other intervention takes place that reduces or contains the antagonism. The creation of the state is such an intervention. Rather than engaging in mutual destruction and a dissolution of society, the state is implemented as something above society and alienated from it whose purpose is to moderate the antagonistic class conflict and keep order.

What this shows, says Lenin, is that the state doesn’t resolve or reconcile the social contradictions inherent in that society (at best, it is brought in to keep the worst excesses from occurring). Rather, the state serves to contain or perpetuate class conflict, not resolve it.

Not only does the state not resolve class conflict, but, claims Lenin, by definition, Engels is committed to the claim that it can’t resolve that conflict since it arises precisely at that point in which conflict becomes irreconcilable. It is not a means of reconciliation, but marks the point at which reconciliation becomes impossible.

The implication is, of course, that at least by the time he wrote Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State in 1884, Engels was already opposed to moderate approaches that attempt to use the state as a tool of liberation.

Furthermore, Lenin claims, Marx also held the same position since he held that the state necessarily serves as a tool of class rule that legitimizes oppression through moderation. If this is the case, then the state simply cannot be used as a means of liberation since its very existence entails oppression.

The upshot of both these claims is twofold: first, any proposal and political movement that sees the state as a means reconciliation and liberation is not an accurate reading of Marx and Engels. And second (and more importantly) liberation is achieved only through the violent destruction of the state. I quote:

If the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a power standing above society and “increasingly alienating itself from it,” then it is obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this “alienation.”

The State and Revolution Ch. 1 Part 1 pg. 9; italics in original

Analysis

It’s clear that the major part of Lenin’s conclusion relies not on the fact that class conflict is irreconcilable, but that the state is supposed to be the tool for one class to oppress the other. Thus, it relies less on the claim about Engels and more on the one about Marx. If, for example, the state were some impartial referee that merely contained conflict without taking sides, then it would not follow that the only way out of the irreconcilable conflict would be through violent revolution and the destruction of the state. Just as in boxing the existence of a referee who contains the conflict within certain boundaries (no biting!) does not imply that the way to end the fight is to destroy the referee, so the existence of an entity separate and alienated from the class conflict which produces it does not imply that the way to end the conflict would be to destroy the state. You might just have to take out the opponent.

However, there is a sense in which my argument only works if we assume some kind of equal starting point, and, furthermore, some further assumption about the agreement regarding the conditions under which we’ll be constrained. Suppose that you and I are set to box, but you’ve spent the last 90 days malnourished while I’ve been hitting the gym every day with my trainer and eating well. The introduction of a ‘moderate’ judge who rewards points on abilities that require good health and training only serves to the benefit the person who already has the initial advantage. In that case, the only path towards your liberation might be to first remove the referee who imposes certain unfair rules against you! Likewise, even if we start from an equal starting point and with an impartial referee, only to quickly switch to an arrangement in which that referee is replaced with my mom (who, as you should know, always rules in my favor and is willing to do horrible things to protect me), then it makes sense to take her out.

So, what matters is why the state, separate and alienated from society, always serves as a tool of oppression in favor of the ruling class.

Unfortunately, Lenin doesn’t offer any citations for the claim that Marx thought the state must necessarily be a tool for the oppression of one class and maintenance of class conflict. This isn’t to say that Marx doesn’t say this, but only that this most vital argument is missing here and that I’ll have to look for it in the literature. I’ll eventually get to it. For now, we can flag this as a fundamental assumption in Lenin’s argument and assume it conditionally. In any case, he says more about this in the rest of the chapter so stay tuned.

Interestingly, one may have thought that who the initial state comes to favor is also an important one. However, it appears that at least from what I’ve gleaned here, this isn’t the case. It’s easy to see why this is the case if we grant Lenin that the state will always favor one side over the other and will necessarily serve to preserve the conflict between classes. If that’s so, then as long as the state exists, regardless of who wields it, it will maintain the irreconcilable conflict which produced it. We can imagine that this power has been traded many times before between the antagonist classes, sometimes in favor of one class sometimes in favor of the other. But because these classes have vested their powers in the state rather than taking measures to abolishing it, the antagonism and conflict has been and continues to be maintained. Thus, if true liberation really does rest in ending class conflict, then true liberation requires the abolition of the state. This also gives us a better sense of what is meant by true liberation: namely, true liberation involves the resolution of class conflict (which seems to be in line with what Marx thought as well).

If what’s been said is right, then it’s also apparent that the abolition of the state is necessary, but not sufficient for the resolution of the conflict! If we accept the story that Engels and Lenin have given us, then the destruction of the state would, presumably, only bring us back to the initial position of irreconcilable class conflict–but now with no holds barred. But this still isn’t reconciliation of the contradictions that made the state a necessity since these contradictions would still be in place. What would be required at this point is the further removal of one of the contradictory terms. And it’s not clear what this entails, but, I assume, it’s not something pretty if avoiding it required the creation of the state in the first place. This is another place to put a finger on.

Finally, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the fact that the claim that oppression is perpetuated through appeals to moderation is one that many of us would sympathize with today. One doesn’t have to be a Marxist or follow any of Lenin’s argument thus far to notice that an appeal to moderation is not always a way of ensuring anything like fairness and that it can very often be used as a means of oppressing. If you try to kill me and I fight back, to appeal to the ‘moderate’ solution that you should moderate your approach by trying to merely enslave me and I should moderate my response by trying to talk you out of it is clearly one that favors you and not me. And this, indeed, is what many socialists are attempting to point out to moderates: the situation we’re in right now is one in which the rules of moderation only serve to preserve the power of existing structures.


2. Special Bodies of Armed Men, Prisons, etc.

Summary

Returning to Engels, Lenin describes the effects of the state on the initial society which brings it to life. First, it divides people on the basis of territory, and second, it creates an independent armed organization through which it can exert its power and keep order. This organization is not only limited to armed individuals, but also includes separate institutions and material elements that are necessary for it to operate (e.g. prisons and such). This arrangement constitutes the state’s power over the society which birthed it.

Engels’ intention in making this point, claims Lenin, is a revolutionary one: it’s supposed to make the more revolution conscious workers realize that the very existence of a separate armed body in place to keep order is a contingent arrangement that’s in place precisely because the state needs it to serve its function as a regulatory body that suppresses and moderates class conflict.

The question that arises once this is realized is that of whether there can be an alternative to this arrangement involving a special armed body that operates apart from society and polices it. To this question “the West-European and Russian philistines” say ‘no’, citing the complexities of modern society, the division of labor, and so on. However, claims Lenin, this is not why the alternative is impossible–one could imagine a highly complex society that only differs “from the primitive organization of a stick-wielding herd of monkeys, or of primitive man, or of men united in clans, by its complexity, its high technique, and so forth.” (both quotes from pg. 11) Rather, what makes an alternative impossible is the fact that in modern societies (more generally, any society after the creation of a state) there already exists the deep and irreconcilable rift between classes.

Crucially, if there weren’t such a separate entity which alone were entitled to use force, but if each individual were armed and capable of doing so, then there would be immediate armed conflict.

The argument here goes pretty quickly but it’s a fairly interesting one. When we ask “why do we need the state? Why do we need the police?” The most common answer is, of course, that without this there would be chaos. This is precisely right and Lenin agrees–if the power of the state disappeared and population armed, you can guarantee that the landowners’ estates would be pillaged and the aristocracy butchered (as Lenin knew from the history of mass peasant revolts in Russia). However, what Lenin asks is why this should be the case. Why should a general arming of the population in the absence of state power result in violence? The answer is apparent: it’s because there are irreconcilable class conflicts simmering below the surface that are constrained only by the existence of the state.

Importantly, because the function of the state is to constrain class conflict, the more acute that conflict becomes, the more power the state will need in order to suppress it. Thus, as empires grow, encompassing more and more people who are ruled by a smaller and smaller minority, the needs of empire will proportionally demand a more and more powerful state–more guns, more ships, more surveillance, etc. with which to contain the conflict.

This is further exasperated by competing states which seek to conquer more and more territory. In other words, the power needed to constrain Germany and France and the class conflicts therein is much greater than the power that either state needs to constrain their respective class conflicts. Thus, conquest of other territories requires a proportionate increase in state power.

Here, Lenin sneaks in an extra argument and jab at his opponents: support for military intervention is defacto support for the continuing oppression and perpetuation of class conflict. Likewise, given that he’s writing this in 1918 before Russia has pulled out of WWI, support for continuing the war, even in defense of ‘the fatherland’, amounts to strengthening the state against the interests of the working class.

Analysis

Engels/Lenin’s understanding of the state as an organization vested with power made manifest in armed men and the institutions that support them seems fundamentally correct. However, one could push on two places. The first has to do with whether the role of the state is indeed to suppress or contain class conflict. In other words, one might grant that perhaps one of the functions of the state is to keep such control in check, but that this is not the fundamental reason for the existence of the state; here, Lenin’s philistine enemies who stress the growing complexity of society might have something to say.

In response, one might make a kind of argument in Lenin’s defense similar to the one Nietzsche makes in On the Genealogy of Morals. Namely, one could argue that people who appeal to the current utility of a practice or institution to infer the original purpose for which that practice or institution arose are making a mistake. Thus, one could argue that although the state now serves to manage complex society with differentiate functions does not mean that it arose because of that need. Pace Nietzsche, just as the current supposed utility of punishment for deterrence (or whatever) doesn’t establish that the initial purpose of punishment was to deter, so the current utility of the state in whatever respect one might point to doesn’t establish its initial purpose.

But this wouldn’t be enough just yet. One would also need to first give an argument for why the original purpose of the state really is what Engels and Lenin say it is–namely, the containment and moderation of irreconcilable class conflict (presumably for that we’ll need to go to Engels himself and see what he says)–and, second, one would also need to demonstrate that the initial purpose for establishing the state is still, in some sense, relevant and present. Clearly, if the genealogical explanation Engels gives is wrong, or if it were right but it could decisively be shown that class conflict had been resolved, then Lenin’s conclusion wouldn’t go through. The latter option seems highly implausible since class conflict seems very much with us. The former, however, might cause some trouble.

Here, again, we would need to depart from the text and do a in-depth study of Engels’ (and probably Marx’s) writings to assess those genealogical arguments. I won’t do that here, but this might make good reading for a further installment in this series. In lieu, I’ll stick another flag here as I did in the first section.

The second related place one might push Lenin back is with respect to the argument that the armed violence that results with the collapse of the state is the result of a return to a kind of naked class antagonism. This also seems to imply that these kinds of violent events occur only under the conditions of class conflict which, in turn, sounds a bit utopian. Won’t there still be instances in which people fight and rob and steal from one another within a classless society? If not, then it seems that one is laying the explanation of every conflict, every jealousy, every disagreement that ends with blood at the feet of class conflict. This seems not only terribly simplistic and naive and at odds with certain basic assumptions about psychology, but also appears to idolize the working class to the extreme; is the working class so psychologically situated that workers never fight?

I think there’s something to this argument, and there are hints elsewhere in Lenin’s writings that seem to point to the kind of absolute faith he had in the post-revolutionary society to just be able to do things right. So, I don’t want to dismiss it out of hand. Nevertheless, the argument is at least partially an uncharitable one since, strictly speaking, nothing is said about the elimination of all violence or conflict. One might grant that conflicts will still exist between individuals or small groups, but insist that these conflicts will not be irreconcilable nor will they be based on some deep contradiction. How they’ll be settled remains a mystery (surely, a better story will be needed than: “they’ll be reconciled because one person will kill the other”!) but there’s space for this kind of position.

Furthermore, one can also claim that the there will be much less violence in the absence of class conflict because the world that we’re considering is precisely the one in which the means of production have been harnessed to provide for the needs of everyone. In such a world, the very motivation for the kind of mass violence associated with peasant riots–poverty, collective revenge for social wrongs, lack of food or luxury that belong to the landowner, etc.–will be entirely undercut. If each of us has what we need and none of us is oppressing the other, then what reason would we have to collectively engage in mass violence, robbery, pillaging, etc.? Does this mean that jealous men won’t kill each other over petty shit? Of course not! But note that jealous men kill each other over petty shit even with the presence of the state! Nothing is made worse. Individuals will still continue to have the same kind of psychologies, but nobody will have motivation to commit the kind of collective violence that now occurs in the vacuum of a collapsed state.

[On the flip side, I think the argument can be made that there will be new motivation for collective action against individuals who, because of idiosyncratic or pathological differences nevertheless wanted to steal or murder or or pillage for its own sake. Specifically, in a mirror to the current state of affairs we would be on guard against anyone who is able to use violence to disrupt the general state of equality we’ve set up since they would pose a threat to the system that fulfills our needs. This needs to be much more fleshed out, but I think there’s an argument there.]

However, one problem with this response to the somewhat uncharitable argument I presented earlier is that it leaves room for a different line of attack. Namely, if all conflict is not necessarily class conflict and if this conflict can be explained in simpler psychological terms, then perhaps the explanation for why violence occurs in the vacuum of weakened state power can also be explained in such terms. That is, one might argue that mass peasant violence occurs not because of class conflict but because people are naturally greedy and they are always interested in accumulating more and more stuff. Mix that in with a theory of group mentality and how it operates and you have an explanation that doesn’t have anything to do with classes. And if that’s right, then the state doesn’t come in as something contingent that is brought in simply to contain and avoid class antagonisms, but as something necessary to curb natural inclinations.

Here, again, the genealogical argument that I don’t provide once again proves vital!


3. The State as an Instrument for the Exploitation of the Oppressed Class

Summary

Maintaining the state requires maintaining certain means which are necessary for its support. These are obtained through the levying of taxes and through the appointment of officials who are qualified to collect these taxes. Naturally, such people come to take a privileged position in society as the state grows in power. In pointing this out, claims Lenin, Engels is once again drawing our attention to the purpose of this stratification: “The main question indicated is: what is it that places [the officials] above society?” (pg. 14) This answer to this question is, as could be predicted, the growth of economic influence.

To see why this is the case, Lenin walks us through more of Engels’ story of the emergence of the state. Initially, as we have learned, the state emerges because of class conflict. However, because it also emerges within that conflict, it by default becomes the-state-of-the-class-which-wields-the-most-economic-influence. Thus, the state “as a rule” (Engels’ words!) automatically comes to support and justify the economic interests of the dominant class: the feudal state supports and justifies the maintenance of slaves and serfs (i.e. the feudal mode of production), and the modern state supports and justifies the maintenance of wage labor (i.e. the capitalist mode of production).

The argument here is a bit obscure (why is it that “[the state] is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class”?), but, given the context in which Lenin presents the quote, I think the argument is meant to be as follows. The state, in its inception, is ex hypothesis created as a tool and does not have an autonomous life–it does not (as yet?) have any “state interests” which it pursues independently. Consequently, it must be yielded by one group or another. However, it is nevertheless populated by people who make it run. And if the question is between whether the more dominant or the less dominant group will have influence over these people, and hence, over the state, the answer seems to be obviously in favor of the former rather than the latter. Why? Simply put, because the economically dominant class buys the state and co-opts it for its purposes. Hence, Lenin’s quote of Engels that:

“Wealth exercises its power indirectly, but all the more surely,” first, by means of the “direct corruption of officials” (America); second, by means of “an alliance between the government and Stock Exchange” (France and America)

The State and Revolution Chapter 1, Section 3, pg. 15

This reading is reinforced by Lenin’s subsequent remarks railing against his political opponents, arguing that the coalition government established after the February Revolution was immediately bought out by capital and immediately went to work serving capital.

Contained in this tirade is also a more general critique of democracy and democratic republics. It is under these forms of government, specifically, that capital can exert its influence most easily and form what Lenin calls a “political shell for capitalism…[in which] no change either of persons, of institutions, or of parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic, can shake it.” (pg. 15-16) Here, again, Lenin’s justification is obscure (or missing!), but it’s clear that the implication is that just like the shell of a clam obscures the ligament inside from view, so the political shell of democracy is supposed to obscure capital’s influence.

This, he thinks, is why Engels also believes that universal suffrage is nothing but a tool for bourgeois rule. If all that voting in democratic republics does is swap the players out within a static, hijacked system that always serves the dominant economic class, then enfranchising more people simply won’t make a difference in their liberation. They will simply elect individuals who will immediately be co-opted by the existing machinery of the state.

It seems to me that this is a crucial argument (and one to which I will return shortly), but Lenin’s stated intentions here are (apparently) just to clarify that Marx and Engels’ views are not amicable to any attempts to work within the state.

Analysis

This section promised to supply the missing piece that we were looking for in the analysis of section one: viz. why the state is always necessarily a tool for the oppression of one class by the economically dominant one. However, I’m not sure what to make of the argument that’s presented. If my summary is correct, then the argument is, again, that the state serves this purpose because it is essentially bought out by the economically dominant class either directly on indirectly. Now, I think some basic knowledge of the workings of American government makes this argument seem plausible–the military-industrial complex (or the military-industrial-information complex) gives us a really good model for how this actually works in practice. So, I don’t want to deny that this does, in fact, happen. Nor do I want to deny the fact that the state does (and seems to always have) operate to secure the necessary conditions for a particular period’s mode of production (c.f. Elizabeth Anderson’s recent book on private government for evidence of that).

However, what this shows is that the state can easily come to be under the influence of one or another group, and not that it must necessarily always be a tool of oppression by one class against the other. What Lenin needs is the latter claim and not the former. So, I still remain puzzled about why he thinks he’s shown the latter. In fact, the part of what he quotes from Engels seems to suggest that Engels himself doesn’t think that this is a necessity claim. I quote:

By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires a certain degree of independence of both. Such were the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Bonapartism of the First and Second Empires in France, and the Bismarck regime in Germany.

Lenin quoting Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State

If this is true, then it’s not true that the state necessarily has to be a tool of oppression since it can, even if only as an exception, acquire an independent status of those who would wield it in that way. Accepting this is not tantamount to denying that, nevertheless, the state does not usually or normally come to play such an oppressive role, nor that it’s currently playing such a role. Rather it only leaves open room for the possibility that it might not under certain conditions.

Now, in saying this, I don’t mean to suggest that a ruling state independent of any class interest is a good thing–in fact, such independence might be the worst of all possible worlds. I’m don’t know too much about the First and Second Empires and nothing at all about Bismarck’s Germany, so I can’t speak to that, but one can easily see how a powerful state with its own interests could easily become a totalitarian state.

Nevertheless, the there is a theoretical opening in the argument here that allows us to at least make sense of what might be appealing to a more moderate position. If the state can be made into a genuinely neutral arbiter under certain conditions, or if it can be wielded by the oppressed under others, then it might be best not to destroy it, but to use it for precisely those purposes by attaining those conditions.

However, this is still only a theoretical possibility and does not provide any answer to the difficult question: namely, what should we do if the state is currently in the hands of an oppressive class and being used for the oppression of another? This is, arguably, the situation in which we find ourselves (although, ironically, not the situation that Lenin himself sees in the Kerensky government).

The moderate answer to this question would be, presumably, to bring about the conditions that would allow the state to either attain some significant independence from class interests, or those that would allow it to be wielded by the oppressed. What these conditions might be remains unclear, although the general answer given in the twentieth century was to advocate for institutional development and reform. I admit, my sympathies still lie with in this direction. However, it bears stressing just how vulnerable such institutions are and how interested capital is in infiltrating them and destroying them for its own purposes. One doesn’t need to look beyond the Trump presidency’s blatant cronyism as evidence of this (however, feel free to go back to Citizens United, the rise of Super PACs, the War on Terror, trickle-down-economics, union busting, and pretty much every conservative administration in the last 100 years if you feel like it).

Here, Lenin’s argument still has some life: as long as class antagonisms exist the state will be vulnerable (far more vulnerable!) to the influence of those who control the means of production and will come to be used as a tool for the oppression of those who do not. Thus, as we have seen, any temporary advantages that might be gained through slow, incremental, decades-long building up of institutional reforms intended to remove that vulnerability can always we wiped out and the oppressive status resumed. If that’s correct, then we have two options: the creation of an invulnerable and incorruptible state, or the permanent removal of the underlying class antagonism (i.e. the socialist revolution). If I’m being honest, I have no idea what would be required to do the former, but it seems wildly implausible. And whether the latter is only viable if Marx and Engels are right about the underlying role that class antagonism is supposed to play.

It’s worth noting at this point that even if one advocates for the permanent removal of the underlying class antagonism, nothing has been shown that this must be done violently. We can grant Lenin everything that has been said so far, reject working within the state, and still not endorse violent means.

Nevertheless, there is something like an argument forming in the background from which we might be able to tease out Lenin’s fundamental assumptions. Specifically, Lenin appears to be thinking something along the following lines: before the arrival of the state, society was “a self-acting armed organization of the population”; it arrives on the scene because this way of doing things becomes impossible precisely because it risks mass violence and the collapse of the society. In order to avoid this possibility, the state disarms the population and obtains a monopoly on violence in the name of a shared interest for society as a whole. However, given the context in which it arises, it is immediately corrupted by the economically dominant class and it becomes the defacto militarized arm of that economically dominant class, leaving the economically subservient class in an oppressed position. What this amounts to, then, is not any fundamental change in the conflict between the two classes, but a kind of forced disarmament of and continued violence against the weaker class; i.e. an imposed handicap. In that sense, the arrival of the state only serves to exacerbate the very thing it was meant to address–the irreconcilable class conflict. If this is the case, then it appears that what needs to happen is, at the very least, for the weaker class to be rearmed so that it can fight back against its oppressor’s aggression. Crucially, such fighting back means using violence against the state.

I’ll only make one final point about this story since I’m not sure that this is what Lenin’s argument actually is and I’m only trying to fill in the gaps thus far. First, it’s interesting to note that there’s a kind of cyclical, almost biblical element to the kind of story told here: we start an initial, primitive self-acting armed society with limited means of production, which is divided by an advance in the means of production resulting in class antagonisms. These class antagonisms are kept at bay by a state which grants one side the right to use violence and which oppresses one for the benefit of the other. Under this arrangement, however, great strides in production are made as society advances to different modes of production, ending in the capitalist mode which is able to produce so much that all of the needs of society are satisfied. Given the characteristics of the capitalist mode of production, however, the advances in production also come with an increase in class consciousness which allows the oppressed class to realize its predicament, arm itself, seize the means of production for itself, and banish the oppressing class. With this final revolutionary act, the initial rift is finally closed, and society returns, once again, to a self-acting armed organization of people, now fully satisfied and needing nothing.

This is, of course, interesting for the easily identifiable religious elements present: a simple start, a fall from grace, trials and tribulations, redemption through knowledge of the truth, final confrontation against the Other, and a return to the Father. However, these elements can also be found in Marxism in general. What’s specifically interesting, and what I suspect is uniquely brought in by Lenin, is that the use of violence drive everything! It is through the loss of the ability to inflict violence that the oppressed class becomes oppressed, and it is through regaining that ability that it is able to restore the original balance. The question, however, is still whether this is the right story to tell (both with respect to Lenin and with respect to Marxism).


4. The “Withering Away” of the State and Violent Revolution

Summary

Lenin begins this section with a quote from Engels about the fate the state after the socialist revolution. Briefly put, once the proletariat seize the state they will use it to seize the means of production which will at the same time end class antagonisms and end the role of the state qua state. The idea is straightforward: the state’s purpose is precisely to keep class antagonisms at bay. In turn, these class antagonisms are produced on the basis of a distinction between those who own the means of production and those who do not. So, by socializing the means of production, the proletariat removes the distinction, hence, removing class antagonisms, hence, removing the need for the state. Crucially, however, this doesn’t happen overnight, and the socialization of the means of production are a self-undermining act of the state which makes it superfluous. In Engels’ famous words:

The state is not ‘abolished,’ it withers away.

Engels Anti-Durhing p.303 third German Edition (italic in original)

Lenin claims that people read the claim that the state withers away rather than being abolished as evidence that Engels was in favor of a slow and gradual change rather than a revolution. This, however, “is the crudest distortion of Marxism, advantageous only to the bourgeoisie.” (pg. 19)

The proper interpretation is as follows. First, in Engels’ claim that by seizing state power the proletariat abolishes the state as state, the use of the first term ‘state’ should be given a narrow reading and the second should be given a wide reading. That is, the seizure of power abolishes the bourgeois state as state simpliciter. Crucially, there’s no withering away of this state–rather, it is, as Lenin points out, abolished. In other words, the seizing of state power amounts to a revolution. What withers away is the husk of that state which is now in the hands of the proletariat.

Second, given that the state is a “special repressive force”, what follows is that one kind of repressive force is abolished (that of the bourgeoisie) and another (that of the proletariat) is put in its place–at least until it withers away.

Third, the withering away of the proletariat state occurs only after the state has done its job–i.e. only after the means of production have been socialized. This means that the state can’t wither away incrementally before it does its job–thus, presumably, attempts to enter the state and weaken in from within are fundamentally counterproductive. Interestingly, Lenin also claims that the withering away of the proletariat state will also mean the withering away of democracy. Here, I quote in full:

We all know that the political form of the “state” [after the socialist revolution] is the most complete democracy. But it never enters the head of any of the opportunists who shamelessly distort Marxism that Engels is consequently speaking here of democracy “ceasing of itself,” or “withering away.” This seems very strange at first sight; but it is “incomprehensible” only to those who have not pondered over the fact that democracy is also a state and that, consequently, democracy will also disappear when the state disappears. Revolution alone can “abolish” the bourgeois state. The state in general, i.e., the most complete democracy, can only “wither away.”

The State and Revolution, Ch. 1, Section 4, pg 21

In other words, claims Lenin, Engels is saying something much stronger than what people take him to mean. If the proletarian state just is the means by which the proletariat organizes itself after the revolution, if those means are absolute democracy, and if that state is meant to wither away, then, clearly, it is democracy that withers away and not Congress or Parliament.

Fourth, contrary to popular opinion, Engels’ claims are directed not only to anarchists (whom he addresses explicitly in Lenin’s quote), but also to any opportunists (mention of whom is missing from the quoted passage). Thus, the goal of the revolutionary should not be to fight for a democratic republic since a democratic republic is merely “the best form of the state for the proletariat under capitalism.” (pg. 22; italics mine) Rather, they should be aiming far beyond that and at the direct abolition of the state via revolution.

Fifth, this revolution must be a violent one. Here, Lenin brings in a separate passage from Anti Duhring. I’ll reproduce the paragraph in full here since this is a crucial passage that I’ll return to later.

…That force, however, plays another role [other than that of diabolical power] in history, a revolutionary role; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new, that it is the instrument by the aid of which the social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms–of this there is not a word in Herr Duhring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of the economic system of exploitation–unfortunately, because all use of force, forsooth, demoralizes the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has resulted from every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision–which indeed may be forced on the people–would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness as a result of the humiliation of the Thirty Years’ War. And this parson’s mode of thought–lifeless, insipid and impotent–claims to impose itself on the most revolutionary party which history has known!

Engels, Anti-Duhring pg. 193, third German edition, Part II, Chapter IV (Lenin’s citation)

To Lenin, this is nothing short of a panegyric in favor of violence and is only ignored for opportunist purposes. Furthermore, this panegyric is repeated in Marx’s The Poverty of Philosophy, The Communist Manifesto, and his criticisms of the Gotha Program. More dramatically:

The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with this and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of all the teaching of Marx and Engels.

Lenin The State and Revolution Ch. 1, Section 4, pg. 25

The chapter then closes with a promise that this claim will be further elaborated by looking at Marx and Engels’ separate treatment of the failed revolutions of 1848 and 1871.

Analysis

As with section three, this section promised to provide us with a missing puzzle piece. And as with section three–though perhaps even more so–I find the core argument about the role of violence presented here rather…bad. Let me begin with that before I loop around to discuss the beginning commentary on Engels.

What Lenin wants to show is that Engels was really in favor of a violent revolution and the evidence for that is the passage I quote above in full. However, despite his protestations that only opportunists see Engels’ panegyric as anything other than a full-throated call for violence, I just find that a bit hard to believe (maybe that makes me an opportunist).

Specifically, it seems to me that the purpose of this quoted passage is primarily as a polemic against Duhring and his advocacy of inaction. Now, it does appear that Duhring is, from what I can pick up from the passage, grounding his opposition to acting on the fact that to act would require using force. But to raise an objection to that claim is not to praise violence! In fact, Engels could be interpreted here as saying “yes, I know the use of violence is demoralizing, but in certain cases it is necessary–if only to make people take more seriously the threat that they’re facing.” Note, for example, that he says the use of force may be thrust upon the people and that this might be good because it might have a motivating effect. What Engels seems to be arguing against is the more general claim of the coward who might say “look, violence is always bad, and if standing up for something means that violence might be used against me or that I might have to use violence against someone else, then it’s better not to do anything.” What Engels appears to be doing is arguing that the use of force is not a categorical reason against doing something and that, in fact, in the particular case of Germany at Duhring’s time, the badness of using force is outweighed by what he stands to gain. It’s clear, however, that to say that the use of force is not a categorical reason for acting does not by any means imply that the use of force is always necessary. What follows is not, as Lenin insists, that the revolution must be violent and that the proletariat must be imbued with a violent class consciousness. If anything, what follows is that the proletariat must be willing to use violence if it comes to that.

These are two different claims. It’s one thing to say that it may be worth it to use violence to, say, save your child from danger, and it’s another thing to say that the use of violence is always necessary to save your child from danger. The former claim is a reasonable one even for people who abhor violence; the latter is the claim of a maniac. Mutatis mutandis, it’s one thing to say that the revolution may require the use of violence, and another to say that there must be a violent revolution. Lenin needs the latter, but I haven’t seen an argument for that yet, and I certainly don’t see it as contained in this passage from Engels.

That being said, it’s easy to see how even the weaker claim that I’ve argued for can be made much stronger very quickly. If by definition the state is a tool of oppression whose purpose is to exercise force and violence against the proletariat, then it seems almost certain that it will retaliate to any demand for a peaceful revolution with exercise of that force. And given that certainty of that force, if the only options are “find ways to resist and combat that force in turn” or “submit rather than risk it”, then the former becomes appealing. In that kind of situation, one may as well go in fully prepared to use violence.

Likewise, it’s easy to see how even the weaker claim could be subject to abuse. If we take a loose definition of the use of force without any constraint about the proportionality of its use, or, if alternatively, the value of what is to be gained by the revolution is to be inflated without limit, then anything goes.

But it’s also true that the weaker claim is not an absurd one, and that, in fact, I have a much harder time accepting it’s negation. Is it really never acceptable to use violence against the state? (Against anyone?) Was the French Resistance not justified? Was the Warsaw Uprising not justified? Was John Brown not justified? If they were, then there are some conditions under which the use of violence, however demoralizing, can be justified. Once that’s established, what we need is a method of finding out which cases are ones in which we can use violence and which ones are not. This is beyond the scope of this reading series (though my favorite on this subject is De Beuvoir), but it’s enough here to argue that there’s a middle path between a violent revolution is necessary and violence in a revolution is prohibited.

With regards to Lenin’s other arguments about Engels’ claims, I actually think he’s right–I can’t see another way of reading the claim that the state qua state is abolished yet nevertheless also withers than by giving wide and narrow readings of the term ‘state’ here. And, indeed, it makes sense that the state in the hands of one should be abolished and in the hands of the other it should disappear.

What I’m more skeptical of are two further claims. The first is Lenin’s claim that the withering away of the proletariat state means a withering away of absolute democracy. This simply sounds like utopianism to me. I can grant the claim that there will be no need for a separate body to exist outside of society to moderate class conflict. However, it does not mean that there will be no need for society to coordinate and organize itself according to some means. And here, I think Lenin conflates the state-as-a-means-of-stopping-class-conflict and (what might be called) the state-as-a-means-of-coordinating-society. There’s no need for the latter to be outside of society, and, in fact, the fact that it’s absolute makes it a direct expression of that society, and it can still provide the coordinating function (even if we don’t call it a state). Thus, I think it’s best to read Engels as saying that withers away on this view is the state as a tool of oppression, but absolute democracy still remains as a means of coordination.

Now, I think the charitable way to read Lenin here is as leaving open the option for some new not-yet-known way of organizing society. This, after all, was Marx and Engels’ preferred stance on what happens after full communism. But I think Lenin just got ahead of himself here.

Finally, it’s worth noting that we can see the shadows of totalitarianism in Lenin’s previous claim about the withering away of democracy and his claim that the proletarian state nevertheless doesn’t wither away until it has completed its job. If the role of the proletarian state before it withers away is to a) ensure the seizure of the means of production and b) to oppress the former oppressors (who, while still controlling the means of production will always try to get control of the state), then as long as there are enemies of the revolution internally or externally, the state and its increasing power can be justified. I don’t mean to run quickly over this last element, but I’ve gone on for long enough. I promise I’ll return at a later point.


Wowee! That was only Chapter 1! And it took forever! Chapter 2 coming soon.